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Abstract 
How should the criminal justice system respond to women who conceal their 
pregnancies, resulting in the death of the foetus or baby?  It is widely expected 
that a pregnant woman will act in the best interests of her unborn child, including 
submitting herself to medical examination.  However, these expectations are not 
always met and this causes particular problems for vulnerable women who 
experience crisis pregnancies.  In such situations women have hidden their 
pregnancies, given birth in secret, and are suspected of causing the death of the 
baby.  Alternatively, their actions while pregnant, and during labour and delivery 
are deemed to have culminated in the stillbirth of the child.  While there are no 
accurate statistics, every year approximately 7 babies/foetuses are known to die 
in such circumstances during the perinatal period. 
 
Through a detailed examination of transcripts from sentencing hearings of 
criminal cases heard 2010-2014, I explore how and why women involved in such 
cases have come to be dealt with through English criminal law.  There appears 
to be a strong desire to criminalise women who are perceived to fail to put the 
foetus first.  Criminal justice professionals use out-dated offences to capture 
these perceived criminal wrongs.  I conclude that if the state wishes to punish 
women for harm caused to the foetus, then the enactment of foetal protection 
laws would be appropriate.  However, as critical assessment of such law in the 
United States of America illustrates, such laws could have dramatic 
consequences on the rights of women. 
 
The cases analysed in this thesis provide a fascinating lens through which to 
examine a range of broader issues including, the expectation that women should 
put the needs of the foetus before their own, and the assumption that 
motherhood starts at conception and is natural and inherent. 
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Definitions 
Abortion The purposeful termination of a foetus in the womb and 
expulsion of that foetus from the woman’s body 
Child Member of the human species who has a separate 
existence from its mother 
Concealment of 
birth, shortened to 
‘concealment’ 
The criminal offences as defined by s60 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861 
Filicide The killing of a child by its parents, including a step-
parent 
Foetus Member of the human species developing in the womb at 
any gestational age from the point of fertilisation until 
separate existence from the mother has occurred 
Infant Child aged under one year 
Infanticide The criminal offence as defined by the Infanticide Act 
1922 or Infanticide Act 1938 
Miscarriage The spontaneous expulsion of a foetus from the uterus 
prior to a specific point defined in medicine and law.  In 
the United Kingdom this is up-to 24 weeks gestation. 
Distinct from ‘procuring a miscarriage’ which is a criminal 
offence in England under s58 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 
Neonaticide The purposeful killing of a child within the first 24 hours of 
live-birth 
Perinatal Period surrounding birth – defined in this thesis as 
commencing at 23 completed weeks of gestation and 
ending twenty-four completed hours after live-birth 
Quickening The point at which a woman first feels the foetus move 
inside, typically 15-17 weeks’ gestation 
Stillbirth The spontaneous expulsion of a foetus from the uterus 
after a specific point defined in medicine and law.  In the 
United Kingdom this is after 24 weeks gestation 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
But lest there be any misinterpretation about her behaviour, this is not, I 
would submit, before you a callous, hard-hearted individual who simply 
swept this aside and carried on as normal, because she is, after all, a 
grieving mother, this was her child and within two hours or so of giving birth 
her child had died (Defence mitigation, Hannah’s case). 
This statement derives from the sentencing hearing of a woman suspected of 
causing the death of her newborn child.  Hannah’s1 child died from neglect.  
Following the death Hannah left the body in a friend’s garden, and continued her 
normal day.  Hannah’s defence barrister argued that Hannah returned to her 
normal routine following the birth because she was a grieving mother, so 
disputing the prosecution’s claim that her actions demonstrated her lack of 
desire to be a mother.  Hannah’s case is one example from the cases analysed 
in this thesis of the deployment of the concept of motherly behaviour in the 
courtroom.  The concept is so employed and used to determine wrong deemed 
to warrant criminalisation, and culpability.  This thesis is an interrogation of the 
gender biases that are encoded in criminal law and the responses by the 
criminal justice system towards women who ‘fail’ as ‘mothers’, resulting in the 
death of a child around the time of birth.  It provides an analysis of the gendered 
assumptions that operate when criminalisation occurs in such cases, illustrating 
that the application of criminal law goes beyond the scope and limits of that 
intended by Parliament upon enactment.  Furthermore, it identifies that the intent 
to criminalise women for perceived moral wrongs is both done with limited 
regard for the context of the cases, and targets some of the most vulnerable 
                                             
1 Not her real name. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 2 
women in society.  This introductory chapter provides an overview of the focus of 
the thesis, outlining key concepts and areas of the debate.   
Aim of the study 
The aim of this study is to consider how the criminal justice system responds 
when it is believed that a woman has caused the death of her newborn child.  In 
addressing this aim, I am interested in three further factors: 
1. The perceived wrongs in such cases that are deemed to warrant 
criminalisation; 
2. How complex factors, specifically relating to the concept of ‘newborn’, affects 
the application of the law; 
3. How the myths of motherhood and subsequent concept of the ideal mother 
affects and feature within such cases.  
Clarification of the phrase ‘caused the death of her newborn child’ is required 
here, as this apparently straightforward phrase, masks historic and 
contemporary legal controversy.  I have specifically chosen to use the phrase 
‘newborn child’ due to the nature of the analysed cases.  They began as murder 
investigations.  In England, in order to be a victim of homicide or a crime against 
the person, the victim must be a ‘reasonable creature in Rerum natura’ (Coke, 
1681: 50-1); that is, a legal person with full protection under law is one who has 
been born alive and lived a separate existence.  Consequently, if the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) wish to convict a person of the homicide of a newly 
born child, then they must prove live-birth occurred.  Herein lies one of the 
complex factors that impact the application of the law.  If proof of live-birth is 
absent then a homicide conviction cannot be made, even if evidence suggests a 
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woman has purposefully harmed or killed the foetus/child.  The second 
clarification lies in my decision to use the phrase ‘caused the death of’ rather 
than ‘killed’.  In analysed cases, as in cases in the literature on newborn child 
death, it is often not clear why the foetus/child died.  It can also be unclear as to 
whether the pregnant woman intended to cause the death of the foetus/child.  
The aim of this study is not to assess why the seven women acted as they did.  
Not only would that be beyond the scope of the available data, numerous studies 
have previously considered the ‘type’ of woman who kills her newborn child and 
the reasons that motivated her actions (Beyer et al., 2008; Meyer and Oberman, 
2001; Spinelli, 2003; Vellut et al., 2012).  Thus, further research of this nature 
has limited merit.  
 
Instead, this study considers how the law is applied when a wrong that is 
deemed to warrant criminalisation is identified by members of the criminal justice 
system.  The function and role of criminal law has been widely debated within 
legal philosophy.  Simester and Von Hirsch (2011) drawing upon the work of 
Feinberg (1987, 1988, 1989, 1990), argue that criminal offences are grounded in 
morally wrongful behaviour that warrants blame; something is wrong if it is 
something one ought not to do.  However, as criminal law is a form of state 
coercion into the lives of citizens, it must be justified, particularly as it results in 
censure.  The occurrence of a wrong is not sufficient to warrant criminalisation, 
as disapproval of behaviour can be expressed through civil law.  For criminal 
sanctions to be justified there needs to be a form of harm or offence to others 
(Jones, 2017).   
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I complete two tasks in this thesis.  Firstly, I offer a critical analysis of cases of 
newborn child death to examine what wrongs have been identified and how they 
have been used to justify criminalising the women involved.  Secondly, I assess 
the laws that have been used to facilitate this criminalisation.  Through this 
process I identify the gendered assumptions that continue to exist around 
women in their roles as mothers and, by extension, pregnant women.  
Intention of the PhD 
My PhD studies began life as an exploration of responses to violent women.  
The aim was to explore how women who commit violent acts are understood 
and perceived in mainstream culture/society and feminist theory.  Consequently, 
the crime of ‘infanticide’ was picked as a means of conducting such analysis.  
This form of violence was selected as a distinct and specifically female crime 
that requires a special response from the criminal justice system, demonstrated 
by the existence of the Infanticide Act 19382 (discussed in Chapter 4).  Initial 
research revealed that maternal filicide has received significant attention from 
psychologists, psychiatrists, criminologists, and sociologists.  ‘Filicide’ is the term 
used to describe the killing of a child of any age by their parents, including step-
parents.  ‘Infanticide’ is used within the literature to describe the killing of infants, 
usually aged under one year, often when perpetrated by the infant’s mother.  
The term ‘neonaticide’ refers to the killing of a child within 24 hours of birth.  
These terms are not mutually exclusive and scholars do not use them 
consistently within the literature.  For the purpose of this thesis, the term 
‘infanticide’ will only be used to discuss the criminal offence of infanticide, as per 
                                             
2 1 and 2 Geo.6, c.36. 
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the Infanticide Acts.3  Feminists have concerned themselves with the offence of 
infanticide and the consequences upon offenders and perceptions of women’s 
legal culpability.  The legal responses to the killing of infants by their mothers 
and subsequent legislation has also received considerable scholarship from 
historians and lawyers.  As such, my research began with a review of the historic 
legal developments of maternal infant killing, specifically considering how and 
why infanticide became a criminal offence, and the social, legal, political and 
cultural consequences of the offence.  This research highlights the legal 
controversies that exist within this area of offending due to the historic and 
contemporary difficulties of proving live-birth.  As the analysis in Chapter 4 
illustrates, attempts to regulate the behaviour of filicidal women has resulted in 
numerous changes to the law from the early seventeenth-century.  However, 
there is little scholarship that analyses the operation and application of law 
relating to newborn child death in contemporary society.  A significant amount of 
research relates to women who kill children of any age, who are known to have 
been born alive, and a reasonable amount of legal theory exists in relation to the 
born alive principle.  Similarly, research exploring related offences has been 
conducted, such as procuring a miscarriage4 and child destruction5 (both 
offences outlined in Chapter 4).  However, this existing research rarely considers 
how the law applies to women who actively attempt to harm their foetuses, but 
often considers illegal abortions provided by third parties, or third parties who 
attack pregnant women resulting in the death of the foetus.  Therefore, a gap 
exists in research exploring the operation of English law in cases where newborn 
child death is suspected as being perpetrated by the mother but cannot be 
                                             
3 1922 (12 and 13 Geo.5, c.18); 1938 (1 and 2 Geo.6, c.36). 
4 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vict. c.100), s58. 
5 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (19 and 20, Geo.5, c.34). 
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proven.  While legal theory and explanations of the scope and workings of the 
law exist, no scholar has analysed how the law is applied in practice to this area.  
My research not only fills this gap, it illustrates how the practice of law and 
operations of the criminal justice system draw upon and reproduce gendered 
assumptions, impacting the most vulnerable women in our society, and so 
furthering their disadvantage not only within law, but also within their lives in 
general.  Within the context of this thesis, vulnerability is defined as an aspect of 
a woman’s life that makes her increasingly susceptible to the hardships and 
difficulties that can be faced in life; this includes an increased likelihood of 
involvement with criminal justice as both a victim and offender (Milne et al., 
Forthcoming).  These vulnerabilities can take the form of class, poverty, 
race/ethnicity, and living within an abusive or controlling relationship, for 
example.  As Fineman (2008) argues,  
Because we are all positioned differently within a web of economic and 
institutional relationships, our vulnerabilities range in magnitude and 
potential at the individual level… it is experienced uniquely by each of us 
and this experience is greatly influenced by the quality and quantity of 
resources we possess or can command (2008: 10). 
Within the context of the cases analysed in this thesis, the vulnerability of the 
women is directly connected with their interpretation, understanding and 
engagement with their pregnancies.  As argued below, and outlined in the 
literature discussed in Chapter 3, a woman’s interpretation that her pregnancy as 
a crisis is closely connected with her social and cultural circumstances 
(Oberman, 2003b; Vellut et al., 2012).  Within the context of cases of women 
suspected of causing the death of newborn children, being pregnant when it is 
perceived by the pregnant woman, and possibly those around her, that she 
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should not be, adds a distinct level of vulnerability to women in such 
circumstances (Ayres, 2007). 
 
Consequently, due to this shift of focus, analysis of the criminal offence of 
infanticide is not as prominent in this thesis as I initially thought it would be.  The 
infanticide offence is analysed, its use in cases in the sample is considered, and 
the role of the offence in criminal law and its impact upon women’s agency is 
debated in the Conclusion.  Similarly, the specific focus on feminist responses to 
violent women is also no longer the direct focus of the research.  The thesis 
does consider how women in the cases studies are represented in court, with a 
particular focus on how they are viewed as failed mothers, but the scope of the 
research has prevented an analysis of feminist theories of violent women, which, 
as I argue elsewhere (Milne and Turton, Forthcoming) is still required.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I consider the manifestations of law – theory and 
practice.  I consider the different aspects of the regulation of pregnant women 
and mothers, and how these manifestations of law operate within legal practice 
and are reproduced outside the courtroom.  The overarching themes that run 
through these manifestations of law are the failure of women to conform to the 
ideals of motherhood, and the use of criminal law to criminalise women for the 
perceived wrong of failure to protect the foetus/child. 
 
For ease of reading the text I have listed legal citations in footnotes, rather than 
in-text citations.  To facilitate a coherent narrative, the thesis employs British 
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English, including in quotes, some of which have been adapted from American 
to British English.  
Key areas of debate and concepts 
Within my thesis I draw upon a number of key ideas and concepts.  It is 
important that the reader understand specifically to what these refer and why I 
use particular terminology.  As will become clear, language within this area of 
study has specific meanings and implications, both in terms of what it refers to, 
and due to legal ramifications.  The terms I will define here are ‘crisis pregnancy 
and ‘neonaticide’ in contrast to the terms ‘infanticide’ and ‘suspicious perinatal 
death’.  Finally, I will present key feminist theories that underpin the concepts of 
the myths of motherhood and the perception of the ideal mother.  
 
First, I wish to make a point about language and my use of the phrase ‘woman’.  
The debate about what constitutes a ‘woman’ is important and should not be 
ignored, specifically in relation to conceptualisation of gender and human 
reproduction (Annandale and Clark, 1996).  With full awareness that gender is 
performative (Butler, 2010), and that people who identify as male or do not 
prescribe to the gender binary can and do become pregnant (Halberstam, 2010), 
it is important to consider the gendered aspect of this debate.  Discourse relating 
to pregnancy and motherhood, outlined in Chapter 3, will affect not just people 
who are born female and identify as a woman, but also any person with female 
reproductive organs, due to their physical ability to menstruate and potential to 
become pregnant.  But the discourse will also affect individuals who identify as a 
woman, but may not have female reproductive organs, as the debate relating to 
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risk and pregnancy is applied to women not on the knowledge that they can 
become pregnant, but on the assumption they can.  This assumption is likely to 
be extended to a transgender woman.  As I have not personally met the 
individuals whose cases are examined in this thesis, I am not able to comment 
upon their gender identification.  However, all seven were born with female 
reproductive organs and had (have) the ability to become pregnant.  Throughout 
this thesis I refer to these seven individuals as ‘women’.  I also refer to ‘women’ 
in general.  My decision to use this terminology is not to negate the gender 
debate, but rather for ease of communicating ideas.   
Crisis pregnancy 
Crisis pregnancy is a term I employ to describe an experience of pregnancy 
whereby the existence of the pregnancy creates a crisis for a woman, and so it is 
perceived as such.  Crisis pregnancy, as defined here, is not to be confused with 
an unwanted pregnancy.  While a crisis pregnancy is likely to be an unwanted 
pregnancy, although some commentators have argued against this assumption 
(Vellut et al., 2012), an unwanted pregnancy is not necessarily cause for crisis if 
adequate and safe means to end the pregnancy are available and easily 
accessible.  If those services cannot be accessed then an unwanted pregnancy 
would constitute a crisis pregnancy.  For example, Mahon et al. (1998) use the 
phrase ‘crisis pregnancy’ when referring to Irish women residing in the Republic 
of Ireland who are forced to travel abroad to seek abortion services because 
they are not available in their own country.  More specifically, crisis refers to an 
instance where a woman feels unable to resolve the pregnancy for some reason, 
for example: she may be terrified of her parents finding out she is pregnant, 
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particularly if she is very young; she may be in an abusive relationship and 
therefore not be able to seek medical assistance to end the pregnancy; or the 
knowledge of the pregnancy may panic her to such an extent that she feels 
unable to respond to the pregnancy.  Use of the phrase ‘crisis pregnancy’ in my 
PhD should not be confused with ‘Crisis Pregnancy Centers’ in the United States 
of America (US), which market themselves as spaces for women to seek 
assistance with unwanted pregnancy, with an aim to dissuade women from 
accessing an abortion or contraception (Winter, 2015). 
 
Crisis pregnancies may result in a woman concealing or denying that pregnancy.  
It is upon this form of crisis pregnancy my research focuses.  All the women in 
the cases analysed experienced their pregnancy as a crisis, concealing and/or 
denying their pregnancies, all resulting in them giving birth alone.  From analysis 
of the literature on neonaticide, the majority, if not all women, who are suspected 
of neonaticide have experienced a crisis pregnancy; this literature is explored in 
Chapter 3.  My research considers neither the reason why individuals 
experienced pregnancy as a crisis, nor attempts to evaluate the validity of this 
perception of crisis, instead it explores the responses of the criminal justice 
system in such situations whereby the foetus/child dies following that crisis 
pregnancy.  
Neonaticide 
Women commit relatively little homicide.  In England and Wales, between 
2005/06 and 2015/16, women made up 9% of all homicide convictions and 14% 
of all murder convictions (Office for National Statistics, 2017).  However, if we 
Chapter 1 Introduction 11 
only consider data relating to the killing of children aged under one year 
(hereafter ‘infants’) then the rate of female suspected offending increases to 
26% (53% male suspects, 21% of suspects sex not recorded).6  Other studies 
have found the rates of female perpetrators to be even higher.  A Home Office 
report into homicide concluded that a female suspect was responsible for the 
killing in 47% of infant homicides (Brookman and Maguire, 2003: 16-18; see also 
Wilczynski, 1995).  The high rate of female criminality in cases of infant killing, in 
comparison to other forms of homicide, has resulted in considerable academic 
scholarship (for example Alder and Baker, 1997; Barlow and Clayton, 1999; 
Brookman and Nolan, 2006; Dean, 2004; Scott, 1973; Wilczynski, 1997a).  The 
killing of newborn children has received specific focus, as the overwhelming 
majority of perpetrators are mothers following a concealed/denied pregnancy 
and a solo birth, and the motivation for the killing is deemed to be very different 
from other homicides.  To distinguish this form of infant homicide, Resnick 
(1969) defined the term ‘neonaticide’ – the killing of a child within 24 hours of its 
birth.  Resnick noted that neonaticide was a distinct form of child homicide, most 
often committed by the mother following an unwanted pregnancy.  Numerous 
other scholars have also noted the distinct nature of neonaticide (Bourget et al., 
2007; d'Orbán, 1979; Friedman and Friedman, 2010; Meyer and Oberman, 
2001; Pitt and Bale, 1995; Porter and Gavin, 2010).  
 
My research brings the term ‘neonaticide’ into question due to the difficulty 
presented by evidence of live-birth.  While much of the literature on the 
                                             
6 Data as of 14 November 2016; figures are subject to revision as cases are dealt with by the 
police and the courts, or as further information becomes available. Offences currently recorded 
as homicide where victims are under the age of one years old by the sex of the principal suspect, 
2002/03 to 2015/16. Data obtained from Homicide Index, Home Office.  The term ‘sex’, as 
opposed to ‘gender’ is provided by the Home Office. 
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occurrence and nature of neonaticide does not consider the importance of the 
born alive rule, I have argued elsewhere that the significance of live-birth must 
be considered by scholars when investigating this form of killing, particularly if 
considering legal culpability and the role of the criminal justice system (Milne and 
Brennan, Forthcoming).  The term ‘neonaticide’ comes from the Latin neos 
meaning new, and caedere meaning to kill.  To be a victim of homicide in 
England, and many other jurisdictions, it is necessary to be a legal person.  
Consequently, I argue the term ‘neonaticide’ can only cover the killing of a child 
born alive, living a separate existence prior to being killed.  Consequently, a 
foetus that dies in utero or in the course of labour cannot be considered a victim 
of neonaticide.  Thus, when considering the death of a foetus/child around the 
time of labour – before, during, after – ‘neonaticide’ as a technical descriptor of a 
type of killing is not sufficient. 
 
Consequently, I have developed two potential new phrases to cover killings or 
suspicious deaths in this period – either ‘suspicious perinatal death’, or 
‘suspected perinatal killing’.  Perinatal refers to the period immediately 
surrounding birth.  Different timescales are used for this period, the World Health 
Organisations defines the perinatal period as commencing at 22 completed 
weeks of gestation and ending seven completed days after birth (World Health 
Organisation, 2016).  For the definition used in this thesis, the perinatal period 
commences at 23 completed weeks of gestation and ends 24 completed hours 
after live-birth.  I have specifically chosen the parameters of this period to reflect 
key aspects of English law.  A woman can legally request an abortion from a 
registered medical practitioner if ‘the continuance of the pregnancy would involve 
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risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family’ 
under the Abortion Act 19677 up to the 24th week of pregnancy.  Following this 
gestational age, an abortion can only be obtained if to prevent grave permanent 
injury or death of the pregnant woman, or due to foetal abnormality.8  Obtaining 
an abortion under any other circumstances is a criminal offence; the law 
surrounding abortion is explored in Chapter 4.  At the other end of the time-
period, the first 24-hours post-birth marks a critical period in the life of an 
unwanted child; it is the time during which the child is most likely to be killed 
(Bortoli et al., 2013; Porter and Gavin, 2010).  Consequently, the period between 
the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy and the first day of life captures the time 
when a foetus/child may be at risk of being purposefully killed.  However, if live-
birth does not occur, or cannot be proven, then this act of killing will not fall 
within the definition of neonaticide or homicide.  I prefer the phrase ‘suspicious 
perinatal death’ over ‘suspected perinatal killing’, as not all cases I investigate 
involve a specific act of killing and in a number, the specific intent to kill the 
foetus/child appears to be lacking.  
 
It is difficult to know how many cases of suspicious perinatal death occur each 
year.  Numerous scholars researching neonaticide have commented on the 
inaccuracy of official statistics; Wilczynski (1997a) argues there is a large ‘dark 
figure’ of child killing (victim aged under 16 years, no discussion of live-birth), 
estimating that true incidents of child homicide are 3 to 7 times higher than 
official statistics report.  In England, no official record is kept for how many 
                                             
7 c.87, s1(1)(a). 
8 Ibid, s1(1)(b-d). 
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children are killed within the first day of life, and there are no records that I have 
found reflecting suspicious deaths that occurred prior to live-birth.  Therefore, to 
attempt to calculate how many examples of suspicious perinatal death occur 
every year, it is necessary to piece together information from whatever data is 
collected and reported.  The Homicide Index, collated and reported by the Home 
Office, provides some insight into the occurrence of suspected homicide where 
the victim is aged one day or less; frequency of such cases can be seen in Table 
1. 
Year Number9 
2002/03 3 
2003/04 2 
2004/05 0 
2005/06 0 
2006/07 3 
2007/08 1 
2008/09 5 
2009/10 0 
2010/11 1 
2011/12 1 
2012/13 1 
2013/14 2 
2014/15 1 
2015/16 2 
Table 1 Offences currently recorded as homicide, victims one day old or less 2002/03 to 2015/16. 
As these statistics refer to cases considered to be homicides, we can assume 
that there is evidence of live-birth in each case.  To partially capture cases of 
suspicious perinatal death that lack evidence of live-birth, the police recorded 
figures for concealment of birth can be used, as this offence does not require 
evidence of live-birth, see Table 2.  Concealment of birth (hereafter 
‘concealment’) is a criminal offence involving the concealment of the dead body 
                                             
9 Data as at 14 November 2016; figures are subject to revision as cases are dealt with by the 
police and the courts, or as further information becomes available. Data obtained from Homicide 
Index, Home Office. 
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of an infant to conceal the fact the infant was ever born;10 the scope and 
parameters of the offence are outlined in Chapter 4.  
Year Concealing an infant death close to birth11 
2002/03 7 
2003/04 6 
2004/05 6 
2005/06 8 
2006/07 4 
2007/08 8 
2008/09 8 
2009/10 6 
2010/11 9 
2011/12 5 
2012/13 2 
2013/14 2 
2014/15 5 
2015/16 5 
Table 2 Police recorded data of the offence concealing an infant death close to birth. 
Due to the close connection of concealment with newborn homicide, it is 
possible that some instances of suspicious perinatal death will be recorded in 
both the Homicide Index and the police recorded statistics for concealment.  
Nevertheless, these are the best numbers we have.  It is not possible to draw on 
police recorded statistics from the offences of procuring a miscarriage or child 
destruction, as both offences can be committed by third parties who attack 
pregnant women, causing the foetus to die (and most convictions follow such 
circumstances).  Therefore, the data sets presented here offer the most 
comprehensive picture of suspicious perinatal deaths that are known to the 
authorities.  Taken together, the average is 7 deaths per year, as demonstrated 
in Table 3.  
 
 
                                             
10 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vict. c.100), s60. 
11 Data obtained from Office for National Statistics (2016b). 
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Year Offences currently 
recorded as homicide, 
victims one day old or 
less 
Police recorded 
crime: Concealing an 
infant death close to 
birth 
Total 
2002/03 3 7 10 
2003/04 2 6 8 
2004/05 0 6 6 
2005/06 0 8 8 
2006/07 3 4 7 
2007/08 1 8 9 
2008/09 5 8 13 
2009/10 0 6 6 
2010/11 1 9 10 
2011/12 1 5 6 
2012/13 1 2 3 
2013/14 2 2 4 
2014/15 1 5 5 
2015/16 2 5 5 
Annual 
mean 
2 6 7 
Table 3 Rates of suspicious perinatal deaths known to the authorities. 
However, we need to consider that the actual occurrence of suspicious perinatal 
deaths is likely to be underestimated, due to the ability to hide or dispose of the 
body of a foetus/child.  As most of these cases occur following a 
concealed/denied pregnancy, the authorities are likely to not look for the body.  If 
we use Wilczynski’s (1997a) estimate of actual numbers being three times 
higher than official statistics, then the possible number of suspicious perinatal 
deaths to occur each year is 21. 
Further terminology distinctions 
The use of the word ‘child’ will only refer to a member of the human species who 
has a separate existence from its mother.  I may at times refer to ‘unborn-child’, 
when doing so I refer to a foetus, rather than a child with a separate existence.   
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Foetus refers to a member of the human species developing in the womb.  
Foetus is not the technically correct term for all periods of gestational 
development, different terms are associated with different periods of 
development: zygote (at fertilization), blastocyst (at implantation, 6-10 days after 
ovulation), embryo (at about 2 weeks), and foetus (from 8 weeks until birth).  I 
will use the term ‘foetus’ for ease, and, unless specifically stated otherwise, I am 
referring to a human developing in the womb from the point of conception until a 
separate existence has occurred.   
 
I am purposefully referring to ‘separate existence’ when defining a foetus and a 
child, as it feels erroneous to refer to a member of the human species that has a 
separate existence as a ‘foetus’, even if it was stillborn.  Once a human has 
been born it is generally considered a ‘child’, even if it died as a foetus.  Thus, 
my use of the words foetus and child does not specifically reflect legal 
terminology.  So, for example, if a woman’s foetus died in the womb I would refer 
to it as the death of a foetus, not a child.  However, once that foetus has been 
delivered, I would then refer to it as a child, possibly also stating it is a dead 
child.  At other times, I use the phrase ‘foetus/child’.  In using this term, I refer to 
situation where it is unknown if live-birth has occurred.  I often use this phrase 
when referring to perinatal deaths in general, rather than specific cases, or in 
reference to a number of cases whereby the timing of the death of the 
foetus/child is unknown, or they occurred at different times in the perinatal 
period. 
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Myths of motherhood 
Feminist writings on motherhood and mothering are extensive.  The literature 
reviewed here focuses on the feminist critique of the ‘myths of motherhood’.  The 
myths of motherhood maintain that to be a woman is to be a mother; 
motherhood and mothering is natural, universal and unchanging for all women.  
The myths draw on the perception that women are inherently caring, nurturing, 
and self-sacrificing, and such behaviours originate from biology and a women’s 
ability to birth children.  The consideration here does not lie in and of the fact that 
women, as females, have the capacity to conceive a child, gestate, give birth 
and lactate, but that some women choose to partake in the nurturing and raising 
of children.  As Arendell (2000: 1193) argues, the issue for consideration is ‘How 
these biological activities are culturally organised and given meaning’.   
 
Oakley (1974: 186) argues the myths are based on three beliefs, ‘all women 
need to be mothers, that all mothers need their children, and that all children 
need their mothers’.  The myths insist that ‘no woman is truly complete or fulfilled 
unless she has kids, that women remain the best primary caretakers of children, 
and that to be a remotely decent mother, a woman has to devote her entire 
physical, psychological, emotional, and intellectual being, 24/7, to her children’ 
(Douglas and Michaels, 2005: 3-4).  Consequently, the myths set unachievable 
standards of perfection for women who are mothers, while also constructing and 
maintaining a popular belief that all women should want to be mothers and 
motherhood is the true destiny for women to fulfil.  The myths saturate society 
and social and cultural interaction (Johnston and Swanson, 2003; Dally, 1982; 
Kaplan, 1992; Gillis, 1997). 
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Barthes (1973) defines a myth as an uncontested and unconscious assumption 
that is so widely accepted that the cultural and historical origins are no longer 
remembered.  Thus, mothering is presented as ‘natural’ and ‘instinctive’, rather 
than cultural, political, economic and historical (Hrdy, 2000).  The myths have 
credit and merit due to the ideologies that shape popular thoughts and beliefs of 
mothering.  The dominant ideology represents the views of the dominant group.  
In patriarchal society the myths of natural motherhood facilitate locking women 
into biological reproduction, denying them identifies and selfhood outside of 
mothering (Glenn, 1994).  Thus many feminists have identified the perpetuation 
of patriarchy as the underlying causes of the myths (Chodorow, 1978; Hays, 
1996; Rich, 1986; Ruddick, 1989; Maushart, 1999; McMahon, 1995; Thurer, 
1994; Trebilcot, 1984).  Oakley (1974) argues that the myths are made plausible 
due to social and cultural conditions that impel women to become mothers.  
These conditions are reinforced by ‘science’.  One example Oakley notes is 
psychoanalytical theory from the 1920s and 1930s that argued ‘normal’ women 
desire a child and that those who reject motherhood are rejecting femininity.  Her 
review of the evidence demonstrates that results of these beliefs have been that, 
to appear normal, women who might otherwise not have had children do so, and 
women who would have been happier sharing childcare responsibilities make 
mothering an all-absorbing job.   
 
Medical discourses and governance of the body has reinforced the myths of 
motherhood, acting as a regime of power, knowledge and veridiction.  Foucault’s 
(1980) work on power/knowledge and the birth of the clinic has been central to 
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theoretical developments in the sociology of health and tandem literature.  Here, 
Foucault argues that medical knowledge (like other regimes of knowledge) is a 
form of power and coercion.  Whilst there is some relevance to this thesis – via 
its identification of the way in which medical theories relating to pregnancy are 
utilised by and encoded into law – the focus of research is directed more 
towards procedural legislative and criminal justice practices.  Nevertheless, 
through the lens of feminist critiques of the gendered assumptions embedded in 
legal and judicial forms of knowledge and practice, I appreciate the connections 
of these broader debates, although they do not constitute a central theme of my 
analysis.  Instead the research draws upon a number of feminist conceptual 
approaches, namely the critique of the myths of motherhood.  
 
The myths construct the notion of the ‘good’ mother, someone who conforms to 
the myths, compared to the ‘bad’ mother.  Today the ‘good’ mother is the 
intensive mother, defined by Hays (1996) as ‘child-centred, expert-guided, 
emotionally absorbing, labour-intensive, and financially expensive’ (1996: 8).  In 
contrast, the ‘bad’ mother is identifiable by her deviant care-giving practices and 
failure to conform to the ideal.  The line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mothering is 
not fixed, or stable, rather it is blurred and it shifts (Smart, 1996; Thurer, 1993).  
The ideal ‘good’ mother is based upon the white, middle-class, married, 
heterosexual woman who has the exclusive responsibility for mothering her 
biological children, focused solely on their care and wellbeing (Glenn, 1994; 
Sanger, 1992).  Thus, the myths are not only gendered, but also rooted in class 
and race, consequently, so is the construction of the ‘bad’ mother.  The further 
away a woman’s identity sits from this ideal and the less privilege she has, the 
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harder it is for her to adhere to the myths (Geronimus, 2003).  An example of the 
discriminatory nature of the myths is presented by Solinger (1994) in her historic 
review of the responses to illegitimacy in the US – white single mothers were 
considered ‘trouble’ but ‘redeemable’, whereas black single mothers were 
labelled ‘deviant’ by the dominant culture.  The construction of the good/bad 
binary has led scholars to theorise a particular form of gender oppression 
referred to as mother-blame (Caplan and Hall-McCorquodale, 1985; Jackson 
and Mannix, 2004; Garey and Arendell, 2001; Caplan, 1998).  Children with 
problems, or children as problems, are often linked to the social situations of 
their mothers (poor, unmarried, divorced, and unemployed) rather than to the 
social and economic forces that affect their lives (Arendell, 2000; Garey, 1999; 
Smith, 1988).  Similarly, the feelings of unhappiness or dissatisfaction women 
may feel as mothers are attributed to the failings of the individual mother, rather 
than the system; a good mother is a happy mother (Johnston and Swanson, 
2003; Taylor, 1996).  
 
One of the main thrusts of feminist critique has been to challenge the notion that 
motherhood is natural and originates from women’s biology.  Nancy Chodorow 
(1978, 1989) offered one of the earliest critiques, using psychoanalytical object 
relations theory to argue that female behaviour of caring and mothering is learnt, 
transmitted from mother to daughter through the experience of being mothered.  
Alternative analysis is offered by Ruddick (1989) who argues that maternal 
practice of caring for children is a requirement that is imposed on any person 
who conducts the work.  Mother work is not based on instinct, but on a decision 
to recognise and respond to the vulnerabilities of a child and to nurture its 
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intellectual and emotional growth.  The work of Chodorow and Ruddick has been 
highly criticised for being universal in nature and relying upon a narrow 
experience of mothering that is both racial and class-biased.  In their attempt to 
construct universal theories they accept the dominant ideal of what it means to 
be a mother – white, middle-class, living in the west (Glenn, 1994).  
Nevertheless, the principle that mothering is natural to women is contradicted by 
clear evidence that not all women mother, and the nurture and care of children is 
not inevitably exclusively completed by women (Forcey, 1994; Rothman, 1994; 
Schantz, 1994). 
 
Other challenges to the ideology of the ‘naturalness’ or inherent nature of 
mothering has focused on the historical and social contexts in which ideologies 
of motherhood exist.  Smart (1996: 48), for example, argues that motherhood is 
a ‘highly contrived and historically specific condition’, with the ideal image being 
drawn from ‘a class-specific, historically located ideal of what a mother should 
be’ (1996: 45).  Although this ideal was not accepted unquestioningly by all 
women, Smart argues that alternative ways of mothering are difficult to maintain 
when they oppose the dominant ideal, particularly when perceived to lack 
legitimacy.  Furthermore, the actions that demonstrate a good mother change 
over time, for example, leaving a baby to cry, or self-sooth, has historically been 
considered the response of a ‘good’ mother who does not spoil their child.  
Current advice advocates that leaving an infant to cry can be harmful to a child.  
Smart argues that ‘there is nothing natural in these manifestations of supposedly 
instinctual behaviour’ (1996: 47; see also Bassin et al., 1994; Glenn et al., 1994; 
Risman, 1998; Badinter, 1981; Hays, 1996; Johnsen, 1987).  Emphasis on the 
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historic, social, cultural, and political influences that have helped to construct the 
image of the ideal mother challenges the principles of naturalness and 
instinctiveness of mothering and motherhood.  If women’s actions towards their 
biological children were instinctual, as the myths of motherhood imply, then 
expectations of maternal behaviour would not have developed and changed over 
time. 
 
A further critique feminists have levelled at the myths of motherhood is of the 
universalism that dominant discourses promote.  As already stated, the myths 
are based on the idealised image of white, middle-class, heterosexual, western 
women.  However, critique provided by second-wave feminists has also used 
such women as the basis for their critique of the myths; which is problematic.  
Patricia Hugh Collins (1994, 2000) argues that much feminist theorising about 
motherhood has projected white middle-class women’s concerns as universal to 
all women.  For women of colour the subjective experience of motherhood is 
inextricably linked to sociocultural concerns of the racial ethnic community.  She 
argues motherhood needs to be recontextualised to locate racial ethnic women’s 
experiences of mothering, so allowing the impact of race and class on 
motherhood to stand out.  Such analysis allows for further demonstration of the 
fallibility of the myths of motherhood, as alternative ways of raising, caring and 
nurturing children can and do exist, disputing that mothering practices, such as 
intensive mothering, are natural or inherent to all women.  For example, 
mothering practices in African-American communities from the time of slavery, 
continuing to modern day in some communities, have been characterised by 
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shared mothering, in contrast to the individualised model the myths promote 
(White, 1999; Stack and Burton, 1993).  
 
Similar critiques have been levied in relation to the geographic focus of research 
and its implications for understandings of motherhood and the family outside the 
West.  As Ambert (1994) argues, ‘The western emphasis on mothering and 
intensive emotional bonding between parents and children results in western 
biases in constructs which affect research paradigms’ (1994: 529).  Studies, 
such as Scheper-Hughes (1992) anthropological study into mothers in shanty 
towns in Brazil have demonstrated that motherhood and mothering is not a 
universal experience.  Her ethnographic work demonstrates the impact of culture 
on the experience of mothering, including maternal attachment, again, 
emphasising the cultural, societal and historic construction of mothering practice 
and behaviour.  The western focus of research and understanding of the family 
and maternal behaviour has had an effect on the lives of those mothering 
outside the west.  The cultural domination of western ideas has influenced law 
and policy, for example in Botswana, child support laws are based on the 
idealised European family, with the privilege given to biological paternity.  Such 
perceptions of motherhood fail to take account of the local culture.  Law 
implemented with intent to support children of unmarried women actually work 
against their social wellbeing as the structure of kin groups differs from the 
European model (Garey and Townsend, 1996).  Such research further critiques 
the myths of motherhood, demonstrating the cultural differences that lie in the 
experiences of raising children.   
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The impacts of the myths of motherhood are far reaching for women who are 
mothers, as they influence their behaviour and decisions.  However, they also 
impact women who are not mothers, women who mother children who are not 
biological offspring, and people who are not women who care for children.  
Glenn et al. (1994) argues the impact of the myths is to conflate woman with 
mother, making women appear as if they are undifferentiated and unchanging, 
as opposed to men who appear with historic specificity in a variety of roles and 
contexts.  As such, the myths conflate actors and activities, recognising only 
women, or birth-mothers, as nurturers and caregivers.  Consequently, people 
who are not birth-mothers are excused from the responsibilities of raising 
children; recognition is denied to those who provide nurturance and care but are 
not birth-mothers; and nurturance and care are assumed to only flow in one 
direction.  Furthermore, Glenn argues that the myths conflate mothers and 
children, assuming they are one entity with one set of needs, denying 
personhood and agency to both, and failing to acknowledge that mothers’ and 
children’s interests may conflict.  Lack of recognition of distinct subjects with 
different needs is also significant in relation to the interaction between the 
pregnant woman and the foetus, explored in Chapter 3.  The ‘good’ mother and 
pregnant woman is assumed to not conflict with her child/foetus (Roth, 2000).  
The impact of these conflations, described by Glenn, hinders women from 
achieving beyond of the role of mother, and places pressure on those women 
who are not mothers to take up the role.  However, it also impedes all individuals 
who parent outside the ‘norms’ constructed by the myths of motherhood, such as 
people of colour (Roberts, 1995; Dill, 1988), LGBTQ people (Hequembourg and 
Farrell, 1999; Pollack, 1990), individuals who do not identify with the gender-
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binary, single parents (Dowd, 1997), young parents (Phoenix, 1991), poor 
parents (Fineman, 1995), adoptive parents (Letherby, 1994), disabled parents 
(Frederick, 2015), and numerous others; the list is extensive as a significant 
majority of people cannot live up to the myths.  However, the consequence of 
failure, while felt by most women, notably with feelings of guilt and inadequacy 
(see Sutherland, 2010), is experienced most keenly by the most vulnerable.  It is 
poorer women, single women, young women and women of colour who are 
policed most aggressively and who face greater sanctions for their appearance 
of failure when compared to the myths (Smart, 1996).  As will become clear in 
the data analysis, Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the policing of vulnerable women is a key 
feature in cases of suspicious perinatal deaths. 
 
The aim of feminist critiques of the myths of motherhood is to make apparent the 
structural oppression that exists within the dominant ideology of mothering.  It is 
not aiming to be deterministic, nor does it suggest that all women experience 
motherhood in the same way, even if the myths are consistent (Johnston and 
Swanson, 2006).  Feminists have been keen to stress the distinction, first 
outlined by Rich (1986), between motherhood as a relationship between a 
woman and her children, and the institution of motherhood, noting that the 
relationship can and does bring many women satisfaction and joy.  By identifying 
and critiquing the myths of motherhood feminists are highlighting the impact it 
has on how women experience mothering, and how society responds and acts 
towards mothers and all women.  Their aim is to demonstrate that the myths 
perpetuate inequalities and hardships for women.  However, it is important to not 
see ‘women’ as a homogenous group, but to consider the vulnerabilities and 
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struggles individuals and cultural groups experience due to their intersecting 
identities (Crenshaw, 1991). 
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Chapter 2 Methodology 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach of the study – the research 
strategy, approaches to data collection, analysis, and ethical considerations.  I 
discuss the difficulties faced in identifying and accessing cases, provide a 
justification for the selection of cases, and outline the limitations of this study.    
 
In this research, I draw on two distinct sources of data.  The primary source is 
court transcripts from criminal cases in England.  A separate investigation in the 
US was conducted drawing on Federal and state case law.  The study of US 
cases was conducted to provide an alternative perspective on the nature of 
criminal law relating to suspicious perinatal deaths.  As foetal protection laws are 
in operation in most states in the US, the legal and political developments in that 
country reveal key themes that relate the protection of foetuses and impact on 
women’s rights.  No comparison between cases or jurisdiction was conducted.  
As such, both sets of data were analysed and reported separately – analysis of 
court transcripts and findings from the English cases is presented in Chapters 5 
and 6, analysis of US case law is presented in Chapter 7.  
Selection of method 
To address the research aims, I chose to conduct a qualitative study.  As the aim 
of the research was to understand how the criminal justice system responds 
when a woman is suspected of causing the death of her child/foetus in the 
perinatal period, inductive research was the most effective approach (Bryman, 
2012; Ormston et al., 2013).  From initial literature reviews of cases of 
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neonaticide and the history of the law in this area, it was clear that there was a 
lack of clarity of knowledge of legal practice.  As noted in the Introduction, this 
area of law and the workings of criminal justice in such cases in contemporary 
England has been little explored by scholars.  I wanted to understand what was 
happening within this area of law, and why it was happening.  Using qualitative 
methodology was essential to view and interpret the underlying assumptions and 
perceptions that exist within the cases; facilitating a construction of theory from 
the themes and ideas that emerged from the data.  Through this approach, I 
accessed deeper meanings from analysis of the cases.  A further reason for 
using qualitative methods, rather than quantitative, was in recognition of 
gendered assumptions that exist within day-to-day life that are often constructed 
as gender-neutral (Harding, 1991; Hartsock, 1990).  As the aim of the research 
was to identify and analyse these gendered assumptions, I deemed it 
appropriate to utilise qualitative methods.  This decision was taken with 
recognition of the difficulties of research raised by feminist scholars (Bloom, 
1998; Kelly et al., 1994; Maynard, 1994; Stanko, 1994; Stanley and Wise, 1990).  
 
Following a decision to utilise a qualitative approach, I determined my source of 
data.  In line with feminist principles of research (Oakley, 1981), one of the more 
effective ways to understand women’s experiences is to interview women who 
have lived such an experience.  As such, interviewing women who had been 
convicted of an offence relating to suspicious perinatal death would have been a 
good primary source of data here.  However, there were significant practical and 
ethical implications of recruiting such women to the study; namely that I would 
have needed to approach women who had finished serving their sentences; I 
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deemed this to be inappropriate.  Furthermore, while hearing women’s narratives 
of their lives in relation to their crisis pregnancy and the subsequent death of the 
foetus/child would have been an invaluable source of data for understanding 
such cases, it is unlikely this data would have fully addressed the research aims.  
The aim of the research is to understand how the criminal justice system 
responds to women and how the law is applied.  Interviewing women who had 
been convicted may have provided insight into why the cases proceeded as they 
did, including why guilty pleas were entered.  However, individual perspectives 
on lived-experience could not access the broader processes and deeper 
meanings encoded in the legal process, which is the focus of this study.  
Considering the practical and ethical concerns of such data collection, it was 
decided this was not a viable option.  
 
Interviewing professionals who have worked on such cases was another option.  
I attempted to approach both the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and police 
forces which had investigated cases, but all refused to participate in the 
research.  I considered approaching solicitors and barristers who had 
represented convicted women, but decided against this option as it seemed 
unlikely that they would have been willing to talk about specific cases due to 
legal professional privilege.  Therefore, all conversation would likely have been 
hypothetical, having limited value in terms of the data obtained.  I came to a 
similar conclusion regarding approaching judges.  As such, interviews with 
individuals involved in cases of suspicious perinatal death were ruled out as a 
source of data. 
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Consequently, I determined that using texts and documents would be the most 
appropriate data source to address the research aims.  Such documentation is 
created to administer the application of law and other professional practice 
relating to suspected deaths, providing insight into the workings of the law.  As 
they have not been manufactured for research, the data are less burdened by 
the reactive effect, which can limit the viability of other sources of data (Bryman, 
2012).  Handling such documents is no different from any other data in social 
research, and equivalent rigour must be employed when analysing the source 
(Scott, 1990).  These documents are texts with distinctive purposes in mind, they 
do not simply reflect reality (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011).  As such, the 
documents need to be contextualised within the context of their function and 
purpose for and means of their creation (Prior, 2008). 
 
Several sources of documentation relating to cases of suspicious perinatal death 
exist and could have been drawn upon.  The main source used was court 
transcripts from criminal hearings.  This source was identified as useful to 
achieve the research aims due to the richness of the data provided during 
criminal hearings, and the practicalities of access.  Court hearings are recorded 
and transcripts can be requested (unless the case is closed to the public).  To 
obtain access to a transcript one seeks permission from a judge in writing 
(Ministry of Justice, 2015: 4).  If permission is granted, then the transcription 
company which owns the transcript will provide a copy at a cost.  If a trial occurs 
then the entire proceedings will be recorded, including the sentencing hearing (if 
a guilty verdict is obtained).  All cases used in the sample resulted in conviction 
following a guilty plea, hence I only focus on sentencing the hearing.  Within the 
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sentencing hearing the prosecution must outline why the conviction has been 
sought; this includes the facts of the case, arguments supporting conviction for 
the offence, and support for the recommended punishment.  The defence 
present mitigating factors and may aim to rebut the arguments of the 
prosecution.  Finally, the judge is required to provide justification of the sentence 
given.  The nature of the sentencing hearing in these cases is that it provided a 
re-telling of the events that surrounded the death of the foetus/child.  
Consequently, this source of data provides detailed accounts of the legal 
interpretation of the actions of the defendant.  As such, this source provides 
insight into the broader processes and deeper meanings encoded within the 
legal process; therefore, directly addressing the research aims.  Such accounts 
are told for the process of the law, rather than in relation to the collection of 
research data.  Therefore, they provide insight into justification of the application 
of law and inform the key research aims, attending to the broader contexts in 
which the applications of law take place.  They present a narrative that is woven 
by each player within the courtroom (prosecutor, defence and judge) to justify 
their legal decisions.  This provides insight into both the operation of the law, but 
also the underlying judgements of individual behaviour that drives application of 
the law.  As the purpose of the research was to understand the criminal wrongs 
identified in cases and how gendered assumptions of the myths of motherhood 
affected the cases, court transcripts are ideal in providing a detailed insight into 
these underlying aspects of the law and its application.  
 
Further documentation exists relating to court hearings, specifically the case file.  
This file holds documents, relating to the case, which were used during the 
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hearing, including witness testimony, the indictment sheet, court-ordered 
psychiatric reports, pre-sentencing reports and reports produced by community 
supervisors.  The court keeps this file for seven years following the conviction.  I 
was allowed access to one court file.  This access was granted when a court 
clerk queried if I wanted permission to access the transcript or the file and I 
responded I would like to access both.  The file had to be read in the court with a 
clerk present.  The clerk seemed to be rather unsettled by my having access to 
the file, attempting to dissuade me from looking at certain documents, telling me 
that they would not be relevant; in fact they were very relevant.  Eventually the 
clerk ended my access to the file 50 minutes early.  After this experience, and 
due to the cost of traveling to individual courts and the wealth of information 
available in the transcripts, I decided that it was unnecessary to access any 
further court files for the research as the details about each case provided in the 
court transcript was sufficient to address the research aims.  The context of the 
cases provided by the court files will be useful for postdoctoral work, noted in 
Chapter 8 – conclusion.  
 
A further source of data available relating to suspicious perinatal deaths is the 
Homicide Index.  Upon discovery of a suspected homicide, police forces 
complete a Homicide Return form for the Home Office.  The form must be 
submitted within one month following a suspected homicide and requires details 
of the victim and suspected killer, the relationship between the offender and 
victim, information about the nature of the suspected homicide, circumstances 
surrounding the death, and legal outcome of the case.  This information is 
collated and presented in statistical form in the Homicide Index.  Academic 
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researchers can be permitted access to record level data from the Homicide 
Index, providing anonymised information.  I only discovered that it was possible 
to access cases from the Homicide Index after I had secured access to 
transcripts, and initial analysis had been completed.  While access to data from 
the Homicide Index would be of great interest to this study and would have 
provided a clearer picture of the number of cases of suspected perinatal death, it 
is unlikely that it would have assisted with the research aims of understanding 
how and why women in such cases are criminalised, as the data would be 
largely quantitative and would provide little contextual information.  For this 
reason, I did not seek access to this source.   
 
The Ministry of Justice holds data on cases that have been tried.  I made 
enquiries about accessing qualitative data from the Ministry of Justice and was 
provided with information as to how to request access to data collections and 
research.  The Ministry of Justice were not forthcoming about the data they hold, 
and I assessed that the time to request access may not have justified the 
outcome.  As such, this source of data was deemed unnecessary, specifically 
considering the data available in the court transcripts. 
 
One final source of data that I have drawn upon are Serious Case Reviews 
(SCR).  When a child dies, the Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB) is 
required to complete a SCR if: 
(a) abuse or neglect of a child is known or suspected; and 
(b) either— 
(i) the child has died; or 
Chapter 2 Methodology 35 
(ii) the child has been seriously harmed and there is cause for concern as 
to the way in which the authority, their Board partners or other relevant 
persons have worked together to safeguard the child.1 
The aim of an SCR is to evaluate individual and agency practice to identify any 
improvements which may be required in professional practices to better 
safeguard children; it is not the intention of SCRs to investigate how a child dies 
or who is responsible for their death (HM Government, 2013).2  SCRs are 
completed with the engagement of all professionals who interacted with the child 
and those who took care of the child.  The reports are required to provide a 
critique of professional conduct of those responsible for safeguarding children.  
As such, they should provide a detailed account of instances of fatal child abuse.  
However, the quality of the report varies between LSCB, additionally the nature 
of the amount of detail that LSCB were required to published changed over the 
research period (HM Government, 2006, 2010, 2013).  
 
Initially I had hoped to use the SCRs as the main source of data.  However, it 
became clear that these reports would not provide sufficient information about 
the cases as they provide limited information about the application of law.  
Furthermore, in several cases of suspicious perinatal death an SCR does not 
appear to have been conducted, possibly as the LSCB decided that as no 
professional responsible for child protection knew of the existence of the 
pregnancy, few professional lessons could be obtained from the cases.  As 
such, such SCRs as I used merely provided background information.  
                                             
1 The Local Safeguarding Children Boards Regulations SI 2006 No. 90, regulation 5(2). 
2 National safeguarding children guidelines were republished in April 2015.  This occurred after 
the completion of the data collection process and so these guidelines have not been consulted.  
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Data accessed 
In this section, I describe how I identified cases for inclusion in my research and 
what data I accessed for each case.  Decisions as to which cases to access 
developed in line with the progression of initial research and the focus of the 
analysis upon the application of law in cases of suspicious perinatal death.  
Initially data was sought relating to deaths of infants up to the age of one year 
where the perpetrator was the mother.  Following the decision to only consider 
neonaticides, cases involving the death of a child within 24 hours of a live-birth 
were sought.  Evolution in the focus of the research project, to consider 
application of the law in relation to women who suffer crisis pregnancies and 
suspicious perinatal deaths, resulted in cases that fall outside of homicide 
convictions also being included in the sample.  As will become clear following 
this discussion of the methodology and in the analysis chapters, this project 
reflects a mosaic or patchwork of information about cases of suspicious perinatal 
deaths.  The difficulty knowing about such cases and then accessing related 
data, reduces our ability to understand the nature of suspicious perinatal deaths.  
However, I am confident that my sample provides a sufficiently comprehensive 
picture of the application of criminal law in this area of offending, for reasons 
outlined below.   
 
I identified cases in three ways – through SCRs, internet searches, and news 
reports.  As the project began as an investigation into maternal filicide of infants, 
I began collecting data using SCR reports.  To establish how many cases of 
maternal filicide had occurred, I sourced and processed as many SCRs as 
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possible relating to the death of a child under the age of one year (hereafter 
‘infant’), between 2001-2014 (year of data collection).  I sent Freedom of 
Information (FOI)3 requests to LSCBs in England and Wales to access SCRs 
relating to infants and completed from 2002-date.  I reviewed all SCRs on LSCB 
websites and the NSPCC national case review repository (2017) for published 
SCRs.  Table 4 shows the SCRs obtained. 
 Executive 
Summary 
Overview 
Report 
Executive Summary 
and Overview Report 
Total 
FOI request 105 15 1 120 
LSCB 
websites 
95 26 4 145 
NSPCC 25 2 19 42 
Total 225 43 24 307 
Table 4 SCRs obtained in data collection 
I reviewed all obtained SCRs and created a database, recording information 
about the report, including: information about the subject of the report – age, 
gender, ethnicity; information about the incident – injuries received, cause of 
death, date of incident, if with co-occurring abuse or neglect; the environment in 
which the child lived, notably if residing with one or both parents; and details of 
criminal proceedings.  From this sample, 30 cases were initially identified as 
potentially useful for inclusion in the sample as each infant’s biological mother 
was suspected of committing the act of violence and an investigation for 
homicide or serious violent assault had occurred.  
 
I identified three further cases using the key words ‘infanticide’, ‘infant killing 
mother’, ‘concealment of birth’.  Google searches provided several other cases 
due to the function of the search engine to link information and deliver results 
that are connected but were not the subject of the search; eight cases were 
                                             
3 Freedom of Information Act 2000, c.36. 
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identified.  Media reporting also assisted in this initial data collection stage, as 
several cases relating to infant and perinatal deaths occurred during the period 
of data collection.  Seven cases came to my attention though contemporary 
news reports.  A final case was initially identified through an academic article  
(Ayres, 2014).  As such, my initial case search resulted in 46 cases.  The details 
of these cases and how they were identified is presented in appendix 1.   
 
As my research progressed and my focus narrowed to death in the perinatal 
period, I adapted my list of cases to reflect this change.  I removed all cases that 
did not relate to a foetus/neonate, reducing the sample to 19 cases.  A further 12 
cases were excluded from the sample: four due to the court proceedings not 
having occurred at the time of data collection; three due to being unable to 
locate the case due to lack of information; one case was excluded as it occurred 
outside England and Wales; four others were excluded as the transcripts were 
unavailable due to the tapes being destroyed (details below).  
 
The remaining cases therefore reflected a reliable sample of cases concerning 
the criminalisation of women in relation to suspicious perinatal death during the 
period 2008 to 2014.  During this period, two convictions for infanticide4 related 
to neonates, both were included in the sample (Fiona and Tanya).  9 
concealment or birth5 (hereafter concealment) convictions occurred 2008-2014.6  
I successfully identified all four women convicted 2010-2013.  The transcript for 
one of these cases was unavailable as the tapes had been destroyed, but the 
other three were included in the sample (Hannah, Lily and Sally).  The final two 
                                             
4 Infanticide Act 1938 (1 and 2 Geo.6, c.36). 
5 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vict. c.100), s60. 
6 Ministry of Justice FOI ref. 921-14 94607. 
Chapter 2 Methodology 39 
cases (Alice and Hayley) were purposefully selected for inclusion in the sample.  
Both cases offered an alternative legal outcome to infanticide and concealment.  
Alice’s case involved her abandoning a live-born child which was later found 
alive and so her conviction reflected the survival of the child, despite her 
intention to dispose of the child (if not kill it).  Hayley’s case also offers a 
contrast.  Hayley pleaded guilty to purposefully acting to end her own pregnancy, 
close to term.  Therefore, she acted against her foetus, rather than a born alive 
child.  Weir (2006) argues that medical professionals consider late-term foetuses 
and newly born babies to be essentially the same in all but location, a foetus 
exists inside a woman, a baby outside and separate from her.  As such, it could 
be argued that Hayley’s act of causing the death of her foetus is similar in nature 
to the actions of Fiona, Hannah, and Tanya (see below and appendix 4 for case 
details).  
 
Taken together the seven cases demonstrate the range of criminal offences that 
can be used to convict and punish women who harm a foetus/child in the 
perinatal period, whether her action was intentional or not.  Through my scrutiny 
of the law and attention to the news, I believe my sample captures all offences 
that can be employed by the criminal justice system to criminalise women 
suspected of perinatal killing.  The only exception would be use of the offence of 
child destruction. 7   However, this offence is very similar in nature to procuring a 
miscarriage,8 which is explored in Hayley’s case, and the only known instance of 
woman being convicted of child destruction in relation to her own foetus was in 
2007, which is outside the date range for my research. 
                                             
7 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (19 and 20, Geo.5, c.34). 
8 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vict. c.100), s58. 
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Summary of cases 
Full details of the cases are provided in appendix 4, here I provide a summary. 
Alice: 
• Age: mid-twenties 
• Left baby in a carrier bag in a park, later found by a member of the public, 
baby survived 
• Pleaded guilty to child cruelty by wilfully abandoning or exposing a child in 
a manner likely to cause the child unnecessary suffering or injury to 
health 
• Sentenced to 6-months’ imprisonment, suspended for 2-years with 
supervision 
Fiona: 
• Age: 16 
• Stabbed the baby 27 times with a penknife 
• Pleaded guilty to infanticide 
• Sentenced to a youth rehabilitation order for 12-months 
Hannah: 
• Age: mid-twenties 
• Cause of baby’s death could not be ascertained 
• Left the body in the front garden of a friend’s house 
• Pleaded guilty to concealment and child cruelty due to not seeking 
medical assistance for the child 
• Sentenced to 6-months imprisonment, suspended for 2-years 
 
Hayley: 
• Age: early thirties 
• Evidence to suggest she took Misoprostol, a drug used to start labour or 
cause an abortion, when she was at, or close to, full-term of her 
pregnancy 
• Pleaded guilty to administering poison with intent to procure a miscarriage 
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• Initially sentenced to 12-years’ imprisonment with a reduction for an early 
guilty plea; Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to 3½-years 
Lily: 
• Age: mid-thirties (at time of birth) 
• Body of a baby found four years post-birth, Lily identified as the mother 
• Pleaded guilty to concealment and preventing the lawful burial of the 
corpse, also indicted for fraudulent offences 
• For all indictments sentenced to 1-year’s community sentence with 
supervision 
Sally: 
• Age: mid-thirties (at time of births) 
• Bodies of four babies found in her bedroom, over ten years after the births 
• Pleaded guilty to four counts of concealment 
• Received community sentence with supervision for a period of 2-years 
Tanya: 
• Age: 16 
• Suffocated the child with tissue 
• Pleaded guilty to infanticide 
• Sentenced to a 24-months’ youth rehabilitation order with supervision 
Accessing court transcripts 
As noted above, court transcripts can be accessed after receiving permission 
from a judge.  Once I had identified the cases I emailed the relevant courts to 
seek permission, copy of the email available appendix 2.  My initial requests 
were made without knowledge of the rules and procedure for application (which I 
found difficult to identify) and so my request was rejected by a judge from one 
court.  He requested that I resubmit an application which complies with 5.B.8 of 
the Criminal Practice Directions, which states, 
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An application to which CrimPR 5.8(7) applies must be made in 
accordance with rule 5.8; it must be in writing, unless the court permits 
otherwise, and ‘must explain for what purpose the information is required.’ 
A clear, detailed application, specifying the name and contact details of the 
applicant, whether or not he or she represents a media organisation, and 
setting out the reasons for the application and to what use the information 
will be put, will be of most assistance to the court. Applicants should state if 
they have requested the information under a protocol and include any 
reasons given for the refusal. Before considering such an application, the 
court will expect the applicant to have given notice of the request to the 
parties.9 
As such, I reapplied, redrafting my request, copy available appendix 3.  I was 
granted access to all transcripts requested except for one case.  I initially 
requested access to only the sentencing remarks for Sally’s case, but upon 
reading the case I was interested to view the prosecution’s opening remarks and 
the defence’s mitigation.  The judge refused to grant access to the rest of the 
hearing, no reason for refusal was provided.   
 
I experienced several difficulties accessing the transcripts.  The first was in 
accessing cases that had reporting restrictions attached to them.  To request 
permission to view the transcript, details of the case are required.  It is 
necessary to know the name of the defendant, the date of the hearing, the 
courtroom and the judge who heard the case.  In Alice’s case, her name was not 
reported, and so I was only able to provide the name of the judge who heard the 
case, the date of sentencing (as reported by the media), the offence convicted of 
and the sentence.  The court in question orders cases by defendant name.  The 
only means of determining that defendant’s name would have been through 
access to the daily court listings; however, these are destroyed after one year.  
Consequently, the court clerks were unable to determine the defendant’s identity 
                                             
9 Criminal Practice Directions [2015] EWCA Crim 1567. 
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and therefore, initially, could not forward my request for permission to the judge.  
I am uncertain how the court managed to identify the case, but permission was 
eventually granted.  This was not a difficulty in all cases with reporting 
restrictions, and so seems to be due to the nature of storing cases in individual 
courts.  
 
A further difficulty was due to Ministry of Justice policy relating to data retention.  
If a transcript has not been made within five years of the date of the court 
hearing, then the tapes of the transcript and records relating to the case are 
destroyed.  As such, even if permission has been granted, if no one has 
previously requested access to the transcript within that five-year period then the 
transcription company will not have any records of the case in their database.10  
It is for this reason that all my cases were heard after 2010, and why four cases 
were excluded from the sample.  
 
A final difficulty of using court transcripts lies in the cost associated with 
accessing such records.  The recording of the court case and subsequent 
transcripts belong to the transcription company who made the recording.  As 
such, access to the transcript can only be obtained if the fee for production is 
met.  Production of the transcripts of cases used in this research can be seen in 
Table 5, 
Case no. Cost (incl. VAT) Note 
Alice £30.91 Sentencing remarks 
Fiona £42.24 Sentencing remarks 
Hannah £180 Whole transcript 
Hayley £108 Whole transcript 
                                             
10 As per the Ministry of Justice policy The Crown Court Record Retention and Disposition 
schedule, accessed through FOI ref. 076-15 95498. 
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Lily £540 Whole transcript 
Sally £36 Sentencing remarks 
Tanya £396 Whole transcript 
Table 5 Cost of court transcripts 
As anecdotal evidence, in discussion with another academic who has used court 
cases as the source of data researching rape trials, I was advised that they 
decided it was more cost effective to pay a research assistant to sit in court and 
make verbatim notes of the proceedings, rather than pay for transcripts.  While 
this approach to data collection would work with an offence that is frequently 
heard in court, it would not work for suspicious perinatal death as the cases rare, 
and it is difficult to locate these cases prior to the court appearance.  Accessing 
court transcripts is expensive; however, considering the nature of the topic and 
difficulties accessing other sources of information, it is the most appropriate and 
feasible way to analyse how the law and criminal justice system respond to 
women who are suspected of perinatal killing. 
American case study 
To assist with my analysis of the law and its application in England, I conducted 
research into legal developments in the US.  This research was conducted while 
completing an AHRC research fellowship at the Library of Congress in 
Washington, DC.  The Library of Congress has one of the largest and most 
comprehensive law libraries in the US, providing access to the penal codes for 
all 50 states and Federal law.  Therefore, this research placement offered an 
ideal opportunity to consider how other legal jurisdictions have developed their 
laws in response to suspicious perinatal death.  
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American states provide an excellent example of legal development in criminal 
law relating to perinatal deaths, offering an example of an alternative process 
and ways of dealing with behaviour by pregnant women that is deemed to 
require criminalisation.  In most states in the US, a foetus is considered to have 
legal personhood.  As argued in Chapter 6, it may be favourable to change 
English law to provide protection to foetuses; however, this would have 
consequences on women’s rights.  Critical assessment of the developments and 
application of law in US states provides a case study of the impact of legally 
protecting the foetus.  As such, this research is not designed to be a comparison 
with the English system or law.   
 
The US provides an excellent case study of the development of law for a several 
reasons.  Developments in the law in these jurisdictions demonstrate the 
possible route that English law could follow, as most states derived their penal 
codes from English law and the born alive principle existed until 1970.  
Secondly, American Federal and state legal scholarship is advanced, providing a 
foundation to conduct legal research.  Thirdly, the development of law relating to 
prenatal harm has been subjected to considerable comment and debate from 
legal, political, sociological and criminological scholars, politicians, and activists.  
This debate has occurred amid a fierce political dispute surrounding abortion 
and the rights of the foetus.  This debate has informed and influenced the 
development of law and subsequent academic analysis.  Finally, as the legal 
developments surrounding prenatal harms are relatively new, case law is 
developing rapidly, and is freely available via Google Scholar.  Looking to the 
events in the US to help inform criminal responses to cases in England is not a 
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new method of analysis, but has been used by a number of scholars (for 
example Thomson, 1994).  
Analysis 
The court transcripts from the English cases were analysed in two different ways 
for two different purposes.  Firstly, they were analysed for their content, to 
consider what was said about the women within the setting of the court hearing.  
Thematic analysis was utilised.  Spencer et al. (2013b: 271) define thematic 
analysis as ‘discovering, interpreting and reporting’ meaning which is discovered 
within the data, based upon the principle of identifying ‘topics’ which are used to 
develop key ‘themes’’.  The aim is to gain data driven descriptions which will 
then be compiled and utilised to create abstract theoretical concepts and ideas.  
The use of this form of analysis results in a substantive (rather than structural) 
approach to the data being adopted, I sought to analyse the meaning of the 
content of documents as a reflection of the situations and events they depict.  
The analysis was cross-sectional, using the same codes and themes of analysis 
for each transcript.  The analysis approach followed the U-shaped model, first 
using the literature to inform and create initial ideas; secondly referring to the 
data to seek emerging themes, leads and ideas that come directly from the 
research data; finally returning to the literature to contextualise and further 
inform the themes identified in the data.  The principles which I followed are 
based on Spencer et al. (2013a; 2013b).  All seven transcripts were read to 
become familiarised with the content, and topic areas were identified.  The 
transcripts were indexed and sorted by topic.  Following this, the topic areas 
were developed and further analysed to produce three themes, which spanned 
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the initial topics.  Further analysis of the transcripts was conducted, using the 
themes as the lenses through which key sections of the transcript were identified 
and analysed.  The findings of this analysis are presented in Chapter 5. 
The nature of court transcripts makes thematic analysis the most appropriate 
form of analysis.  Court transcripts are a specific and unique type of source.  
They are a verbatim translation of speech presented in court, with the removal of 
hesitations, pauses and filler words.  In my attempts to engage with the 
transcription companies to enquire into their method of transcribing, I only 
received feedback from one company who advised their transcripts were ‘pretty 
much verbatim’.   
 
Speeches in court, particularly during the sentencing hearing, contain narrative 
elements.  They are re-constructions of what happened to whom and when, they 
are story telling with a purpose, a ‘contest of stories that transpires’ (Olson, 
2014: 371; Gewirtz, 1996; Jackson, 1996a; Rackley, 2010).  Understanding the 
courtroom as a place of narrative construction would potentially lead to the 
conclusion that narrative analysis would be an appropriate form of analysis, as it 
is concerned with how past events are captured and expressed with for the 
intended audience, with a focus on the sequencing and temporal nature of the 
narrative (Elliott, 2005).  However, narrative analysis has traditionally been used 
in the social sciences to capture how an individual narrates their life, the stories 
they tell, when and where (Plummer, 2001).  As a court hearing is a presentation 
of a narrative by third parties with the intention of telling a story for their own aim, 
the prosecution to justify the conviction and the suggested sentence, the 
defence to mitigate culpability, the judge to justify the sentence; it is not an 
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attempt to express what happened but to justify the process of law.  Within legal 
studies the method of ‘narration’ has also been used (Olson, 2014), however, 
this research does not aim to consider the process of law and its working per se, 
but rather to determine how it is utilised in order to criminalise women, what 
actions and characteristics of women are drawn upon to justify criminalisation.  
As such, narration was also not considered to be the most appropriate form of 
analysis.  A further mode of analysis that could have been employed was 
discourse analysis.  However, the focus of my analysis did not relate to how 
language works as a function to construct reality (Georgaca and Avidi, 2012) but 
was concerned with how existing social concepts and ideas are utilised in court 
to justify the legal response.  Therefore, it was decided that thematic analysis 
was the best option to fulfil the research aims.  
 
The second type of analysis conducted on the transcript was a consideration of 
how law was utilised, which offences were used as the means to criminalise the 
woman’s actions and what criminal wrongs were identified.  This form of analysis 
focused upon the structural aspects of the narrative provided in court, rather 
than how a defendant’s personal characteristics were portrayed.  Therefore, I 
drew on the details from the transcripts that outlined the defendant’s actions, 
how these met the criteria of the offence that was charged and therefore 
justified.  Subsequent analysis is reported in Chapter 6. 
 
The analysis of US case law was conducted with the intention of understanding 
how statute and the states’ penal codes have been interpreted.  Therefore, this 
analysis had a far clearer legal focus upon the consequences of judicial ruling 
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and the implications this had upon the lives and rights of women.  This analysis 
is presented in Chapter 7. 
Limitations 
One of the main limitations of this research project is that it only provides a 
partial picture of how the law responds in a small number of cases of suspicious 
perinatal death.  As application of the law is largely based upon discretion, police 
to investigate, CPS to charge, defendant to plead guilty, it is highly problematical 
to know the extent to which the operation of the law in the sample is 
representative of the application of the law in other cases.  In all cases in the 
sample, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge.  I have no way of knowing 
why this decision was made.  The incentive to plead guilty in exchange for a 
sentence reduction or plea or charge bargaining is noted by numerous 
researchers, leading to a conclusion that production of a guilty plea does not 
necessarily signify that a defendant has committed the crime to which they have 
pleaded guilty to (Hedderman et al., 1992; Jeremy, 2008; Henham, 2002; 
McCabe and Purves, 1972).  The extent to which decisions relating to the 
outcome of cases were based upon the interpersonal relationships between 
barristers and members of the CPS, or informal decisions of individuals within 
the system is beyond the scope of this research.  Such research would likely 
only be able to be conducted through interviews with legal professionals.  As the 
aim of the research is to reveal themes and processes that work within the legal 
system, and the gender biases encoded within criminal law, it is unlikely that 
interviews with individuals who work within the system would assist in meeting 
these aims.  It is not my aim to present a representative sample of how 
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individuals within the system complete their role.  Due to the personal discretion 
that operates within the system, interviews with individual professionals would 
only produce a partial view of how the system works.  A further limitation is that I 
have no information relating to cases that resulted in no legal sanction.  
However, what this research does offer is an analysis of the workings of the law 
once a conviction has been secured through a guilty plea.  It also demonstrates 
the actions of the accused women and their characteristics that are drawn upon 
to justify conviction.   
Ethics 
Whilst this research project does not have traditional ethical concerns of data 
collection, as the data has been collated and constructed by others, there are 
ethical concerns that need to be considered.  A priority was the protection of the 
accused women and their families.  As there are so few cases of suspicious 
perinatal killing in England, these cases would be easily recognisable if personal 
information about the accused were provided in the research.  I judged that their 
identification in this thesis and subsequent publications would cause potential 
harm.  As such, personal details of the women, their family, including the 
foetus/child, professionals who worked on the case, have all been anonymised.  
Similarly, dates of the events and proceedings, and the geographic location of 
the events and the courts have been excluded.  This includes withholding details 
of class and ethnicity.  These intersecting identities are important and affect the 
experiences of offenders in the criminal justice system, but neither is the focus of 
this thesis.  As I am interested in the perceived criminal wrongs, the impact of 
the structures of the law, and the role of the myths of motherhood in the 
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responses of the criminal justice system, the identities of these women and their 
personal circumstances are not of fundamental importance.  Their cases are 
examples of how women have been treated in England 2010-2014.  
Anonymisation of cases was also a condition under which access to court 
transcripts were provided.  The transcripts were anonymised and names of the 
defendants and family members were replaced with pseudonyms.  Similarly, 
personal information such as addresses were removed.  Use of text from the 
transcripts in quotes is provided only with the reference to the pseudonym given 
to the defendant and the section of the transcript from which the texts have been 
abstracted. 
 
Research data has been stored in encrypted files on a password protected 
computer.  Each type of source – transcripts, SCRs, and data analysis, have 
been stored in different encrypted folders, with different passwords.  Any hard-
copies of data have been secured in a locked filing cabinet.  The cross-reference 
list advising me of the identities of the defendant is stored in a separate 
encrypted folder, kept separately from the data. 
 
My sources of data were created by others and so I hold no copyright.  Under 
the s29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,11 the use of copyrighted 
material for research for a non-commercial purpose is allowed under ‘fair 
dealing’.  I have explicit permission from judges to make use of the court 
transcripts in this PhD research and subsequent research publications, provided 
                                             
11 c.48. 
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the identities of the defendants and any other person involved in the cases are 
not revealed.  
Conclusion 
As I have outlined in this chapter, researching the application of the law in cases 
of suspicious perinatal deaths is neither simple nor easily done.  I selected the 
method and source of data most appropriate to achieve the research aims, 
analysing court transcripts to explore the justifications for the application of 
criminal law.  The sample, while small, provides a comprehensive overview of all 
cases of suspicious perinatal death that I have identified to have occurred in 
England between 2010 and 2014. Through my stringent analysis of media 
reports and criminal statistics I can confidently state that I have included all 
relevant criminal cases that are known to have occurred and for which data is 
available.  The thematic analysis employed assists in meeting the research aims 
and is most appropriate for the data source.  Researching the killing of a 
foetus/child is difficult.  As noted, our knowledge of the application of law is 
partial, and a picture of the processes of law can only be constructed by piecing 
together information.  This research project provides the most comprehensive 
picture of events concerning suspicious perinatal deaths within the English 
criminal justice system between 2010-2014.  
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Chapter 3 Social regulation of 
motherhood 
Pregnancy is a highly medicalised and managed state, regulated and monitored 
by medical professionals.  During the twentieth-century, medical knowledge of 
pregnancy and childbirth has accumulated, constructing pregnancy as a period 
where two patients are contained within one body.  Desire to protect maternal 
and foetal life has resulted in check-lists of behaviours that are seen to be 
positive in pregnancy, as opposed to those considered to create or increase risk 
to a healthy outcome.  Changing expectations of behaviour during pregnancy 
has had consequences on the lives of pregnant women, who, feminists argue, 
are expected to self-manage their own risk, and the risk to their foetus.  This 
chapter presents an overview of the literature relating to risk management and 
governance of pregnancy.  The connection between the myths of motherhood 
and risk management are pervasive.  Feminists have argued that a direct 
connection is made between the ‘responsible pregnant woman’, who manages 
her foetus’ risk, and the ‘good’ mother (Lupton, 2011; Gregg, 1995; Harper and 
Rail, 2012).  This body of literature is significant in relation to the discussions of 
behaviour of the seven women in the data sample who were convicted of 
offences relating to suspicious perinatal death.  The extent to which each woman 
acted as a ‘mother’ and responded appropriately to pregnancy was a central 
feature of the court discussions.  To contextualise the court hearings, an 
understanding of concealed/denied pregnancy is required.  The nature of 
concealed/denied pregnancy and the connection with neonaticide is complex 
and does not simply demonstrate a woman’s intent to dispose of an unwanted 
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pregnancy, as is suggested by legal professionals during the court hearings.  
What is clear from the literature is that motherhood is perceived to begin long 
before birth, and it is widely expected that a mother will put the needs of her 
foetus before her own.  In cases of crisis pregnancy that manifest as a 
concealed/denied pregnancy, it is unlikely a woman will put the foetus’ needs 
before her own.  If the crisis pregnancy ends with the death of the foetus/child 
then such expectations cause significant problems for vulnerable women.  
Governing pregnancy 
The development of risk management theories has become a central focus of 
scholarly analysis of the treatment of pregnant women (Ruhl, 1999). The 
construction of medical knowledge in relation to pregnancy and foetal 
development has dramatically changed the ways that pregnancy is approached 
and managed, by medical professionals and pregnant women.  Prior to the 
twentieth-century pregnancy, labour and delivery were generally conducted in 
the community, a female-dominated sphere of life (Gowing, 1997).  Awareness 
of pregnancy might be indicated by ‘quickening’ (the point at which a woman first 
feels the foetus move inside, typically 15-17 weeks’ gestation), but otherwise it 
was unable to be confirmed until a woman’s labour was in its final stages.  
Furthermore, the health of a foetus was unable to be determined until post-birth.  
The mechanics of pregnancy were unknown, and no body of knowledge or set of 
techniques to manage pregnancy existed, consequently there was no rationale 
for medical supervision (Oakley, 1984).  During the twentieth-century, the 
conceptualisation of pregnancy changed.  Medical knowledge developed and 
pregnancy was pathologised – becoming an occasion for medical surveillance 
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and treatment (Oakley, 1993).  Tests to diagnose pregnancy were developed, for 
example, the hormonal pregnancy test became available for use by doctors in 
the 1930s (Oakley, 1984).  Pregnancy and childbirth moved from being a 
female-led, community-based experience, to an institution-based, medical 
experience, managed predominantly by male professionals (for historiography 
see Wertz and Wertz, 1989; Leavitt, 1986; Ehrenreich and English, 2010).   
 
The ‘medicalisation’ of pregnancy has received substantial criticism from 
second-wave feminists and feminist midwifery groups, who have viewed it as 
male control over women’s reproduction, requiring women to consult medical 
experts in what is ‘naturally’ a woman’s domain (Davis-Floyd, 1992; Leavitt, 
1986; Oakley, 1984; Martin, 1987; Lupton, 2012a; Rothman, 1989, 1993a; 
Ehrenreich and English, 2010).  The aim of this critique is not to argue that all 
medical intervention and knowledge is inherently negative.  Medical 
advancement has many benefits for women, for example, medical understanding 
of pre-eclampsia has resulted in successful treatments being developed for what 
was previously a fatal condition for women and their foetuses.  Instead, the 
critique lies in the harmful consequences of the technocratic model promoted by 
medical professionals (Davis-Floyd, 2001).  However, as Brubaker and Dillaway 
(2009) argue, there is no clear definition of the concept of medicalisation within 
sociological literature, nor is the concept of a ‘natural’ birth fixed or determined, 
particularly in the minds of women or medical professionals.  Brubaker and 
Dillaway argue that hospital birth has become so common place that it may 
seem ‘natural’.  Nevertheless, critique of the over-technical medical intervention 
remains strong as can be seen by campaigns in the United States, such as Our 
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bodies, ourselves, and the movement towards midwifery-led care in the UK 
(Boston Women's Health Book Collective, 2008, 2011; National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence, 2014; Wagner, 2006; Strong, 2000). 
 
The debate about the medicalisation of pregnancy is relevant due to its impact 
on the development of risk mentality in the medical management of pregnancy.  
The development of medical knowledge about pregnancy changed the way it 
was understood and approached.  Oakley (1984) argues, a division developed 
within childbearing of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’.  When antenatal care first 
operated, the task was to screen the population in search of the few women who 
were at risk of disease or death.  Now, screening is conducted in the ‘population 
suffering from the pathology of pregnancy for the few women who are normal 
enough to give birth with the minimum of midwifery attention’ (1984: 213).  The 
change in perception happened rapidly – 70 percent of childbirths were thought 
‘normal’-enough to be delivered at home by a midwife in the 1930s.  However, 
by the 1950s, 70 percent of all births were considered sufficiently ‘abnormal’ to 
be delivered in hospital (Oakley, 1984: 142).  Today, just 2.3 percent of all 
women give birth at home (National Health Service, 2015) suggesting that 
childbirth is perceived to be risky by professionals and also by women and their 
families.  As Ruhl (1999) argues, medical professionals’ involvement in 
pregnancy has had a dual-impact, the creation of risk through testing, monitoring 
and research, as well as the alleviation of that risk through treatment and 
medical management.   
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Weir (2006) notes that the construction of the perinatal threshold was a key 
element in the development of current responses to pregnancy.  She argues that 
the birth threshold, the point at which the foetus becomes a living subject and 
enters the social world, was disrupted in the early twentieth-century.  In attempts 
to lower rates of infant mortality and to optimise health of infants’, medical 
intervention moved into the new perinatal threshold.  Ideas developed that 
deaths around birth – before, during and after – bore similarities and remained 
high, and the foetus in later gestation in the womb was considered to be 
essentially the same as the newborn baby.  Consequently, physicians developed 
new targets and measures to prevent foetal and neonatal mortality – perinatal 
death.  Weir argues that this reduced the significance of birth and the nature of 
the treatment of pregnancy, as the threshold of two distinct subjects – mother 
and baby, moved from the end of labour, to during pregnancy.  The shift in 
perception assisted in the construction of the foetus as a subject requiring care.  
Rather than pregnancy being a situation where one person (the pregnant 
woman) needs care to produce a new human life, pregnancy has been 
constructed as a situation where two distinct beings need care. Weir argues, that 
the changing concept of the life/birth threshold, developed in the 1950s, signifies 
the start of the application of risk techniques towards pregnancy.   
 
The development of medical knowledge’s construction of the foetus as a subject 
distinct from its mother, and the responses to that knowledge have led many 
feminists to critique modern obstetric care, arguing that the foetus has become 
the focus – the patient, while the pregnant woman has been defined as no more 
than the foetal carrier or container (Bordo, 2003; Martin, 1987; Young, 1990; 
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Chavkin, 1992; Lupton, 1999b; Longhurst, 2001; Phelan, 1991).  Further 
development of foetal imaging techniques (Petchesky, 1987) and foetal surgery 
to directly treat the foetus (Knopoff, 1991; Williams, 2006; Fletcher, 1981) have 
reinforced this critique.  Feminists have argued that such technology and 
developments have framed the foetus as an independent entity, which 
marginalises the woman (MacKinnon, 1991).  This changing perspective of 
pregnancy has led to the pregnant woman being constructed as a threat to the 
foetus, and the role of foetal protector has been reassigned to healthcare 
professionals who may intercede on its behalf to ensure its wellbeing and 
security (Phelan, 1991; Halliday).  Nevertheless, as Fox and Worts (1999) have 
argued, medicalisation developed with the endorsement and encouragement of 
communities of women, many of whom take great comfort in the support 
provided by medical institutions during pregnant, and labour and delivery.  
However, women’s desire for intervention should not be accepted without 
consideration.  Fear of a bad outcome and belief in risk management strategies 
are pervasive and embody the everyday experiences of pregnancy and 
childbirth.  The success of theories of risk relies on people ‘buying in’ to fear and 
uncertainty.  The impact of risk management on women will be considered later 
in this chapter.   
 
Rather than consider the appropriateness of constructing the foetus as a distinct 
medical subject, the focus here is upon the impact of medical development and 
risk management upon women.  Beck’s (1992) theory of risk society has been 
influential, with the development of the preoccupation with risk prevention and 
security.  Risk comprises language, practice and modes of knowledge.  The 
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more attempts that are made to categorise risk, the more risk will be found, as 
such it is an unfulfilled process; no one can escape the fear of risk or its impact.  
Furthermore, while risk is often seen as value-free, with the use of scientific 
knowledge presented as objective, it is value-laden, and, specifically for this 
study, is gendered (Chan and Rigakos, 2002; Stanko, 1997; Walklate, 1997).  
Also influential is the work of Rose (1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2000), O'Malley (1992, 
2000, 2004) and Simon (1988), who developed Foucault’s (1991 [1977], 1992 
[1985]) principles of governmentality.  This body of literature theorises the 
governing and regulation of individuals within neoliberal society, arguing that 
rather than state management through force and coercion, the ideal neoliberal 
subject is guided and regulated by experts, embodying principles of prudence 
and self-regulation, managing risk and absorbing the cost of risk as opposed to 
burdening society by requiring social support.  Viewing pregnancy through this 
prism facilitates an understanding of the controls and regulations placed on 
pregnant women.  Governance of pregnancy is conducted not only by the 
medical community, but also by the wider community and by pregnant women 
themselves, which has led theorists to argue that the pregnant body is now a 
space for monitoring, control, and influence by individuals other than the woman 
whose body is impregnated (Stormer, 2000).  Both pregnant women and their 
foetuses have become biomedical subjects ‘their bodies defined, given meaning 
and regulated by the discourse of biomedicine’ (Lupton, 2012b: 336).  One of the 
consequences of this development is that there is now no such thing as a non-
risk pregnancy (Wertz and Wertz, 1989; Ruhl, 1999).  Undoubtedly a tension lies 
within the dynamic of pregnancy – two human subjects within one body, both 
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potentially needing, and in the case of the woman desiring, different and 
potentially oppositional treatment or behaviour.  
 
Within the discourse of risk, pregnancy has become a state that requires careful 
and managed risk prevention.  Risk management is predominantly focused on 
the risk to the foetus; the focus is not upon averting maternal risk, but reducing 
possible risk to the foetus that may be caused by maternal behaviour (Weir, 
1996; Ruhl, 1999; Lupton, 2012b; Helén, 2004).  The majority of the regulation of 
risk is achieved through, what Ruhl (1999) defines as the ‘liberal governance of 
pregnancy’, which enlists the co-operation of the ‘responsible’ pregnant woman.  
Drawing on the work of Rose (1993) and Valverde (1996) and their theories of 
liberal governance, Ruhl argues that within this context, responsibility is equated 
with rationality and the principle of adopting behaviour that will ensure the 
greatest benefit with the least risk, as such this risk discourse is also moralistic.  
One consequence is that pregnant women absorb the burden of the risk, as it 
plays out within the form of an individualised risk model, rather than a collective 
risk model.  In this sense, it is the behaviour and factors surrounding the 
pregnant woman and her responsibility for those factors, drinking alcohol for 
example, that are perceived to have most impact on the foetus, rather that wider 
social factors, such as pollution (see Chavkin, 1992; Bordo, 2003; Lane, 2008; 
Lazarus, 1994).  The concept of upholding health as an act of responsible 
citizenship in neoliberal society is not solely experienced by pregnant women.  
However, as Lupton (1999b) argues, greater pressure is exerted on pregnant 
women as they are expected to uphold not only their own health, but also the 
health of their foetus.  As such, the individualised risk model constructs the 
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pregnant woman as her foetus’ most ardent protector, but also its greatest threat 
(Ruhl, 1999).  Within pregnancy, Ruhl argues, risks that attract social 
commentary are those that are borne by the foetus and the responsibility for 
these risks falls to the pregnant woman, regardless of the fact that many are 
beyond her control.  In her critique of the individual risk model of pregnancy, 
Ruhl aims to highlight the inappropriateness of applying the individual risk model 
to pregnancy.  Women do not ‘control’ their pregnancy as the risk model 
suggests and the definition of ‘responsibility’ in pregnancy is often moral and 
scientific.  In an analysis of popular advice manuals written for pregnant women, 
Ruhl identifies that a ‘responsible’ pregnant woman is defined as a woman who 
has planned her pregnancy, has an expected standard of motivation and 
education, and an acceptance of medical authority.  The demands on pregnant 
women to adapt their behaviour are extensive and rarely acknowledged.  Even if 
a woman decides not to follow the constrained requirements, she nevertheless 
feels guilty and responsible for anything that may go ‘wrong’.  Ruhl argues that 
the construction of risk in pregnancy ignores several key factors.  Firstly, 
assumptions of risk are all encompassing.  Secondly, the construction of risk is 
highly medicalised and so is extremely partial, it includes only the medical 
aspects of health during pregnancy, ignoring socio-economic factors, such as 
poverty and domestic abusive situations.  Thirdly, the constructions of risk are 
necessarily partial and so exaggerate some risks, while downplaying others.  
Finally, the discourse allows for no evaluative mechanism to weigh the effects of 
different risks.  Nevertheless, the actuarial model of government and classic 
liberal theory holds the concept of prudence as key (O'Malley, 1992).  The ideal 
liberal citizen possesses self-discipline and will refrain from burdening others.  
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When applying this concept to pregnant women, the suggestion becomes that 
women are complicit in any birth defects regardless of whether she could have 
prevented it.  Such a perception overlooks women’s lack of control over their 
foetus’ development.  The ‘prudential model of pregnancy’ makes demands on 
women that are simply unrealistic, requiring ‘that pregnant women be on their 
guard, every second of their pregnancy, for something, anything, which might 
prove to be the slightest bit harmful to their foetus’ (Ruhl, 1999: 110).  
 
Weir (1996, 2006) also disputes the validity of the concept of risk in application 
to pregnancy and foetal development.  She considers the risk management of 
pregnancy as operating as a form of security, defining it as ‘clinical risk’.  Prior to 
the 1970s risk in pregnancy was defined on an individual level, based on family 
medical history and exposure.  Following the ‘constitution’ of the foetal body 
through verbal and visual distinctions denoted from medical tests and 
examinations starting in the 1950s, the ‘proliferation of foetal objects established 
parameters of physiology and pathology in the foetus’ (1996: 377).  This 
construction has created a new subject of medical governance.  Consequently, 
standardised, population-based, routine risk assessments in clinical practice 
have ‘saturated’ management of pregnancy.  As Weir argues, ‘the schema 
‘prenatal risk assessment’… has acted as a transmitter of security for the unborn 
configured as foetus, standardising and concerting care of foetal health in clinical 
practice’ (2006: 4).  As such, all women are subjected to the same concepts of 
risk, regardless of their personal circumstances and medical history.  Weir 
argues there is strong argument to suggest that risk prevention models in 
pregnancy have limited impact upon the outcome of the pregnancy or the health 
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of the foetus.  Nevertheless, all women are expected to adapt their behaviour 
and conform to ‘guidance’ provided based on medical knowledge.  
 
It is important to appreciate that public policies and social expectations of the 
responsible neo-liberal subject are not only experienced by pregnant women.  
As noted above, neoliberal citizens are expected to self-manage and self-
regulate with the guidance of experts.  Development of feminist discourse 
identifying women as rational agents, rather than as being passive, less 
intelligent and able to reason than men, has undoubtedly had positive impact on 
women.  Feminists have highlighted the distinct nature of women’s offending 
(different to that of men in both nature and volume), the vulnerabilities of female 
offenders, and the structural disadvantages faced by women that can lead to 
both victimisation and offending (Worrall, 1990; Edwards, 1984; Carlen, 1983).  
However, a consequence of this is that women have been ‘responsibilised’, as 
both offenders (Kendall, 2002) and victims (Walklate, 1997).  Indeed, as Snider 
(2003) has argued, through attempts to demonstrate the complexities of female 
offending and punishment, feminists criminologists have been complicit in the 
responsibilisation of criminal women, and the surge in punitive punishments of 
women both within and outside criminal justice institutions.  Within neoliberal, 
industrial, capitalist society, only select discourses are heard by politicians, the 
public and criminal justice professionals.  This has had an impact on all women 
as they interact with regulatory institutions (criminal justice, social services, 
education, health, for example).  For pregnant women, there have been specific 
consequences in regards to how behaviour deemed to be bad for the ‘baby’ has 
Chapter 3 Social regulations of motherhood 64 
been conceptualised and responded to (Benoit et al., 2014).  This idea is 
explored in Chapter 7, when the experience of American women is analysed.  
Risk: the impact on women 
The framing of pregnancy in relation to risk has affected women’s experiences, 
scholars have debated whether or not this has been beneficial to women.  
Rothman (1986, 1993b) and Tymstra (1991) argue that pregnancy often has a 
tentative nature for women, only becoming ‘real’ after all the tests have been 
carried out and the results are positive.  Women have reported that they kept 
their pregnancy a secret until they were certain that the foetus would be healthy.  
As already argued, all pregnancies are now considered to involve risk, therefore 
this uncertainty in pregnancy is likely to continue until the baby is born.  Lennon 
(2016) argues that increased knowledge of pregnancy has not increased a 
sense of security, instead surveillance and testing have resulted in women 
feeling at increased risk.  Gregg (1995, 1993) supports this finding, arguing that 
women now face a ‘paradox of choice’ – increased technology has served to 
reduce women’s choices.  The quantity of choices for prenatal testing now 
available, forces women to make choices, and so pressures them to participate.  
From her study of pregnant women, Gregg (1995) concludes that for some 
women the decision to participate in prenatal testing cannot be considered a 
‘choice’, instead they perceive it as a responsibility and expected behaviour.  
Other women reported feeling obliged to have tests as they were considered to 
have an elevated risk, such as being aged over 35, hence at an increased risk of 
their foetus having Downs Syndrome.  Women also reported feeling compelled 
to ‘choose’ prenatal testing due to pressure exerted by friends and family.  
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Gregg concludes that ambiguity and contradiction characterises women’s 
experiences of pregnancy. 
 
Other scholars have argued that prenatal testing reassures women.  For 
example, Harpel (2008) reviewed women’s opinions of and feeling towards 
ultrasound tests.  She concluded that while the prospect of the test did appear to 
cause anxiety, this may have represented excitement about the examination as 
well as concern that they might be told of potential problems with their foetuses.  
Harpel concludes that pregnant women want to know about the health of their 
foetuses, they want good news; reassurances about foetal health.  Harpel 
questions how prepared some women would be if they learnt of potential 
problems.  Research, such as Harpel’s, suggests that the principle of prenatal 
testing and risks associated with harm impact the ways that women experience 
their pregnancies.  The concepts of ‘normal’ pregnancy that can be identified 
through tests raise difficult ethical questions both in relation to the foetuses and 
pregnant women.  For a foetus, the impact of a test with a negative result may 
lead to a decision to terminate the pregnancy (for discussion of ethics see Scott, 
2007).  For pregnant women, the impact of such tests can be numerous.  
Tymstra (1991), for example, argues screening for detection of disease or risk 
factors creates the prevention paradox: it is not possible for one person to profit 
without others losing out.  For the risk-based tests to function a high participation 
rate is required.  The benefits of information about high risk obtained by a small 
number of women is gained at the expense of many more women who will 
undergo ultimately unnecessary tests, which may result in emotional disturbance 
due to the tests and results.  For some women, a miscarriage of a healthy foetus 
Chapter 3 Social regulations of motherhood 66 
may occur as a direct result of testing.  While these issues are not the focus of 
this thesis, the point raised here is that the concept of risk and the construction 
of ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ foetuses and pregnancies, and ‘low-risk’ and ‘high-
risk’ pregnancies are not neutral nor purely positive in outcome; they have a 
direct effect on the way women experience being pregnant and the decisions 
they make.  
 
A further effect of risk identified through empirical research is the self-regulation 
and control of behaviour that pregnant women experience.  Lupton (2011) 
argues that women extensively self-regulate and adapt their behaviour to 
conform to expectations.  Furthermore, she argues that the lack of resistance to 
dominant discourse by mothers in her study of 60 women demonstrates the 
strong societal pressures exerted upon women.  Studies have concluded that, as 
Ruhl (1999) argued, this pressure often involves extensive burdens on women.  
For example, in their study of women’s perception of weight gain during 
pregnancy, Harper and Rail (2012) concluded that women found it difficult to 
reconcile the dominant discourse of maternal responsibilty, personal control over 
weight and health, and criticism of those who did not conform, with alternative 
and contradictory discourses influenced by external factors and embodied 
experience; as one woman noted ‘if I was in a different culture, probably nobody 
would care how much I weighed’ (2012: 76).  However, women also reported 
feelings of guilt for not meeting recommendation, as the same woman 
exclaimed: ‘Am I doing something wrong? Is the baby going to be too small at 
birth?’ (2012: 76).  Nevertheless, women in the study reproduced, or at least 
accommodated, the medical health discourses, describing their understanding 
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and employment of this discourse as a maternal and moral responsibility for the 
foetus’s health.  Women in the study discussed feelings of anxiety due to not 
doing everything they should for their unborn child.   
 
Studies have also identified the strong link made between the concept of the 
‘responsible’ pregnant woman and the ‘good’ mother.  Lupton (2011) concludes 
that the pressure on women to conform to dominant ideas presented in the 
discourse of maternal responsibility is inextricably linked to the idea of the 
‘responsible mother’ who puts the needs of her foetus and child first.  But 
constraints on pregnant women are not merely from above.  The women 
interviewed in Lupton’s study self-regulated and voluntarily disciplined their 
bodies and their own behaviour.  They also policed the actions of other pregnant 
women; they were the subjects of surveillance as well as the instigators of 
surveillance over their own infants and other mothers.   Lupton concludes that at 
the centre of these reproductive health imperatives lies the emotional aspect of 
caring for babies and children: the desire to protect the vulnerable and beloved 
child, to ensure optimal development and life chances, to avoid distress cause 
by illness, and to view oneself and be recognised by other as a ‘good mother’.  
This connection between conforming to health and risk discourse and being a 
‘good’ mother was also a conclusion drawn by others (see Gregg, 1995; Harper 
and Rail, 2012).    
 
The impact of the myths of motherhood and ‘good’ mother ideology has been 
noted to have distinct consequences on pregnant women and how they conduct 
themselves during pregnancy.  Van Mulken et al.(2016) interviewed 30 pregnant 
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women to investigate women’s experiences of physical activity while pregnant.  
They concluded that women’s experiences demonstrate that mother-blaming 
now starts at conception, rather than birth.  Many women reported reducing their 
physical activity due to concerns it would harm the baby.  Perceptions of social 
sanctions against exercising during pregnancy were reported by women and 
many women felt obliged to reduce physical activity, in line with social 
expectations, despite their desire to continue to exercise.  Similarly, Brooks-
Gardner (2003) argues that current cultural expectations for pregnant women 
maintain that behaviour during pregnancy is understood as a demonstration of 
her devotion to her foetus and future child.  Women are deemed to have ultimate 
responsibility for the foetus and consequently for its health and development.  
Thus, her behaviour and self-regulation are symbols of love and her role as a 
‘good’ mother.  Lupton (2012b) argues that pregnant women have become 
public figures; their bodies have become a display for others to touch and 
comment upon in ways that would not be appropriate for other adult bodies.  The 
medical construction of the foetus as patient also plays a role here.  As Bessett 
(2010) argues, this hierarchy of foetal and maternal health makes maternal 
sacrifice legitimate.  
 
Despite this increased regulation and control of the female pregnant body 
(including self-regulation), studies have also found that some women are 
resistant to medical advice, or specifically search for non-medical experts to 
guide their pregnancy.  For example, van Mulken et al. (2016) found that many 
women’s decisions to exercise during pregnancy were based on how they felt, 
rather than the opinions of others, including medical professionals.  Women who 
Chapter 3 Social regulations of motherhood 69 
did not adopt the physical activity recommended demonstrated active resistance 
to the dominant discourse, noting that they felt ‘healthy-enough’.  Other research 
such as studies by Burton-Jeangros (2011) and Johnson (2015) concludes that 
women do demonstrate agency within the framework of medical management 
and the governance of pregnancy.  However, as Burton-Jeangros (2011) argues, 
acts of resistance to professional advice are often accompanied by feelings of 
guilt and anxiety, and dismissal of the risk approach is very difficult. Burton-
Jeangros conclude that two mechanisms intervene to prevent rejection of risk, 
firstly healthism, which advocated maternal responsibility and the reliance on 
professionals for advice.  Secondly, the social-cultural environment reinforces 
medically defined behaviour among pregnant women by challenging deviant 
behaviour. 
 
Studies that note women’s resistance to the dominant discourse demonstrate 
the tension between public and cultural expectation, and experience and 
behaviour of pregnant women.  However, as noted in the discussion of the 
myths of motherhood, resistance to dominant discourse, or failure to conform to 
the myths, is not experienced equally by all women.  Class has been noted as a 
point of analysis in the governance of pregnancy literature (see Ruhl, 1999). 
Lupton (2011), for example, concluded that women with higher levels of 
education and income, living in prosperous suburbs, tended to be more vigilant 
of what they consumed while pregnant. In contrast, women from working-class 
backgrounds, with lower levels of education and income, were less likely to 
change their lifestyles.  Women in this demographic were more likely to continue 
smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol while pregnant; although they often did 
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try to reduce their consumption of these substances.  Lupton argues that 
socioeconomic disadvantage, social isolation, and other problems result in 
difficulties breaking these habits, even with awareness of professional warnings.  
As previously argued, women and mothers are not policed equally and public 
scrutiny is often focused on those individuals who are least able to conform to 
societal expectations of motherhood and the responsible pregnant woman.   
 
Literature exploring the impact of the governance of pregnancy on women has 
focused on those women who experience a wanted pregnancy.  The research 
presented above demonstrates the stresses and strains placed on women due 
to the framing of pregnancy in this manner.  Within this discourse of risk, 
responsibilities placed on women and expectations of behaviour are based on 
voluntary participation.  As we will explore in Chapter 4, there is no legal 
obligation in England for a woman to act in the best interests of her foetus.  
Nevertheless, expectations of the behaviour shape how professionals respond to 
pregnant women and new mothers.  No previous literature identified has 
considered the impact of the governance of pregnancy on women who 
experience a crisis pregnancy.  As noted in the Introduction, the cases analysed 
in this thesis involve situations where a woman has interpreted her pregnancy to 
be a crisis.  In the remainder of the chapter, I will present literature on 
concealed/denied pregnancy and neonaticide.  As we will see, the 
understanding of risk in such cases is framed in relation to the risk that women 
cause the unborn child by concealing/denying a pregnancy.  Such analysis 
appears to use expectations of female behaviour outlined above as a standard 
of normality against which women who conceal/deny pregnancy are judged. 
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Concealed/denied pregnancy 
Women who give birth without previously advising anyone they were pregnant 
have been the focus of medical, psychological, and psychiatric literature, as 
attempts have been made to understand and explain such behaviour.  There is 
limited coherency in the literature as to whether a woman and the people around 
her can fail to realise she is pregnant.  Debate as to appropriate terminology 
reflects these disputes.  One clear distinction in terminology is between 
psychotic and non-psychotic denial of pregnancy.  Psychotic denial of pregnancy 
relates to schizophrenic disorders.  Scholars argue that changes in the body 
relating to pregnancy are apparent and people around the woman are conscious 
of the pregnancy.  The woman may interpret the pregnancy as a form of illness 
and the movements of the foetus in a delusional manner, such as perception of 
a ‘bug’ living insider of her or her liver moving around (Miller, 2003; Slayton and 
Soloff, 1981; Gonçalves et al., 2014).  None of the women in the sample 
experienced this form of pregnancy denial.  
 
Within the parameters of behaviour considered to be non-psychotic, disputes lie, 
notably in the distinction between ‘denied’ pregnancy and ‘concealed’ 
pregnancy, the two terms used most often within the literature.  Those who use 
the terminology of ‘denial’ argue that women have an initial recognition and 
awareness of their pregnancy, but that this is followed by a refusal or inability to 
accept the situation and so denial of the pregnancy occurs (Spinelli, 2001; 
Brezinka et al., 1994; Overpeck et al., 1999).  Miller (2003), for example, 
identifies two forms of non-psychotic denial of pregnancy: ‘affective denial’, a 
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woman intellectually knows she is pregnant, but experiences none or few of the 
emotions or behavioural changes; and ‘pervasive denial’, occurs when a woman 
is not consciously aware she is pregnant.  Other scholars have drawn a 
distinction between ‘denied’ and ‘concealed’ pregnancy, perceiving them as two 
distinct concepts, arguing that a denial is an unconscious awareness of 
pregnancy, while concealment is being aware of a pregnancy but actively hiding 
it from the wider world (Friedman and Resnick, 2009; Friedman et al., 2007; 
Berns, 1982; Wessel et al., 2007; Dulit, 2000; Vellut et al., 2012; Murphy Tighe 
and Lalor, 2016).  Others have used the two terms interchangeably or do not 
draw a distinction (Wessel et al., 2003; Spielvogel and Hohener, 1995; Milstein 
and Milstein, 1983).  However, Miller (2003) argues that to deny a pregnancy is 
also to conceal it, thus suggesting they are the same phenomenon.  Similarly, 
Meyer and Oberman (2001) refute the idea that the two phenomena are mutually 
exclusive, arguing that women could go through both types at any stage in their 
pregnancy.  Other scholars have also documented the co-occurrence of denial 
and concealment and so have used the phrase ‘negation’ of pregnancy (Amon et 
al., 2012; Putkonen et al., 2007a; Putkonen et al., 2007b).  As Beier et al. (2006) 
argue: 
…denial and concealment of pregnancy are not separate identities.  
Instead, they represent different intensity levels of a flawed inner 
psychological rationalisation of pregnancy that may have many different 
reasons (2006: 726). 
Others have argued that there is no fixed line between unconscious and 
conscious denial as a defence mechanism, instead it is more of a fluid transition 
(Brezinka et al., 1994; Green and Manohar, 1990).  Similarly, Spinelli (2001) 
argues that to be able to deny something one must have a prior knowledge of 
the existence of the reality being denied.  Thus, there is no consensus as to 
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whether a woman can lack conscious awareness of her pregnancy, and 
consequently the language that should be employed to symbolise awareness.  
Women’s awareness of their pregnancies in these cases does not seem to be 
clearly definable.  Undetermined and varying levels of awareness do not appear 
to be uncommon.  As ‘concealed’ and ‘denied’ are the two most common 
phrases in use in the literature, and as the distinction between the two is unclear 
I will use the term concealed/denied when discussing this experience.  
 
The consequence of concealed/denied pregnancy is that the expected 
symptoms and bodily changes of pregnancy can be misinterpreted, significantly 
reduced or absent (Brezinka et al., 1994; Milstein and Milstein, 1983; Milden et 
al., 1985; Spielvogel and Hohener, 1995), as can the signs and pains of labour 
(Spinelli, 2003; Miller, 2003).  There have been reports that a discovery of 
pregnancy at six or more months gestation can lead to a woman who had no 
previous signs of pregnancy to suddenly developing them, such as growth in 
breasts, weight gain, growth in abdomen and detection of foetal movements 
(Bascom, 1977; Sandoz, 2011).  Many studies have noted that those around 
pregnant women, including parents and sexual partners residing in the same 
home, are also involved in the concealment/denial, the nature of their subjective 
knowledge also being uncertain (Finnegan et al., 1982; Vellut et al., 2012; Meyer 
and Oberman, 2001; Beyer et al., 2008; Amon et al., 2012).  
 
Concealed/denied pregnancy is conceptualised from a biomedical perspective 
and it is perceived that women who experience the phenomenon may have a 
psychiatric disorder (Murphy Tighe and Lalor, 2016); evident in the description 
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as a ‘reproductive dysfunction’ used by Beier et al. (2006).  As such, attempts to 
determine risk factors associated with women who conceal/deny pregnancy 
have been attempted, but with limited success.  Studies have found that women 
who conceal/deny pregnancy come from all social classes, and are not 
determined by age or marital status (Friedman et al., 2007; Wessel et al., 2007).  
Psychological distress, fear, stigma and isolation have been noted as factors 
(Conlon, 2006; Thynne et al., 2012), as has being a victim of rape, incest, and 
domestic and emotional violence (Spielvogel and Hohener, 1995; Friedman et 
al., 2007; Porter and Gavin, 2010; Spinelli, 2001).  However, others have 
disputed some or all of these suggestions, noting that a denial/concealment 
could occur in any well-adjusted woman if the right external pressure and 
psychological conflict occurs (Jenkins et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2007).  
Consequently, a number of scholars have concluded that increased surveillance 
of all women of childbearing age is an appropriate tool to prevent 
concealed/denied pregnancies; including regular administration of pregnancy 
tests (Jenkins et al., 2011; Kaplan and Grotowski, 1996).  Jenkins et al. (2011) 
argue that concealed/denied pregnancy should be viewed as a ‘red flag’ that 
should trigger referral for psychiatric assessment.  The overwhelming perception 
in the literature is that a concealed/denied pregnancy will have detrimental 
effects on both the woman and the foetus/child.  Consequently, stark warnings of 
the dangers of this behaviour are presented, for example Murphy Tighe and 
Lalor (2016) note that a woman may experience psychological stress and 
childbirth complications, such as postpartum haemorrhage or death; the 
foetus/child may have delayed diagnosis in foetal abnormalities that could be 
treated, low birth weight, prematurity, birth injuries, abandonment or death.  
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Fears of such harm are not without their merit, but it must be noted that concern 
over the welfare of the foetus/child in concealed/denied pregnancies is largely 
due to the strong connection made with neonaticide.  A further aspect of risk and 
concealed/denied pregnancy, is the concept that this behaviour is abnormal and 
thus worthy of academic study.  While this perception is perhaps not misplaced, 
it nevertheless signifies the extent to which declaration of pregnancy and pursuit 
of medical advice is now deemed to be the norm.  Consequently, any other 
behaviour has been pathologised and thus believed to require explanation.  This 
point is significant in relation to the data explored in Chapter 5. 
Neonaticide 
Many studies focused on neonaticide have concluded that a concealed/denied 
pregnancy is a risk factor for neonaticide (Jenkins et al., 2011; See also Alder 
and Baker, 1997; Beier et al., 2006; Beyer et al., 2008; Craig, 2004; Friedman et 
al., 2012; Friedman and Friedman, 2010; Friedman et al., 2005; Meyer and 
Oberman, 2001; Oberman, 2003a; Porter and Gavin, 2010; Saunders, 1989).  
However, as Spinelli (2010) argues, neonaticide is an unusual outcome of 
denied pregnancy and may be due to other types of psychopathology.  Similarly, 
Vellut et al. (2012) argue that we cannot determine the extent to which 
concealment/denial of pregnancy results in a neonaticide as studies of 
occurrences of neonaticide draw on different sources to those studying 
concealment/denial, preventing any form of meaningful comparison.  Statistical 
evidence further supports the argument that concealed/denied pregnancy is not 
a risk factor for neonaticide.  Wessel et al. (2002) argues that in Germany one in 
every 2,455 pregnancies are denied for the whole term and result in an 
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unexpected birth of a viable newborn.  Pierronne et al. (2002; cited in Gonçalves 
et al., 2014) argue the rate in France is one in 1,000.  In Wales it is estimated 
that concealed pregnancies occur one in 2,500 deliveries (Nirmal et al., 2006).  
In England and Wales 700,999 babies were delivered, live- and stillborn, in 2015 
(Office for National Statistics, 2016a).  Using the Nirmal et al. (2006) calculation, 
approximately 280 concealed/denied pregnancies would have occurred in 
England and Wales in 2015.  While we do not know the exact instances of 
neonaticide (or perinatal death) that occur each year, as discussed in the 
Introduction, the estimated figure is far lower than 280.  Thus, it is reasonable to 
conclude that while neonaticide often occurs after a concealed/denied 
pregnancy, a concealed/denied pregnancy does not clearly indicate a risk of 
neonaticide.  
 
As with the concealment/denial literature, the neonaticide literature also presents 
a fractured picture of the characteristics of the perpetrator and nature of the 
killing.  This lack of consistency can be partly explained by the nature of 
individual studies.  For example, Beyer et al. (2008) argues that psychiatric 
literature often includes older women, whereas criminological literature tends to 
identify younger women.  Similarly, the sources of data that a study utilises can 
also impact the conclusions drawn.  Bortoli et al. (2013), for example, reviewed 
studies conducted in prisons, psychiatric units and the general population, 
finding that higher rates of mental disturbance were reported in studies 
conducted in psychiatric units.  Nevertheless, even with this caveat, key findings 
can be drawn from the literature.  Due to social, cultural and religious contexts 
the literature reviewed is focused on Australia, Europe, New Zealand and North 
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America.  It should also be noted that this literature is focused on a 
contemporary understanding of neonaticide.  Newborn child death has a long 
history and extensive historiographies exist in relation to characteristics of the 
perpetrator, causes, and social and legal responses to the phenomenon.  The 
legal history of neonaticide in England will be explored in Chapter 4.  
 
Neonaticide is almost exclusively a female crime.  Almost all research identifies 
only female perpetrators.  However, two studies have identified male 
perpetrators, both are based on findings from criminal justice material (Makhlouf 
and Rambaud, 2014; Beyer et al., 2008).  Much of the literature constructs a 
stereotype of the neonaticidal woman: she is young, often a teenager, single, 
lives with her parents, comes from a low socioeconomic background, and has 
few economic, social and emotional resources to deal with the pregnancy (See 
Alder and Baker, 1997; Camperio Ciani and Fontanesi, 2012; Craig, 2004; 
d'Orbán, 1979; Resnick, 1970, 1969; Friedman et al., 2012; Porter and Gavin, 
2010).  Many women are also described as ‘passive’, not taking active steps to 
address the pregnancy (Brozovsky and Falit, 1971; Spinelli, 2001; Beyer et al., 
2008; Amon et al., 2012).  Nevertheless, cases of non-stereotypical neonaticidal 
women have been presented.  For example, perpetrators older than teenagers 
have been identified in numerous studies (Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Friedman 
et al., 2005; Beyer et al., 2008; Vellut et al., 2012).  The Amon et al. (2012) 
review of coroner’s reports and death certificates in Finland and Austria 
concluded that perpetrators’ average age was 28.  There is also dispute in the 
literature about perpetrators’ socioeconomic background, for example Beyer et 
al. (2008) in their review of law enforcement case files in the US concluded that 
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the majority of the offenders were middle-class, with only 5 out of 37 women 
identified as working-class.  Similarly, the Vellut et al. (2012) review of French 
judicial files concluded that no distinctive socio-demographic profile could be 
identified.  A review of cases in the US using newspaper reports, conducted by 
Meyer and Oberman (2001), found the sample came from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds and across ethnic groups.  Many studies reported 
that perpetrators are not always single, childless and living with their parents.  
Amon et al. (2012) noted that 16 of 28 perpetrators were married or living with a 
partner and all sixteen reported having sexual relationships during the 
pregnancy.  Whilst Beyer et al. (2008) found that 15 of 40 perpetrators had 
experienced previous pregnancies, with eleven women having living biological 
children.  From this review of the literature I would suggest that demographically 
there is no ‘typical’ woman who commits neonaticide. 
 
A further debate in the literature concerns the extent to which women who 
commit neonaticide are in control of their actions and their state of mind at the 
time of the act or omission that resulted in the death of the child.  Scholars argue 
widely that neonaticidal women are not psychotic and that psychopathology is 
rare (d'Orbán, 1979; Amon et al., 2012; Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Alder and 
Baker, 1997; Craig, 2004; Beyer et al., 2008; Camperio Ciani and Fontanesi, 
2012; Friedman et al., 2012).  After reviewing the literature, Porter and Gavin 
(2010) conclude that women’s ‘actions of concealing the pregnancy, labour, and 
corpse strongly suggest they are able to function in their own best interest’ 
(2010: 108).  Indeed, much of the literature appears to consider the actions of 
the woman to be for the purpose of personal gain or self-preservation in ridding 
Chapter 3 Social regulations of motherhood 79 
themselves of an unwanted child (Friedman et al., 2012; Makhlouf and 
Rambaud, 2014; Camperio Ciani and Fontanesi, 2012; Motz, 2008).  Studies of 
this nature provide limited context to the lives of neonatal women.   
 
Studies with the aim of exploring the lives of such women, have provided further 
understanding of their motivation and mental state.  In their review of law 
enforcement files in the US Beyer et al. (2008) conclude that women are often 
motivated by fear, associated with shame and guilt of being pregnant and 
concern about the reaction of parents, partners and others if the pregnancy is 
discovered.  Oberman (2003b) argues that maternal filicide is deeply embedded 
in and responsive to the societies in which it occurs.  Oberman’s social-legal 
work with Meyer (2001) into the instances of maternal filicide and neonaticide in 
the US has led them to conclude that overwhelming fear and shame of 
pregnancy explains women’s behaviour.  In many of the cases in their sample 
women were living with other sources of stress, such as religious or social 
values governing sexuality, immigration status, financial hardship, domestic 
violence.  Fear associated with the pregnancy can be experienced as a threat to 
personal wellbeing.  Rather than experiencing a profound psychotic state, the 
experience is temporary and varies in depth.  Meyers and Oberman argue that 
the active fear and cognitive denial of pregnancy experienced by these women 
leads them to postpone any decision about the pregnancy until it is too late and 
they are giving birth alone; the birth often comes as a shock to the woman.  They 
argue that the motivation for killing comes from fear and panic, rather than 
anger; it is common for women not to remember the birth and some women with 
a more profound denial will not recall the pregnancy.  Spinelli (2003) draws 
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similar conclusions after conducting psychiatric interviews with seventeen 
American women who were accused of killing their newborn children.  The aim 
of the interviews was to determine the mental status of the women at the time of 
the offence to assist the court cases.  Spinelli categorised the women as having 
unassisted births associated with dissociative psychosis in 10 cases, 
dissociative hallucinations in 14, and intermittent amnesia delivery in 14 cases.  
All the women in her study described ‘watching’ themselves during the birth.  
Twelve experienced dissociative hallucinations ranging from an internal 
commentary to critical and argumentative voices, 14 experienced brief amnesia, 
9 described associated psychotic symptoms at the sight of the infant.  Following 
the dissociation hallucination and amnesia the women awoke to find a dead 
newborn child whose presence they could not explain.  The women lived in a 
context of social isolation, emotional neglect, leading chaotic lives and with 
bizarre and strained relationships with their parents.  Two psychiatric case 
studies presented by Brozovsky and Falit (1971) provide similar accounts.  Both 
women denied knowledge of their pregnancies and Brozovsky and Falit 
conclude that in these situations the birth of the child is a shock to the woman.  
Denial continued through labour and only ended when the babies began to cry.  
Brozovsky and Falit hypothesise that it is the end of the denial, accompanied by 
the overwhelming fear of abandonment by family, that prompted the initial denial, 
that leads women to kill the child.  Further studies have also reported women’s 
feelings of fear of rejection or abandonment by their social circle if the pregnancy 
is discovered, leading to the concealment/denial of the pregnancy and resulting 
in the woman birthing alone, often shocked by the experience she is facing 
(Alder and Baker, 1997; Wheelwright, 2002; Amon et al., 2012).   
Chapter 3 Social regulations of motherhood 81 
 
From this literature it appears that the context of a woman’s life before she 
becomes pregnant has a significant impact on the occurance of neonaticide.  
This conclusion is also drawn by Vellut et al. (2012) who conducted a 
psychological study in France using judicial files.  Eight out of the 22 women 
wanted to keep the baby, and three women changed their opinion from rejection 
to desire to keep the child during the pregnancy.  Nevertheless, they did not 
prepare for the birth.   
Mothers appeared to disconnect pregnancy from childbirth.  While a 
majority was conscious at one time or another of being pregnant, none of 
them anticipated or prepared for delivery, even though some of them 
wanted the child. They spoke to no one, did not assign a social existence to 
the pregnancy, did not register it and did not have prenatal care (2012: 
562). 
Vellut et al. argue that although the majority of the women knew that they were 
pregnant at some point, none of them anticipated or prepared for the labour or 
delivery, and they were unable to confide their knowledge of pregnancy with a 
third party.  Within this context, the only possible outcome in these cases was to 
give birth in secret, resulting in panic; consequenlty the woman became a victim 
of her own deception, and the baby died.  Vellut et al. further argue that it is the 
context prior to the woman being impregnated which causes neonaticide: 
The causes of neonaticide are in fact to be looked for prior to pregnancy 
among these women who appeared to lack knowledge about the realities of 
sexuality and affective relationships (2012: 562). 
They conclude that neonaticide is not unconditionally connected to 
denied/concealed pregnancy.  Similarly, desire for a child and a woman’s 
emotional connection with her pregnancy will not necessarily prevent 
neonaticide occurring.  The context for neonaticide is formed in relation to the 
characteristics of the woman, the lack of social existence granted to the foetus, 
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and the nature of her relationships with those around her, ‘leading to situations 
of secrecy and isolation’ (2012: 563). 
 
The nature of the context of neonaticide has raised questions about the level of 
culpability and criminal liability that should be placed on women who cause the 
death of newborn children.  In a case reported by Kaplan and Grotowski (1996) 
a woman from New South Wales, Australia, gave birth into the toilet, not 
realising she was pregnant prior to the late stages of labour.  She seated herself 
on the toilet as she believed she was having a bowel movement.  Her state is 
described as an ‘emotional panic’.  After the arrival of the emergency services 
she was assisted off the toilet and the baby was found to be full-term, but dead; 
cause of death is not discussed in the paper.  The authors note that no legal 
consequences occurred for the woman, and the obstetricians believed the death 
was due to unfortunate consequences of the circumstances of the birth.  Kaplan 
and Grotowski note that this is not a case of neonaticide.  Kaplan and Grotowski 
do not aim to discuss the legal parameters of the case, or reasons why the 
criminal justice system chose to not respond to the death.  I highlight the case to 
demonstrate a recorded example of leniency.  For other women such leniency 
has not been demonstrated by the criminal justice system.  For example, in the 
US inconsistency in the decisions to prosecute, determination of guilt, and 
sentencing is noted by numerous legal and sociological academics (Barton, 
1998; Fazio and Comito, 1999; Maier-Katkin and Ogle, 1997).  Legal 
commenters in the US have called for neonaticide syndrome to be recognised as 
a formal medical condition and therefore to be permitted as evidence of criminal 
insanity in trials of women accused of newborn homicide.  In principle, the 
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literature in favour of this argument suggests that while women who kill newborn 
children may not have a mental health disorder, such as schizophrenia or bipolar 
disorder, the accounts of the women who have committed neonaticide suggest 
that they were not in control of their actions, and that they were not fully aware of 
what they were doing or the consequences of their actions (Bookwalter, 1998; 
Macfarlane, 1998; Wills, 2004).  
 
The literature on neonaticide and denial/concealment of pregnancy raises 
questions about criminal liability when the foetus/child dies.  Considering that a 
woman may not be in a rational state of mind, or in control of her actions during 
the pregnancy, birth and in postpartum period, it is questionable if she should be 
held liable for the death.  The argument that neonaticide is caused by the 
context of a woman’s life, and her social isolation, raises further questions as to 
individual culpability.   
Conclusion 
During the twentieth-century significant changes in social expectations of 
pregnant women and mothers have developed.  There are strong connections 
between the myths of motherhood and the demands placed on pregnant women 
to manage risk.  The myths, despite being socially, culturally, politically, and 
historically constructed, continue to influence the expectations of women’s 
behaviour and activities of many mothers.  These expectations now reach into 
the lives of pregnant women and operate from conception.  A contemporary 
example can be seen in the response to the Zeka virus by Public Health 
England.  Women are being advised to not get pregnant for eight weeks after 
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she or her male partner return from a country with active Zika virus transmission, 
if they have no symptoms.  If symptoms of the virus are observed, then it is 
advised that pregnancy be avoided for 6 months following the start of symptoms 
(Public Health England, 2016).  This exemplifies the arguments presented above 
of the governance of pregnancy; demonstrating an expectation that women will 
put the needs of an unconceived child before their own, acting as the 
responsible, and so ‘good’, mother.  Such expectations have consequences for 
all women in relation to their plans to become pregnant, and decisions to have 
sex, as many pregnancies are unplanned.   
 
Medical knowledge about pregnancy, the development of knowledge of foetal 
and prenatal health have had significant impact on how women experience 
pregnancy.  As Lupton (2012b) argues, pregnant women have become a social 
and cultural spectacle.  They are legitimately open and available for public 
concern, comment, and advisement in ways that would be considered 
unacceptable or intolerable by non-pregnant people.  Within neoliberal society a 
responsible pregnant woman, synonymous with a good mother, is one who 
calculates the risks of her actions on the likely outcome for her foetus.  The 
outcome of concern to society is mostly focused on that experienced by the 
foetus.  However, as numerous scholars have noted, there are few assurances 
in pregnancy and poor health of a foetus often has little to do with the behaviour 
of pregnant woman; strict adherence to professionally provided guidance will not 
necessarily produce a healthy foetus.  Thus, as Ruhl (1999) and Weir (1996) 
have argued, individualised or actuarial models of risk simply cannot be applied 
to pregnancy and the behaviour of pregnant women.   
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Nevertheless, concern over the behaviour of pregnant women continues.  
Pregnancy is perceived as a medical condition requiring professional exploration 
and treatment. The literature on concealment/denial of pregnancy would indicate 
that women who fail to seek treatment are perceived to be abnormal and in need 
of academic study to attempt to understand them and mitigate the risk they pose 
to their unborn child.  Similarly, belief about a connection between 
concealment/denial and neonaticide continues, despite significant evidence that 
neonaticide is related to the woman and context of her life, rather than directly to 
the fact that she concealed/denied her pregnancy.  
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the key issues that surround the social 
and cultural concerns of pregnancy.  Understanding this literature is important 
for analysis of the data, Chapters 5 and 6.  The accepted normality of pregnant 
women putting the foetus first and self-regulating to ensure a good outcome is 
evident in the cases of suspicious perinatal death.  Such cases demonstrate not 
only the gendered nature of risk management strategies, but the extent to which 
the application of criminal law is encoded with gendered assumptions.  In the 
next chapter, legal literature of criminal offences relating to suspicious perinatal 
death is reviewed.  Understanding of the social and cultural context is essential 
to contextualise the law.  Application of the law occurs with consent of the 
society and mostly conforms to the cultural beliefs of the dominant ideology.  
Specifically, in relation to identifying perceived criminal wrongs (Simester and 
Von Hirsch, 2011).  This chapter has provided an understanding of the dominant 
beliefs of the appropriate behaviour of pregnant women.  Such beliefs underpin 
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the principles of perceived criminal wrongs.  In conjunction with Chapter 4, this 
analysis provides the framework for how and why the women in the sample are 
criminalised. 
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Chapter 4 Legal regulation of 
motherhood 
To be a victim of a crime against the person in England it is necessary to be 
born alive.  As such, to obtain a conviction for homicide, the prosecution must 
prove that the child lived an independent existence from its mother.  The born 
alive rule is a fundamental principle of English criminal law and provides the 
legal context of the case studies analysed in this thesis.  As will become clear 
from the data analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, prosecutors can draw upon several 
offences to criminalise and punish women who experience a suspicious perinatal 
death; homicide offences, notably infanticide; concealment of birth; procuring a 
miscarriage, and by extension child destruction.  This chapter outlines the scope 
and function of each offence to provide context for the legal analysis in chapter 6 
and to demonstrate the distinctions between the English system and the 
development of foetal protection laws in the US, Chapter 7.  The offences were 
enacted during the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries, and the historic 
development of each has a bearing on the structure and application of the law 
today.  As such a historiography of the offences in question is necessary.   
The implications of concealment 
A historical examination of newborn child death in England uncovers a 
prolonged concern that women who are suspected, but cannot be proven, to 
have killed their newborn children, have got away with murder.  As this brief 
history illustrates, the law has been shaped to facilitate the criminalisation of 
suspected women in instances where wrong-doing is identified, but is not 
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specifically punishable under the law; it is through this desire to criminalise that 
the offence of concealment came in to force.   
 
In 1624 legislation was first enacted to facilitate criminalisation of women who 
were suspected of killing their newborn children, ‘An Act to Prevent the 
Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children’ (hereafter ‘1624 Act)’ mandated 
that in instances where a ‘lewd’ (unmarried1) woman… 
…be delivered of any issue of her Body Male or Female, which being born 
alive, should by the Lawe of this Realme be a Bastard, and that she 
endeavour privatelie either by drowning or secret bury thereof, or any other 
way, either by herself or the procuring of others, soe to conceale the Death 
thereof, as that it may not come to light, whether it were borne alive or not, 
but be concealed, in every such Case the Mother soe offending shall suffer 
Death as in case of Murther, except such Mother can make proof by one 
Witness at the least, that the Child (whose Death was by her soe intended 
to be concealed) was borne dead (Parliament Papers, 1624 21 Jac 1 c.27; 
cited in Kilday, 2013: 17-8). 
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, the requirement to prove live-birth and 
separate existence made convictions for the murder of newborn children difficult 
to secure without a witness to testify the infant was born alive (Jackson, 1996b).  
The 1624 Act directly addressed this difficulty, as the offence removed the 
burden of proving live-birth in such cases where the offender was an unmarried 
woman.  The statute did not create a new offence, as all people were still tried 
under the common-law offence of murder, a capital offence.  However, it did 
reverse the presumption of dead-birth of a child, replacing it with a presumption 
of live-birth in cases involving concealment of the birth of the child born to an 
unmarried woman.  In such cases murder was presumed irrespective of whether 
or not the child was born alive and evidence of concealment of the birth and 
                                             
1 Marriage was not formulary regulated by the state at this time.  Smart (1998) argues that the 
status of being married or not married was more fluid than in subsequent eras. 
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death of an illegitimate child provided ‘almost conclusive evidence of the child’s 
being murdered by its mother’ (Blackstone, 1791: 198).   
 
Focus on women who concealed the birth and the body of a child, and by 
extension the pregnancy, arises specifically during the late sixteenth-, early 
seventeenth-centuries due to changes in state welfare.  Sanctions against 
women who were suspected of causing the death of their newborn children 
appears to have always existed (Wrightson, 1975, 1981; Staub, 2004; Walker, 
1968; Damme, 1978; Kellum, 1974).  However, greater public and official 
concern over women killing illegitimate infants developed within the context of 
increased regulation and control of the poor in Elizabethan society (Hoffer and 
Hull, 1981; Kent, 1973; McLaren, 1990).  Unwed women became the target for 
legislation designed to save the local community from bearing the cost of their 
offspring (Hoffer and Hull, 1981; Kilday, 2013; Sharpe, 1983).  It is the 
enactment of these poor laws which Hoffer and Hull (1981) and Jackson (1996b) 
attribute to the rise in unwed women killing their illegitimate newborns.  Hoffer 
and Hull cite a 225 percent increase in the number of criminal indictments after 
1576 (1981: 8).  Despite this rising figure, it is unclear if this reflected a rise in 
the level of criminality, or if it was simply a rise in the reporting and conviction 
rates.  Nevertheless, there was public anxiety that unmarried women were 
concealing their pregnancies, giving birth alone, and killing the child, to conceal 
the fact that they ever gave birth to that child, with the aim of escaping 
punishment under the poor laws (Jackson, 1996b; Hoffer and Hull, 1981; 
Beattie, 1986; Kilday, 2013).  The 1624 Act was introduced as a means to 
capture women who aimed to escape punishment under the poor laws; with the 
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wider aim to reduce the number of illegitimate children who would be a financial 
burden on the state (Jackson, 1996b).  A consequence of the law was to make 
concealment of birth a criminal offence for unmarried women, punishable by 
death (Loughnan, 2012b; Jackson, 1996b; Beattie, 1986).  While the legislation 
appears to reflect religious and moral sentiment, analysis of Parliamentary 
records by Kent (1973) leads to the conclusions that the aim of the legislatures 
when regulating personal conduct was to curb behaviour that was deemed to 
have social implications, rather than purely religious and moral ones.  In relation 
to statute targeting bastardry, the aim appears to have been financial in nature, 
by reducing the burden of illegitimate children (Beattie, 1986; Jackson, 1996b; 
Hoffer and Hull, 1981).  Nevertheless, the 1624 law and subsequent 
prosecutions had a clear moral focus.  While the killing of both legitimate and 
illegitimate newborn children persisted, unwed women were targeted for 
criminalisation (Rapaport, 2006).  Thus, the statute reflected wider public 
concerns with illegitimacy and female sexuality (Gowing, 1997). 
 
Following an initial rise in the rate of convictions the numbers quickly declined 
(Dickinson and Sharpe, 2002; Hoffer and Hull, 1981; Rabin, 2002).  However, by 
the second half of the eighteenth-century the 1624 Act had widely fallen out of 
use and unmarried women were more frequently tried under the principles of 
presumed dead-birth, requiring evidence of live-birth to secure a murder 
conviction (Jackson, 1996b; Beattie, 1986).  During the eighteenth-century, 
developments occurred within the criminal justice system that proved 
incompatible to the principles of the 1624 Act; the concept of seeking truth 
became integral to the trial process; the adversarial system developed; and a 
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greater emphasis on proof, with the growing belief that where doubt exists it 
should be resolved in favour of the defendant (Beattie, 1986; Langbein, 1977, 
2005; Duff, 2004).  Jackson (1996b) argues that as well as the changing nature 
of the standard of proof required to convict a person of an offence, change in 
use of the law was due to the changing attitudes to the character of accused 
women.  A ‘humanist’ approach to newborn killing developed, whereby women 
were perceived by some to be acting due to a desire to protect their modesty 
and virtue, rather than as a result of them being lewd, inhumane, and unnatural 
murderers (see also Clayton, 2009; Staub, 2004).  Public and judicial concern 
also grew about the accuracy of tests used to demonstrate live-birth and hence 
the reliability of evidence supporting the conviction of women, notably the 
floating lung test (McLaren, 1990; Kilday, 2013).  As such, the number of trials 
conducted under common law increased, and juries were discouraged from 
convicting women (Jackson, 1996b; Kilday, 2013; Hoffer and Hull, 1981). 
 
The 1624 Act was repealed in 1803, (hereafter ‘1803 Act’) (The Parliamentary 
History of England, 1801-1803: 1245-7).2  The 1803 Act re-established the 
presumption of dead-birth for unmarried women tried for newborn child death.  
However, the Act created a new offence, concealment of birth (hereafter 
‘concealment’).  The legislation read, 
…in Evidence that the Prisoner was delivered of Issue from her Body, Male 
or Female, which if born alive would have been Bastard, and that she did 
by secret burying or otherwise endeavour to conceal the Birth thereof… 
that such Prisoner shall be committed to the Common Goal or House of 
Correction for any Time not exceeding Two Years (a copy of the final Act is 
available in 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1802-
1803: s4). 
                                             
2 43 Geo. 3 c.58. 
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The offence only applied to an unmarried woman after she had been charged 
with the murder of her newborn, and at her trial it was determined she could not 
be convicted of that offence, then in such an instance, the jury could return the 
verdict of guilty of concealment.  Jackson (1996b) argues the offence punished 
women for a pattern of behaviour that was deemed punishable but was not 
technically criminal.  The act of concealment was deemed to suggest a 
presumption of wrong-doing.  Furthermore, Jackson argues that the new offence 
demonstrates the ‘persistent prejudice’ to unmarried pregnant women (1996b: 
172); illustrating continued concern with the moral and legal significance of 
concealment, considering it to be suspicious and punishable in its own right 
(Jackson, 1996b; Kilday, 2013).  However, use of the offence went further.  
Concealment provided a legitimate means to punish women who were 
suspected, but could not be proven to have killed their newborn children.  As 
noted, it was extremely difficult to prove that a child had been born alive, and 
therefore murder convictions were hard to achieve.  Thus, concealment offered a 
pragmatic solution to the problem of how to punish such women; Davies (1937: 
213) refers to the offence as a ‘convenient stop-gap’.  The offence also 
facilitated a lenient punishment towards women whom a jury suspected of 
wrong-doing, but did not want to sentence to death with a murder conviction 
(Higginbotham, 1989; Brennan, 2013a; Rose, 1986; Walker, 1968).  In both 
respects, it fulfilled the Act’s sponsor, Lord Ellenborough’s, intention to increase 
the number of convictions and strengthen criminal law (The Times, 1803: 2; 
Jackson, 1996b; Davies, 1937; Kilday, 2013).  As McLaren (1984) argues, 
Ellenborough was a firm believer in using the law to instil terror, and was 
motivated by the desire to penalise women, even if the punishment was minor, 
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rather than have the courts appear to condone the actions of such women by 
refusal to convict.  
 
During the nineteenth-century the offence of concealment was amended.  The 
law was expanded in 1828 to include any woman, regardless of her marital 
status, and became a substantive criminal offence that did not rely upon a 
charge of murder.3  In 1861, under s60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861,4 the offence was amended so that any person who endeavours to conceal 
the birth of a child would be guilty of the offence, thus facilitating the conviction 
of a person who may assist a pregnant woman, or acted with or without her 
permission.  The Act passed without Parliamentary debate.  It is under this 
legislation that the offence of concealment still operates.  However, it is no 
longer possible to be convicted of concealment following a not guilty verdict on 
an indictment of murder.  A conviction of concealment can only be obtained 
following indictment for that offence.5 
 
Today, concealment is categorised by the police as a miscellaneous crime 
against society, it currently reads: 
If any woman shall be delivered of a child, every person who shall, by any 
secret disposition of the dead body of the said child, whether such child 
died before, at, or after its birth, endeavour to conceal the birth thereof, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be 
liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not 
exceeding two years.6 
                                             
3 Offences against the Person Act 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c.31); a copy of the final Act is available in 
19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1828: s17.  
4 24 and 25 Vict. c.100; a copy of the final Act is available in 19th Century House of Commons 
Sessional Papers, 1861: s60. 
5 Criminal Law Act 1967, c.58, s2 13(1)(a). 
6 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s60. 
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The legislation has been interpreted and defined by extensive case law (Legal 
analysis supported by Archbold and Richardson, 2017; Halsbury's laws of 
England, 2016).  The offence prohibits the concealment of the knowledge of a 
birth through the secret disposal of the body.7  The ingredients of the offence 
are, firstly, a woman must be delivered of a child, rather than a miscarriage,8 and 
the child must have been developed enough to have a fair chance of surviving 
outside of the womb;9 currently 24 gestational weeks.  Live-birth is not required 
for the offence.  Secondly, the child must be dead prior to the concealment, 
whether born alive or not.  If the child is alive when the body is concealed then 
this is not concealment,10 but it may be a homicide or child cruelty offence.  
Thirdly, there must be a secret disposal of the body either by the woman or by 
another person.  Secret disposal has been defined by the courts as a body being 
placed in a location in which it is unlikely to be found; such as a secluded 
place.11  Leaving the body in the street is not concealment.12  The offence has 
not been committed if the woman is found to still have the body in her 
possession, even if she is about to dispose of it.13  Similarly, a woman’s denial 
that she has given birth to the child is not sufficient to support a conviction, 
without a secret disposal of the body.14  If a woman allows the dead body to be 
taken away she has not committed the offence, unless she requests for the body 
to be disposed of in a secret place, or has knowledge of someone else’s intent 
                                             
7 R v Rosenberg [1906] 70 JP 264. 
8 R v Hewitt, R v Smith [1866] 4 F & F 1101. 
9 R v Berriman [1854] 6 Cox CC 388. 
10 R v May [1867] 10 Cox CC 448. 
11 R v Brown [1870] LR 1 CCR 244; see also R v Sleep [1864] 9 Cox CC 559; R v Cook [1870] 
11 Cox CC 542; R v George [1868] 11 Cox CC 41; R v Waterage [1846] 1 Cox CC 338. 
12 R v Clark [1883] 15 Cox CC 171. 
13 R v Snell [1837] 2 Mood & R 44. 
14 R v Turner [1839] 8 C & P 755. 
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or consents to it.15  In which case both the woman and the person who has 
concealed the body have committed the offence.   
 
The mens rea of the offence is to endeavour to conceal the birth of a child.  The 
concealment is from the world at large, not from a particular individual.16  The 
offence can be used in circumstances where a child is stillborn, born alive and 
dies through no fault of the pregnant woman, or born alive and killed by the 
pregnant woman through an act or omission.  As such, the offence can be 
charged in conjunction with a homicide offence or offence against the person.  
The concealment of the body does not need to be linked in any way to the cause 
of death and the offence can be used even where concealment is only a 
circumstance of the death of the child, rather than the cause.  Furthermore, the 
reason for wishing to conceal the birth, subsequent death and the dead body of 
the child is not of importance to the offence.  It is for the judge to decide as a 
matter of law if there is evidence that the child’s body was so placed in order to 
conceal it, whilst it is for the jury to decide if the defendant had disposed of the 
body with the intent to conceal the birth.17 
 
The dearth of academic research into the offence of concealment means that we 
have limited knowledge of its use 1900-2010.  From historic crime data, a clear 
downward trend in the number of recorded instances of the offence has been 
seen 1930-date, see Figure 1; with exception of during and following the Second 
World War when a peak is witnessed.  This peak corresponds with a growing 
                                             
15 R v Bate [1871] 11 Cox CC 686; R v Douglas [1836] 1 Mood CC 480; R v Bird [1849] 2 Car & 
Kir 817; R v Skelton [1850] 3 Car & Kir 119. 
16 R v Morris [1848] 2 Cox CC 489; R v Higley [1830] 4 C & P 366. 
17 R v Clarke [1866] 4 F&F 1040. 
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concern about women’s sexuality and illegitimacy (see for example DeGroot, 
2000; Hartley, 1966; Rose, 1998).  Convictions for the offence have been low 
since 2002, as demonstrated in Table 6.  The difference between police 
recorded and conviction data could be explained by the discovery of a body, but 
the mother never being found, or decisions by the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) to not prosecute.  Similarly, lack of evidence to ensure a conviction may 
explain the disparity between the figures.  The introduction of the Infanticide Act 
193818 may also have had an impact on the number of recorded instances, 
prosecutions and convictions of the offence, this will be discussed below.  
Further data available on use of the offence in recent times can be gleaned from 
Mackay’s (2006) review of CPS files 1990-2003.  Out of the fifteen cases of 
infanticide, four women were charged with concealment of birth as well as 
infanticide or murder; Mackay does not note if the women were convicted of 
concealment alongside their infanticide conviction.   
 
Concealment continues to be used in conjunction with homicide offences, as 
was the intention of legislators when enacting the 1803 Act.  However, it is now 
also possible for a woman to be indicted for concealment alone, notably in 
instances where proof of live-birth of the child cannot be ascertained.  Use of the 
offence in these two instances leads to two interpretations of the offence, either, 
it continues to be used in instances where homicide is suspected, but proof 
might not be possible, potentially due to lack of clear evidence of live-birth, or 
alternatively, the act of concealing the dead body of a baby may now be 
understood and interpreted as a criminal act in and of itself, requiring  
                                             
18 1 and 2 Geo.6, c.36. 
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Figure 1 Concealment of birth recorded crime figures 1989 to 2013/14.19   
                                             
19 Data obtained from Home Office (2016) and Office for National Statistics (2016b). 
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Table 6 Offence Concealment of Birth in England and Wales: Police recorded data, offence first charged 
and reaching a first hearing at the Magistrates’ Court, Defendants proceeded against at magistrates’ courts, 
and defendants fund guilty at all courts. 
 
punishment alongside homicide.  If the latter, then a shift in the interpretation of 
behaviour has occurred, moving from what Jackson (1996b) described as 
criminalising a pattern of behaviour that was deemed punishable, although was 
not technically criminal, to belief that such behaviour is, in and of itself, criminal.  
In the cases reviewed by Mackay (2006), not all women who hid the body of 
their infants were charged with concealment.  Such evidence of the use of the 
law would suggest inconsistency in application.  An assessment of the purpose 
and use of the offence is presented in Chapter 6, with consideration of the cases 
in the data sample. 
                                             
20 Data obtained from Office for National Statistics (2016b). 
21 Data obtained from Crown Prosecution Service FOI ref. 4974. 
22 Data obtain From Ministry of Justice, FOI ref. 921-14 94607. 
23 Ibid. 
Year Police 
recorded: 
Concealing 
an infant 
death close 
to birth20 
Offences 
charged and 
reaching a first 
hearing at 
Magistrates' 
courts21 
Defendants 
proceeded 
against at 
magistrates’ 
courts22 
Defendants 
found guilty at 
all courts23 
2002/03 7 2002 - 2002 - 2002 0 
2003/04 6 2003 - 2003 4 2003 4 
2004/05 6 2004 1 2004 1 2004 0 
2005/06 8 2005 3 2005 3 2005 3 
2006/07 4 2006 6 2006 3 2006 3 
2007/08 8 2007 1 2007 1 2007 1 
2008/09 8 2008 3 2008 2 2008 2 
2009/10 6 2009 5 2009 4 2009 4 
2010/11 9 2010 7 2010 3 2010 3 
2011/12 5 2011 0 2011 0 2011 0 
2012/13 2 2012 2 2012 0 2012 0 
2013/14 2 2013 1 2013 0 2013 0 
2014/15 5 2014 0 2014 - 2014 - 
2015/2016 5 2015 - 2015 - 2015 - 
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Procuring a miscarriage 
Debate exists within the historic-legal literature that whether prior to 1861 a 
woman could be held criminally liable for ending her own pregnancy (see 
Dickens, 1966; Keown, 1988; McLaren, 1984).  This ambiguity ceased with the 
enactment of s58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (a copy of the 
final Act is available in 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, 
1861: s58-9).  Keown (1988) argues that the change to the statute to specifically 
target women who self-abort was only a clarification of the law, rather than 
substantive change, as self-abortion had always been a common-law offence.  
However, as the statute passed with limited political and popular debate (Potts et 
al., 1977), it is not possible to know why women were specifically targeted for 
criminalisation by this legislation.  Generally the literature agrees that the historic 
purpose of the law was to prevent or condemn the intentional destruction of 
foetal life and to prevent harm from coming to pregnant women (Dickens, 1966; 
Keown, 1988; Sheldon, 2016b; Potts et al., 1977).  Williams (1958) argues that 
the second purpose was most important, as the concern was not for the unborn 
child, but for the injury done to the mothers as a result of the actions of an 
unskilled abortionist.  
 
Today, abortion is legally regulated through the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861, in conjunction with the Abortion Act 1967.24  The Offences Against the 
Person Act currently reads, 
s58  Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own 
miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other 
noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means 
                                             
24 c.87. 
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whatsoever with the like intent… and being convicted thereof shall be liable 
to be kept in penal servitude for life. 
Exception to prosecution is offered in specific therapeutic circumstances.  In its 
current form, the Abortion Act provides that, 
1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty 
of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is 
terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical 
practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith— 
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that 
the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the 
pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or 
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to 
the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or 
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the 
pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or 
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer 
from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. 
The majority of legal abortions are performed under s1(1)(a), which is interpreted 
widely and facilitates broad medical discretion (Sheldon, 2016b).  In 2015 98% 
of abortions, numbering 181,231 were carried out under this section, 99.95% of 
those were reported as being performed because of risk to the woman’s mental 
health (Department of Health, 2016).  Numerous scholars have explained why 
the Abortion Act was passed in 1967 (Brookes, 1988; Keown, 1988; Potts et al., 
1977; Sheldon, 1997; Francome, 1986; Dickens, 1966).  The main argument is 
that such a significant number of abortions were occurring without prosecution, 
that the law was essentially meaningless, and medical professionals exerted 
significant influence on the framing of abortion legislation, ensuring that control 
and regulation of therapeutic abortion fell to them.  As such, the Act confirmed 
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previous common-law relating to the medical profession, notably R v Bourne25 
which established that abortion was legal if conducted with the intention to 
preserve the life of the mother and that the concept of preserving life included 
both physical and mental health.   
 
What is of relevance to this thesis is the consequence of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861 in conjunction with the Abortion Act 1967 upon the liability 
faced by women who may choose to self-abort (Legal analysis supported by 
Archbold and Richardson, 2017; Halsbury's laws of England, 2016).  A self-
abortion remains illegal under s58 of the Offences Against the Person Act, as it 
would not be conducted within the legal limits of the Abortion Act.  It is not 
necessary for the attempt of self-abortion to cause a miscarriage – the foetus 
does not need to die, nor does its body need to be expelled from the uterus for 
the offence to be committed, however intent to procure a miscarriage must be 
proven.26  Therefore, if the attempt fails and the pregnancy continues then the 
offence has still been committed.  An attempt to procure a miscarriage that 
results in the foetus being born alive would also constitute the offence.  Similarly, 
if the attempt results in the foetus dying, but the body not being expelled from 
the uterus then the offence has still been committed.  
 
The substance must be  a poison or noxious thing and it is not sufficient to prove 
merely that the accused imagined that the substance administered would have 
the interested effect.27  ‘Poison’ is a recognised poison and it is irrelevant if the 
                                             
25 [1939] 1 KB 687. 
26 R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307; R v Spicer (1955) 39 Cr App R 189. 
27 R v Isaacs (1862) LJMC 52; R v Hollis (1873) 12 Cox 463. 
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quantity taken is too small to be capable of doing harm.28  ‘Noxious thing’ refers 
to something other than a recognised poison that is harmful in the dosage when 
administered, even though it may be harmless in small quantities.29  If the 
substance produces a miscarriage then it is clearly a noxious thing within the 
statute,30 but even if it does not and cannot it may still be considered a noxious 
thing,31 as long as the quantities in which it is administered can have some 
harmful effect on the human system.32  However, it is not necessary that the 
substance should be an abortive.33  'Any other means' includes manual 
interference and hitting a woman in the lower part of her body.34  It is irrelevant if 
the means used to procure the miscarriage are incapable of doing so.35  In order 
for a woman to be convicted of the offence it must be proved that she was 
actually pregnant at the time of attempting to procure a miscarriage.  If she is not 
pregnant then she may be convicted of attempt to commit the offence or of 
conspiracy to commit it or aiding and abetting others.36  ‘Miscarriage’ is 
constructed as presupposing that the fertilised ovum has become implanted in 
the uterine endometrium, as such the use of drugs or devices that prevent 
implantation of a fertilised ovum, such as the morning after pill, do not constitute 
the offence.37  However, ‘contraceptive’ drugs that operate at the time of or 
following implantation to either be taken once per menstrual cycle (rather than 
                                             
28 R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307. 
29 R v Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307; R v Hennah (1877) 13 Cox CC 547; R v Marcus [1981] 1 WLR 
774. 
30 R v Hollis (1873) 12 Cox 463. 
31 R v Marlow (1965) 49 Cr App R 49. 
32 R v Hennah (1877) 13 Cox CC 547. 
33 R v Marlow (1965) 49 Cr App R 49. 
34 R v Spicer (1955) 39 Cr App R 189. 
35 R v Marlow (1965) 49 Cr App R 49; R v Spicer (1955) 39 Cr App R 189. 
36 R v Whitchurch (1890) LR 24 QBD 420; R v Sockett (1909) 1 Cr App R 101. 
37 R (on the application of Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 610 (Admin), 
2002 WL 498814. 
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throughout as with currently available contraceptive drugs), or once a woman’s 
menstrual period is late, would constitute the offence (Sheldon, 2015).   
 
The current legal regulation of abortion has come under scrutiny in recent years.  
Sheldon (1993, 1997) has long argued that the law has always refuses to 
recognise that women have a fundamental right to decide to terminate a 
pregnancy.  Instead the law advocates that doctors are the best people to 
determine if a woman should be allowed an abortion.  A woman has no 
fundamental right to an abortion in England (Sheldon, 2014).  She concludes 
that the framing of the Abortion Act 1967 to give control and decision-making to 
medical professionals directly relates to the way women were constructed by 
Parliament when enacting the legislation (Sheldon, 1993, 1997).  In 
Parliamentary debates relating to the Abortion Act, motherhood was portrayed 
as the normal role for a woman; women were constructed by political discourse 
as minors in terms of immaturity and lacking responsibility or morality; as victims 
in horror-stories of back-street and self-abortions; and portrayed as fraught and 
being out of their minds due to the pregnancy.  In contrast, the doctor was 
constructed as a male, mature, responsible and professional.  In her most recent 
work, Sheldon (2016a, 2016b) has directly called for decriminalisation of 
abortion.  Sheldon (2016b) argues that criminal controls on abortion are now 
outdated, out of step with modern medical science, and serve to hinder clinical 
best practice.  The Abortion Act was enacted with two purposes in mind, neither 
of which are achieved under current criminal law.  Firstly, like the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861, the Abortion Act aimed to prevent harm to women 
by ensuring abortions were conducted by skilled practitioners and in hygienic 
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conditions.  Sheldon argues that the advances in medicine since 1967 make the 
criminal prohibition of abortion unsustainable: abortion in the UK carries a far 
lower risk of maternal death than does carrying a pregnancy to term; and there is 
no good evidence to suggest that abortion causes psychological injuries to 
women and claims it causes breast cancer or infertility have been demonstrated 
to be scientifically unfounded.  Sheldon argues that as the aim of the Abortion 
Act was to protect women, it seems odd that they potentially face life 
imprisonment if accessing abortion outside of the medical system, arguing that 
other medical practices that have been accessed illegally and result in harm to 
the user, such as elective cosmetic surgery, result in calls for further regulation 
of the practice, not criminalisation of the patient.  In opposition to the argument 
that abortion must remain part of criminal law to prevent women being coerced 
into an abortion, notably sex-selective abortions, Sheldon argues that removal of 
existing statute would not reduce the robust consent procedure currently 
practiced and regulated by the medical community.  Furthermore, Sheldon 
questions whether criminalisation of women who seek illegal abortions due to 
coercion is the most appropriate way to address the structural sexism that leads 
to such behaviour.  
 
The second purpose of the Abortion Act 1967, Sheldon argues, was to protect 
foetal health and to ensure that only socially acceptable abortions take place by 
ensuring that access to abortions is facilitated by the professional medical 
community.  The foetus is of moral value and holds a significance that increases 
as it grows throughout pregnancy.  However, Sheldon argues that this argument 
is insufficient grounds to criminally prohibit abortion as, even if the rights of the 
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foetus are seen to be greater than a woman’s right to autonomy, gender 
equality, and reproductive health, criminal regulation of abortion does not 
function to protect foetuses through prevention or condemnation of abortion.  
Evidence suggests that restrictive abortion laws do not prevent women from 
having abortions as some women will successfully access illegal abortions.  
Such policy causes moral, social, physical, financial, and emotional harm to 
women by forcing some to continue with an unwanted pregnancy and others to 
travel outside of their country to access an abortion (such as women living in 
Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland), or to risk mortality and morbidity by 
having an illegal abortion.  Belief that abortion should remain illegal to 
discourage women from having the procedure would, in Sheldon’s opinion, result 
in medical professionals being required to act as gatekeepers and to persuade 
women to keep the pregnancy, which would be troublingly coercive.  
Furthermore, use of criminal law to demonstrate society’s moral disproval of 
abortion is out of line with popular opinion which generally supports a woman’s 
right to choose to have an abortion.  The current framing of the law does not 
actually convey the message that an abortion is a moral wrong that should be 
condemned at all gestations, as the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
needs to be read in line with the Abortion Act.  Instead, the law advocated that 
abortion is a serious moral wrong when not carried out under medical orders and 
‘in line with the best medical practice of the 1960s’ (2016b: 356).  Thus the 
message of the law is one of medical paternalism as women are deemed to be 
relatively incapable of making morally significant decisions.  Sheldon (2016b: 
356) concludes that abortion law ‘fails to fulfil any demonstrable modern 
purpose’: the impact upon the number of abortions performed is unknown; it 
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stigmatises women who need abortions; and imposes clinically unwarranted and 
bureaucratic restrictions on medical practice.  Sheldon does acknowledge that 
decriminalisation would offer less appropriate recognition of the moral respect 
due to the human foetus.  However, she also advocates that changing the law 
would not prevent intentional destruction of foetal life as there is unlikely to be 
significant impact on the number of abortions performed – most occur before the 
13th week of gestation has been reached.  Sheldon does acknowledge that 
decriminalisation of abortion would impact post-viability abortions and raising 
moral concerns for many.  Nevertheless, she questions what is gained by 
criminalising women at any stage of gestation, suggesting that the removal of 
barriers that discourage women from accessing professional advice and support 
would be of benefit.   
 
Calls for decriminalisation of abortion have received increased political support 
since 2016, marked by the launch of the campaign We Trust Women (2016), led 
by the British Pregnancy Advisory Service and supported by  a range of 
women’s rights groups, reproductive rights campaigners and professional 
bodies.38  On 13 March 2017 MP Diana Johnson introduced a Private Members' 
Bill, Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Bill 2016-17.  The Bill sought 
to repeal s58 and s59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which would 
result in abortion prior to 24 weeks gestation being regulated solely by the 
medical community, while abortions post-24 weeks gestation would continue to 
                                             
38 Supporters include, the Royal College of Midwives, Women’s Aid, Fawcett Society, Maternity 
Action, the British Society of Abortion Care Providers, Birthrights, Lawyers for Choice, End 
Violence Against Women, Equality Now, IPPF European Network, Voice for Choice, Southall 
Black Sisters, Alliance for Choice NI and Doctors for a Woman’s Choice on Abortion. 
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be controlled within criminal law through the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 192939 
(discussed below).  The Bill passed 172 to 142 and progressed to the second 
reading, which failed to go ahead due to the calling of the 2017 General Election.  
Johnson argued that current law poorly serves women as it states that even 
early-term abortions are inherently criminal, and it poorly serves doctors who 
must operate within a criminal framework that does not apply to other areas of 
healthcare (HC Deb 13 March 2017, vol 623).  Political engagement with the 
issue demonstrates discontent with current legislation.  
The gap between spontaneous birth and 
legal personhood 
The offence of procuring a miscarriage is closely connected with the offence of 
child destruction.  If charged with procuring a miscarriage, a defendant can be 
found guilty of child destruction instead, and vice versa.  Similarly, if charged 
with murder, manslaughter, or infanticide a jury may find the defendant guilty of 
child destruction instead.  Child destruction became a criminal offence in 1929 
with the enactment of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.  The statute 
legislates that, 
…any person who, with intent to destroy the life of a child capable of being 
born alive, by any wilful act causes a child to die before it has an existence 
independent of its mother, shall be guilty of felony, to wit, of child 
destruction, and shall be liable on conviction thereof on indictment to penal 
servitude for life.40 
The term ‘capable of being born alive’ is defined as meaning one who can 
breathe naturally or with the aid of a ventilator.41  In R v Mid-Downs HA,42 it was 
                                             
39 19 and 20, Geo.5, c.34. 
40 Ibid, s1(1). 
41 C v S (Foetus: Unmarried Father) [1988] QB 135; [1987] 2 WLR 1108. 
42 [1991] 1 QB 587. 
Chapter 4 Legal regulation of motherhood 108 
ruled that capable of being born alive meant being able to ‘breathe and live by 
reason of its own breathing without deriving any of its living or power of living by 
or through any connection with its mother’.  When the Infant Life (Preservation) 
Act was enacted, 28 weeks’ gestation was deemed to be the point at which a 
foetus was capable of being born alive; today it is 24 weeks.  The offence of 
child destruction has not been committed if a registered medical professional 
terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the Abortion Act.  If the case does 
not fall within the Abortion Act 1967 then the defendant has a defence if the act 
of causing death to the child was done in good faith for the purpose of 
preserving the life of the mother.43  It is presumed that an omission would not 
constitute the offence, as R v Shepherd44 showed the mother of a pregnant 
woman was under no duty to procure the attendance of a midwife (Legal 
analysis supported by Archbold and Richardson, 2017; Halsbury's laws of 
England, 2016; Mackay, 1988).  
 
The offence of child destruction developed out of desire to close a legal loophole 
that meant a person who killed an infant that was not fully out of the birth canal 
following spontaneous birth, and so not a legal person, would not be guilty of any 
offence.  As the labour was not induced, the offence of procuring a miscarriage 
had not been committed, and no offence against the person had been committed 
due to the child not living an independent existence (Davies, 1937; Graves, 
2006).  The offence was not intended to regulate abortion and yet Sheldon 
(2016b) argues it has been used.  Most often the offence is utilised in instances 
                                             
43 R v Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687; R v Newton and Stungo [1958] Crim. L.R. 469.  Both cases 
were decided under s58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, but the judgements also 
apply to the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 s1(1).  
44 (1862) Le & Ca 147. 
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where a man attacks a pregnant women resulting in the death of the foetus.  
Sheldon identified one instance of the offence being used against a woman who 
procured her own miscarriage of her viable foetus.  Two significant differences 
exist between the offences of procuring a miscarriage and child destruction.  
Firstly, the foetus must be born dead for child destruction to occur; this is not the 
case with procuring a miscarriage.  Secondly, a foetus must be considered 
viable for child destruction to occur.  This is not the case with procuring a 
miscarriage which can occur any time following implantation prior to 
spontaneous labour.  While none of the women in the sample in this study were 
convicted of the offence of child destruction, the overlap of this offence with 
procuring a miscarriage will be of significance in the discussion of the application 
of the law in Chapter 6. 
Infanticide 
Infanticide is a homicide offence, as well as a partial defence to murder.  As will 
become clear in the discussion in Chapter 6, the existence of the offence, and its 
use within criminal law has a bearing on cases of suspicious perinatal death.  
Therefore, while a discussion of the offence of infanticide is not the focus of the 
thesis, it is important to understand how the offence developed and its 
significance in today’s criminal law.  In this section I will outline the scope of the 
legislation, the historic context in which it was enacted, and scholarly 
interpretation of its intention and function. 
 
Infanticide is unique a unique offence, it can only be committed by a woman who 
kills her biological infant during its first year of life, if ‘at the time of the act or 
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omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully 
recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of 
lactation consequent upon the birth of the child’.45  If convicted of infanticide, a 
defendant will be punished as if she were guilty of manslaughter, rather than 
murder.  As such, infanticide operates as an offences, and as a defence to a 
murder or manslaughter charge.  It is very rare for a woman convicted of 
infanticide to be given a prison sentence (Walker, 1968).  Between 2002 and 
2013, 12 women were convicted of infanticide: one was conditionally discharged, 
eight received a community sentence, one a suspended sentence, and two were 
given hospital orders.46  
 
No direct link between the disturbed mind experienced and the act of homicide is 
required.  As such the woman may be fully aware of her actions, and appreciate 
that they are immoral and criminal, yet still have acted within the parameters of 
the offence.  Furthermore, the link is only temporal, so the disturbance of mind 
need not have caused the woman to kill the child, she needs only to be disturbed 
of mind at the time she kills the child (Walker, 1968; Loughnan, 2012b; Allen, 
1987).  This is different to the partial defence of diminished responsibility, which 
requires that the ‘abnormality of mental function… provides an explanation for 
D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing’.47  Infanticide only 
applies if a woman who is disturbed of mind due to child birth or lactation kills 
her own infant.  If she kills someone other than her own infant, she cannot rely 
upon infanticide.  Similarly, if a woman kills her own child who is aged over one 
year then she cannot avail herself of the Infanticide Act.  If another person who 
                                             
45 1 & 2 Geo.6, c36, s1. 
46 Data obtained from Ministry of Justice FOI request, Ref: 004-15 95231.  
47 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, c.25, s52 (1)(1)(a-c). 
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may also be suffering from a disturbance of mind due to the birth of a child, such 
as the child’s father, or the mother’s partner, kills the child, they also cannot rely 
upon infanticide as a defence.  
 
Historically the infanticide offence/defence only operated as an alternative to 
murder; however, the 2009 Coroners and Justice Act48 incorporated the ruling of 
the Court of Appeal case R v Gore49 to allow an infanticide conviction to be 
brought in cases that would otherwise be manslaughter.  Prior to Gore it was 
generally perceived that the mens rea of murder (malice aforethought – either an 
intention to kill ‘express malice’, or an intention to do grievous bodily harm 
‘implied malice’)50 was required for an infanticide conviction to apply; as such the 
judgment received criticism (Ashworth, 2008).  Changes to the language of the 
Infanticide Act 1938 introduced by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, limited 
the offence/defence to circumstances that would otherwise amount to murder or 
manslaughter.  Thus, neglect of a child that falls below the level of ‘gross 
negligence’ could not result in a charge of infanticide, see below for discussion 
of the relationship between neglect and homicide.  Reviews of convictions of 
infanticide and manslaughter by Mackay (1993) concluded that not all instances 
of infanticide would have been covered by the defence of diminished 
responsibility under the Homicide Act 1957.51  The Law Commission (2006) 
similarly concluded that the removal of the Infanticide Act 1938 in favour of using 
diminished responsibility would result in more serious levels of criminality and 
                                             
48 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, c.25, s57. 
49 [2007] EWCA Crim 7289. 
50  R v Moloney [1985] AC 905 at 921. 
51 5 and 6 Eliz.2, c.11. 
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possibly less lenient sentences than is appropriate for the offence (see also 
Lansdowne, 1990; Maier-Katkin and Ogle, 1997).  
 
The connection between childbirth and lactation and women’s acts of violence 
towards their infants has received significant criticism (Brennan, 2007; Law 
Commission, 2006; McSherry, 1993; Langer, 2012).  Similarly, the infanticide 
legislation has received criticism from feminists for perceiving to medicalise or 
pathologise women’s acts of violence.  For example, Morris and Wilczynski 
(1993b) argue that the basis of the offence is that the ‘ordinary conditions’ of 
childbirth and lactation ‘have potentially disruptive effects on the mental state 
and behaviour of women’ (1993b: 204), and that women who act to kill their 
infants are pathologised and understood as ‘mad’.  They argue that such an 
interpretation avoids the social and economic reasons that could lead to a 
woman killing her child (see also Allen, 1987; Nicolson, 2000; Edwards, 1984; 
Weare, 2016; Wilczynski, 1991, 1997b).  Such theorists see the law as blaming 
women’s acts of fatal violence towards their infants based on their biology.  Such 
theory was popular in the nineteenth century with the development of medical 
literature on illnesses such as ‘puerperal psychosis’ (also known as puerperal 
insanity or mania).  Puerperal psychosis was considered a distinct illness caused 
by the strain of childbirth.  Killing one’s newborn was understood to be one of the 
characteristics of the illness, together with depression, hallucination and acute 
anxiety (Marland, 2004; Loughnan, 2012b; Cossins, 2015; Kilday, 2013).  The 
medical condition of puerperal psychosis and lactation psychosis subsequently 
lost support as legitimate medical conditions, and mental illness is now not 
considered to be the cause of a woman killing her infant (for a summary of the 
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debate see Brennan, 2007; Kilday, 2013; O'Donovan, 1984).  Such 
developments in medical research have fuelled debates surrounding the 
appropriateness of the Infanticide Act.  
 
However, to consider the offence of infanticide as an example of pathologisation 
of female offending and medicalisation of women’s crime, is, as Loughnan 
argues, to fail ‘to thoroughly grasp the longevity of a set of lay attitudes and 
beliefs about the ways in which gender, childbirth and ‘madness’ relate to child 
killing by mothers’ (2012b: 688).  Loughnan is one of a number of commenters 
who focus upon the social, cultural and political context surrounding newborn 
child homicide trials and statute.  This body of literature considers the use of 
medical doctrine as a means to facilitate lenient treatment, rather than as the 
basis of that treatment (Ward, 1999; Brennan, 2007; O'Donovan, 1984; Kramar 
and Watson, 2008, 2006; Grey, 2014).  These theorists argue that when first 
enacted in 1922, the Infanticide Act employed a lay understanding of mental 
illness that would be wide enough to cover a range of socio-economic mitigates.  
To openly recognise such factors as causes of infant homicide would undermine 
the principles of the law (Brennan, 2013b).  And so while the language of the Act 
was framed in medical terms, these theorists argue that it was not the intention 
of legislators that it would apply in this way.  
 
As argued above, during the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries public 
sympathy existed for unmarried women who were suspect of killing their 
newborns, and this impacted the rate of murder conviction of such women.  
Growing sympathies for the ‘type’ of women who was accused of newborn death 
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is widely noted by scholars.  The typical perpetrator was the ‘fallen’ woman: 
single, pregnant, abandoned by the man who impregnated her, ruined and 
facing destitution.  Loughnan (2012b) argues that the gender construction that 
occurred during the Victorian period, casting women as the weaker, gentler sex, 
more closely linked and controlled by biology, and more emotional and 
irresponsible, facilitated the construction of ‘the infanticidal woman’.  She, like all 
women, was less autonomous and heavily determined by social forces.  This 
gendered construction, coupled with the medical condition of puerperal 
psychosis facilitated a compassionate view of the woman who killed her 
newborn, ‘based on sympathy for her weak physical and moral state and for the 
physical pain suffered by a woman giving birth without assistance’ (2012b: 699; 
see also Grey, 2014 for discussion of use of the infanticide offence during the 
twentieth century).  Acting out of shame of being pregnant out of marriage was 
widely accepted as the motivation for women (Davies, 1937; Brennan, 2013a).  
Consequently, a divide existed between public perception and the letter of the 
law.  As Davies (1937) argues: 
The widespread dislike of the application of the law of murder in all its 
severity to cases of infanticides by mothers led to such a divorce between 
law and public opinion that prisoners, witnesses, counsel, juries and even 
many of H.M.’s judges, conspired to defeat the law (1937: 203). 
 
A consequence of this gap between public sentiment and the law meant that 
holding women criminally responsible for newborn murder was essentially 
impossible (Brennan, 2013a), and the law had completely broken down (Davies, 
1937).  Concern over the ineffectiveness of criminal law is evident in the 
attempts at reform in the second half of the nineteenth-century (see Davies, 
1937, 1938; Brennan, 2013a; Ward, 1999; Graves, 2006).  The onus of proof of 
Chapter 4 Legal regulation of motherhood 115 
live-birth continued to impact convictions, as it had from the late sixteenth-
century.  Medical tests to demonstrate live-birth were still considered unreliable 
(Kilday, 2013; Brennan, 2007; Graves, 2006), but medical witnesses and jurors 
actively used these ambiguities to find a woman not guilty so as to spare her the 
gallows (Brennan, 2013a).  If a murder conviction was achieved, then justice 
was still considered to be evaded, due to the unlikelihood that the mandatory 
death sentence would be carried out.  The last woman to be executed for infant 
murder was in 1849, and the last woman to be executed for newborn child 
murder was in 1832 (Wiener, 2004: 124-5).   After this date, all other women 
found guilty of infant murder had their death sentences commuted by Home 
Secretaries.  This pattern of condemning a woman to die, only to have the 
sentence reprieved was dubbed the ‘solemn mockery’ by one judge providing 
evidence to the Royal Commission on Capital punishment in 1866 (Davies, 
1937).  Similarly, Walker (1968) notes that the parliamentary debates on the 
various Bills proposed to amend the law frequently noted the distress 
experienced by judges, when sentencing women to death in such cases.  By the 
end of the nineteenth-century, and in the early twentieth-century, the law was 
deemed to be neither preventing newborn death, as the punishment was never 
enacted (Davies, 1937), nor punishing offenders, as the use of offences such as 
concealment, while offering some punishment, did not provide the severity 
deemed suitable for homicide (Brennan, 2013a).  The creation of the Infanticide 
Act 192252 allowed an end to the ‘black-cap farce’, and offered ‘an official 
mechanism for compassionate response’ (Brennan, 2013a: 800).  Ward (1999, 
2002) argues that the creation of the infanticide offence facilitated punishment 
                                             
52 12 and 13 Geo.5, c.18. A copy of the final Act is available in 20th Century House of Commons 
Sessional Papers (1922). 
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for those women who killed newborn children, while recognising that their 
position of becoming pregnant out of marriage had led them to this vulnerable 
position.  
 
The 1922 Infanticide Act only applied to ‘newly-born’ victims and for this reason 
it was swiftly criticised by doctors, lawyers, and the public .  The cases of Mary 
O’Donoghue,53  who killed her 35-day-old baby, and Brenda Hale who cut the 
throat of her three-week-old child in 1936, challenged the offence as popular, 
medical, and legal commenters constructed the women as fitting the aspect of 
the law regarding their mental state at the time of the killing.  This interpretation 
is notable in the case of Hale, who was deemed to be suffering from puerperal 
psychosis.  As such, in 1938 the law was re-enacted to include infants aged up 
to one year and lactation was included as a cause of ‘disturbance of mind’ (for 
discussion of the change in law see Davies, 1945; Walker, 1968; Ward, 1999, 
2002).   
 
Since 1938, developments in criminal law have resulted in further questioning of 
the need of the offence of infanticide.  The creation of diminished responsibility 
as a defence for murder, introduced by the Homicide Act 1957, raised further 
critique of the infanticide offence as necessary to spare women a murder 
conviction and the death penalty.  Similarly, the abolition of the death penalty in 
England in 196554 meant that concern that perpetrators would hang no longer 
existed.  Nevertheless, the offence is considered important in facilitating lenient 
treatment in instances that may not be covered under diminished responsibility 
                                             
53 (1927) 20 Cr App Rep 132. 
54 Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, c.71. 
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(Law Commission, 2006).  The Commission noted that despite the criticism it 
has received, the offence/ defence provides a practicable legal solution to 
particular circumstances and therefore they advised no changes to the offence 
itself.  This recommendation was accepted by the Government at the time (HM 
Government, 2009; Ministry of Justice, 2008). 
 
Commenters have argued that the offence simplifies the link between actus reus 
of the offence (act of killing) and mental incapacity, thus creating a ‘virtual 
assumption’ that the woman was not fully responsible by reason of her mental 
illness (Walker, 1968: 135; see also Mackay, 1995).  Loughnan (2012b) argues 
that this virtual presumption forecloses the question of the woman’s 
responsibility, and so she is believed to have reduced responsibility for her 
actions.  As Loughnan argues, ‘the infanticidal woman’s partial responsibility 
dovetails with the generalised social construction of an infanticidal type, which 
substitutes for individualised inquiries into an individual’s mental capacities at the 
time of the offence’ (2012b: 704).  Loughnan further argues the construction of 
the act of infanticide as an instantiation of abnormality directly leads to the 
determination that the accused woman is only partially responsible for her 
actions.  The ‘network of meaning’ held by both experts and non-experts relating 
to cases of newborn child death, is such that the act came to be understood as 
an ‘instantiation of abnormality’ in both a moral sense, and for criminal law 
adjunction purposes (2012b: 700).   The act of killing is more than just evidence 
of mental illness, instead, Loughnan argues, the Infanticide Act 1938 
incorporates the notion that the abnormality that characterises the accused 
Chapter 4 Legal regulation of motherhood 118 
woman ‘linking her lethal conduct (as caused) to her legal responsibility (as 
attenuated)’ (2012b: 701).   
 
As the mental disturbance is linked to the physiological aspects of bearing a 
child and lactation, the accused woman’s mental disturbance has a physical 
basis in the reproductive practices carried out by many women on a regular 
basis.  Consequently, as Allen (1987) argues, women who kill children soon after 
birth are constructed in two contradictory ways – either the mother is considered 
exempt from responsibility as her act of killing is ‘unthinkable’ unless due to a 
pathology, or as the violence is connected to a woman’s physiology, it suggests 
a ‘natural maternal violence’ that cannot be subject to the usual legal restraints 
(1987: 28).  Many feminists have opposed the offence of infanticide, arguing that 
it pathologises women’s acts of deviance and criminality, negating the socio-
economic reasons for women’s acts of violence against their children, reducing 
them instead an to individual woman’s abnormality of mind or body, and 
consequently ‘providing a basis for the ‘ordinary state’ of womanhood to be 
subject to medical and psychiatric gaze’ (Morris and Wilczynski, 1993b: 215).  
Such a construction of women who kill infants may also act to reinforce the 
myths of motherhood explored in the Introduction – only abnormal women kill 
their children, as all women are ‘natural’ mothers and therefore to harm a child 
goes against nature (Edwards, 1984; Wilczynski, 1991, 1997b; Weare, 2013).   
 
Problems exist in assessing the current use of the infanticide law, due to 
difficulty accessing materials and cases, outlined in the Methodology.  However, 
research into use of the offence has demonstrated that it is loosely framed and 
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generously applied in England and Wales, as well as other jurisdictions which 
have similar statute (Wilczynski, 1997a; Morris and Wilczynski, 1993a; d'Orbán, 
1979; Brennan, 2013c, Forthcoming-b; Kramar, 2005).  The offence allows for 
recognition of the socio-economic factors that may lead a woman to kill her own 
child but frames that mitigation in medical terms, facilitating lenient treatment for 
those women who are able to present themselves as the infanticidal ‘type’ and 
so avail themselves of the lenient treatment (Morris and Wilczynski, 1993b; 
Mackay, 1993; Weare, 2016).  Lenient treatment appears to be unavailable for 
those women who cannot adhere to the image of the infanticidal ‘type’, which is 
imbued with the ideals from the myths of motherhood.  Similarly, infanticide 
prevents a recognition of the vulnerabilities that may lead a woman to conceal a 
pregnancy, give birth alone and kill the child (Ayres, 2007, 2014; O'Donovan, 
1984; Milne and Brennan, Forthcoming; Smart, 1992).  However, it must be 
remembered that without the infanticide legislation it is likely that an increased 
number of vulnerable women would potentially be imprisoned if their socio-
economic circumstances lead them to kill their infant (Brennan, Forthcoming-a).  
Child cruelty 
The final offence for which women in the sample are convicted is the offence of 
child cruelty due to neglect or abandonment.  A mother has a ‘parental 
responsibility’ to her child from birth.  Parental responsibility is defined under s3 
of the Children Act 198955 as: 
                                             
55 c.41. 
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All the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a 
parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property.56 
Cruelty to a child under the age of sixteen is a criminal offence under s1 of the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933.57  It is committed if any person with 
responsibility for a child, 
…wilfully assaults, ill-treats (whether physically or otherwise), neglects, 
abandons, or exposes him, or causes or procures him to be assaulted, ill-
treated (whether physically or otherwise), neglected, abandoned or 
exposed, in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to 
health (whether the suffering or injury is of a physical or a psychological 
nature).  
Neglect is defined as failure of a person with parental responsibility for a child to 
maintain that child, which includes providing food, clothing, medical aid or 
lodging.58  If a person with parental responsibility is unable to maintain the child, 
they should take steps to procure it to be provided.  The child’s death is not 
necessary for the offence of neglect to be committed.  For neglect to be proved, 
two behaviours need be shown, as identified in R v Sheppard.59  The defendant 
failed to provide that which the child needed, and the failure to provide was 
‘wilful’ – the defendant either was aware at the time that the child’s health might 
be at risk if the aid required were not provided, or that the defendant was 
unaware of the aid needed due to not caring whether the child’s health was at 
risk.  Abandonment is defined as ‘leaving the child to its fate’.60  Exposure of a 
child under the age of two years is a criminal offence under s27 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861, defined as, ‘whereby the life of such child shall be 
endangered, or the health of such child shall have been or shall be likely to be 
                                             
56 However, due to the requirement that legal personhood in England and Wales requires 
independent existent, parental responsibility does not begin until the child is wholly born, this will 
be discussed further below.   
57 23 and 24 Geo. 5, c.12. 
58 Ibid, s1(2). 
59 [1981] AC 394; [1980] 3 WLR 960. 
60 Mitchell v Wright (1905) 7 F 568; R v Boulden (1957) 41 Cr App R 105. 
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permanently injured’.  Exposure does not necessarily imply abandonment or 
consist of physically placing a child somewhere with intent to injure.61  Again, it is 
not a necessary element of the offence for the child to die.  
 
If neglect of a child results in the death of that child then it is possible that a 
separate offence of homicide, distinct from child cruelty, has been committed.  
Gross negligent manslaughter occurs when a person has a duty of care toward 
the victim, they act, or fail to act which results in a breach of that duty of care, 
the breach of duty causes death to the victim, and the breach of duty constitutes 
gross negligence.62  The establishment of gross negligence requires the 
circumstances to be such that a reasonable person would have foreseen a 
serious risk of death occurring, risk of bodily injury or risk to health is not 
sufficient.63  In respect of that risk, the defendant’s conduct in all circumstances 
in which she/he was placed must have fallen so far below the standard to be 
expected of a reasonable person as to constitute a criminal offence.64  Thus, in 
order for negligence of a child to warrant gross negligence and the crime of 
manslaughter, a person responsible for a child must have failed to act and a 
breach of duty of care must  have occurred, such that a reasonable person 
would foresee the risk and failure to address that risk was so serious as to 
constitute a crime.65  This form of involuntary manslaughter is distinct from 
                                             
61 R v Williams (1910) 4 Cr App R 89; R v Falkingham (1865-72) LR 1 CCR 222; R v White 
(1865-72) LR 1 CCR 311. 
62 R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171, [1994] 3 WLR 288 (applying R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App 
Rep 8; and Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576; and overruling R v 
Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493, 3 WLR 349).  See also R v Prentice, Sullman, Adomako, Holloway 
[1994] QB 302; [1993] 3 WLR 927. 
63 R v Singh (Gurphal) [1999] Crim LR 582 CA (Crim Div), WL 250004; R v Misra, R v Srivastava 
[2004] EWCA Crim 2375, [2005] 1 Cr App R 21; R v Yaqoob [2005] EWCA Crim 2169, WL 
2003243; R v S [2015] EWCA Crim 558, [2015] 2 Cr App R (S.) 29. 
64 R v Bateman; R v Adomako; R v Misra, R v Srivastava. 
65 R v Nicholls (1874) 13 Cox CC 75; R v Chattaway (1924) 17 Cr App R 7.   
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manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, for which a person will only be 
liable due to an act of commission likely to cause harm, as opposed to an 
omission.66  While no cases of gross negligence manslaughter are presented in 
the data, there is a case of negligence that resulted in the death of the child 
(Hannah’s case).  As Hannah was not convicted of a homicide offence, it must 
be assumed that her negligence towards the child was not such a significant 
breach of duty to constitute a homicide offence. 
Harm to the foetus 
As noted above, to be a victim of homicide or a crime against the person in 
England, legal personhood must be established, requiring a child to be born 
alive and live a separate existence from the mother.  The only offence a foetus 
can be a victim of is child destruction.  Even the offence of procuring a 
miscarriage does not specifically outline the foetus as the victim of the offence, 
as noted above the offence criminalises the attempt to end the pregnancy, rather 
than harm to the foetus.  To be considered to have lived a separate existence, 
live-birth is required, and the whole body of the child must be delivered.67  It is 
not necessary for the umbilical cord to be cut from the child or the afterbirth 
delivered,68 but the child should have an independent circulation and it should 
have breathed after birth.69  However, drawing a breath is not a requirement to 
                                             
66 R v Lowe [1973] QB 702; [1973] 2 WLR 481; Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] 
AC 576. 
67 R v Poullton (1832) 5 C&P 329. 
68 R v Reeves (1839) 9 C&P 25. 
69 R v Enoch, R v Pulley (1833) 5 C&P 539. 
Chapter 4 Legal regulation of motherhood 123 
prove live-birth, if the jury can be satisfied that the child was wholly born into the 
world and was alive prior to being killed.70  
 
While an unborn child cannot be a victim of homicide if it dies before living a 
separate existence, a homicide offence has been committed if a child is born 
alive and dies of injuries deliberately inflicted while in utero.  Such a conviction is 
reliant upon proof the defendant had the requisite mens rea where the intention 
was to do an act which was unlawful and which all sober and reasonable people 
would recognise as likely to cause injury to another person (the pregnant 
woman), as per the ruling of the House of Lords in response to the Attorney 
General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994)71 (hereafter ‘A-G Ref’).  The House ruled 
that an individual who attacks a pregnant woman without intent to kill the 
foetus/child would be guilty of manslaughter if the child was born alive and 
subsequently died of those injuries.  If the defendant has intent to kill the 
foetus/child then they would be liable for murder.72  The ruling has come under 
criticism for its application of law (Ormerod, 2011; Keown, 1998), and due to its 
interpretation and application of the historic born alive rule (Temkin, 1986; Cave, 
2004).  
 
The liability for a foetus carried by pregnant women is a contentious issue within 
criminal and civil law.  Historic legal authority on the issue of maternal culpability 
is clear, a woman has no duty of care to a foetus, until it is born alive.  In R v 
                                             
70 R v Brain (1834) C&P 349.   
71 [1998] AC 245; [1997] 3 WLR. 421. 
72 Attorney General's Reference (No.3 of 1994) [1996] QB 581; [1996] 2 WLR 412, and the 
authority of the cases R v Senior (1832) 1 Mood CC 346 and R v West (1848) 2 C&K 784. 
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Knight,73 it was ruled that a woman who chooses not to be attended during birth 
and so does not take the necessary precautions to preserve the life of the child 
will not be guilty of manslaughter if the child dies during birth.  Nor is she guilty of 
the offence if it can only be demonstrated that the woman was neglectful 
towards the unborn child by not arranging assistance with the birth.  An offence 
of homicide would only occur if it is proven that the defendant was guilty of 
negligence towards the child after it was completely born74.  Once the child 
obtains legal personality, the mother has a duty of care and if not met and the 
child dies after birth she will be guilty of homicide.  In R v Handley,75 it was ruled 
that if before or after the birth a woman intends that the child shall die and so 
upon being born she leaves it to die, she is guilty of murder.  If she does not 
intend for the child to die but conceals the birth using methods that will result in 
the death of the child, then she is guilty of manslaughter.  Similarly, in R v 
Middleship,76 it was ruled that if it is deemed a woman could seek assistance to 
save her child’s life post-birth and fails to obtain that assistance then she is guilty 
of manslaughter.   
 
The A-G Ref ruling has altered a woman’s legal liability towards her foetus.  
Cave (2004: 61-2) argues that there is the potential to apply the House of Lords’ 
ruling on of the born alive rule to women for their conduct during pregnancy 
towards their unborn child, if the child is born alive and then dies.  Cave argues 
that the use of illicit substances, for example, might constitute an unlawful act, 
thus subsequently resulting in a conviction of constructive manslaughter.  In this 
                                             
73 (1860) 2 F&F 46. 
74 R v Izod (1904) 20 Cox CC 690. 
75 (1874) 13 Cox CC 79. 
76 (1850) 15 JP 41, 5 Cox CC 275. 
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case, there would not be a requirement to prove the woman foresaw risk to the 
child, or even knew she was pregnant at the time of the act; the only requirement 
would be that a reasonable man would foresee resulting injury from the conduct.  
Cave also argues that gross negligence manslaughter could also potentially be 
applied to pregnant women, however, such an offence would be complicated by 
the need to demonstrate a duty of care to the foetus.  Alternatively, Cave argues, 
if it was deemed that there was an obvious and serious risk of causing physical 
injury to a child when it was born, and a pregnant woman disregarded that risk or 
did not consider it, then a manslaughter conviction could be brought.  Cave 
argues that the health messages for pregnant women are so prominent in 
England, that action that caused harm would potentially be considered ‘obvious 
risk’.  While the possibility of a woman being held legally culpable for her actions 
against her foetus that is later born alive are currently only theoretical, the A-G 
Ref has opened the door to criminalisation in the future (see also Brazier, 1999; 
Fovargue and Miola, 1998, 2016).   
 
These legal developments do not have direct impact upon the cases explored in 
this thesis.  However, widening medical, legal, and public concern over the 
health of the foetus and the responsibilities of pregnant women may result in 
extension of the law to hold women liable for acts committed while in the 
prenatal period of pregnancy.  The fact that there is room within the current 
criminal law to facilitate such expansion could potentially have significant impact 
upon the rights of women.  Certainly, within civil law, the principle that a foetus 
has the right to be born alive and to be ‘healthy’ has led to challenges to the 
position of the law.  For example, a local authority sought criminal injuries 
Chapter 4 Legal regulation of motherhood 126 
compensation for a child born with Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder because of 
her mother drinking heavily during pregnancy;77 and women’s refusal to consent 
to Caesarean sections have been overruled78 (Priaulx, 2015; Brazier, 1999; 
Fovargue and Miola, 2016; Cave, 2004; Jackson, 2001; Thomson, 1994).  
Fovargue and Miola (1998) argued that these cases demonstrate how the 
interests of the foetus have assumed precedence over those of the women and 
that with the combined logic of the A-G Ref there is the potential for sanctions on 
pregnant women’s lives.  Furthermore, they argue that the courts have 
interpreted the law in such a way as to create an imbalance between the interest 
of the foetus and the woman.  Consequently, ‘pregnant women have become a 
new category of incompetent adults’ (1998: 281).  Furthermore, the judgements 
demonstrate a legal acceptance of medical authority in relation to pregnancy and 
foetal health.  As Meredith (2005) argues, the judiciary have largely accepted, 
without question, both the medical evidence of the need for intervention, and the 
underlying assumption that doctors have a greater claim to knowledge of the 
foetus’ interests and the role of safeguarding, over the pregnant woman.  The 
consequence has been to leave a ‘substantial quantum of discretion in the 
hands of the medical profession’ (2005: 209; see also Oberman, 2000).   
 
As the law currently stands, there is no maternal obligation towards the foetus in 
either civil or criminal law.  The only exception here is in the ability for a born 
alive child to sue its mother for injuries sustained following a car crash while in 
utero.  However, this essentially allows the child to claim from the mother’s 
                                             
77 Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) 
(British Pregnancy Advisory Service and others intervening) [2014] EWCA Civ 1554; [2015] QB 
459. 
78 St. George's Healthcare N.H.S. Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; R v Collins and Others [1998] 3 WLR 
936. 
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insurance company and exists on the basis of compulsory third party car 
insurance (Cave, 2004).  Nevertheless, recent civil cases and the ruling in the A-
G Ref indicates a desire to hold women accountable for actions while pregnant 
that may result in harm or death to the foetus.  The principles of the born alive 
rule are halting any attempts to use the law to hold women liable if the foetus 
dies.  However, as outlined in Chapter 6, analysis of the use and application of 
the law in the cases in this sample raises further questions about the incentive to 
punish women who are perceived to have harmed their foetuses.  Similarly, the 
exploration of cases from the US in Chapter 7, will illustrate the consequences of 
removing the principles of the born alive rule on women’s rights.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed English criminal law that is most relevant to the cases 
presented in the data chapters.  Concern over the conduct of pregnant women 
and the welfare of newborn children has existed since the Elizabethan period.  
Historically, a tension appears to exist between sympathy for women who kill or 
cause harm to newborn children and a desire to punish their suspected criminal 
activity.  This sympathy was targeted at women who fitted the infanticidal ‘type’.  
Nevertheless, the existence of such pity in contrast with the harsh criminal code 
that applied into the nineteenth-century, and the creation of the offences of 
concealment of birth and infanticide suggests that women who kill newborn 
children have always been considered different from other people who are 
suspected of committing homicide.  Whether such a belief still exists is open to 
debate.  While in the past, the focus of concern may not have been upon the 
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wellbeing of the foetus, this wellbeing is most certainly the focus of the public, 
political debate, and the law today. 
 
The medicalisation of pregnancy has dramatically changed the ways a pregnant 
woman and her foetus/child are conceptualised.  As we saw in the last chapter, 
concepts of expected maternal behaviour have changed since the 1950s, with 
maternal responsibility and risk management shaping both maternal and medical 
professionals’ behaviour.  This change has also been reflected in law.  As the 
analysis above has demonstrated, new challenges to long-standing principles of 
law have occurred within the last 30 years.  While the born alive principle 
remains intact today, the desire to protect the foetus appears to be creeping into 
law, offering further protection to the foetus beyond that currently provided under 
the offences of procuring a miscarriage and child destruction.  As has been the 
case since 1803, to convict a woman of the homicide of her newborn child, it 
must first be proven that the child was born alive and lived a separate existence.  
However, the interplay of other offences, namely concealment of birth and 
procuring a miscarriage appear to work to subvert the principle of legal 
personhood; this interplay will be explored in the analysis presented in Chapter 
6.  As noted by Cave (2004), Brazier (1999) and Fovargue and Miola (1998) the 
A-G Ref may have fundamentally changed the concept of maternal legal 
obligation to an unborn child, and may have opened the door to criminal 
sanctions against women whose actions while pregnant cause harm to a child 
who is later born alive, and then dies.  In the next chapter I provide an analysis 
of the social and moral judgements made against the seven women in the 
sample.   
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Chapter 5 Gender expectation 
and crisis pregnancy in the 
courtroom 
This chapter explores the social and cultural judgements made against seven 
English women who have experienced crisis pregnancies that led to a 
suspicious perinatal death.  Drawing on analysis of the cases from the sample, it 
considers how the women’s behaviour is understood and considered against the 
cultural norms and expected behaviour of motherhood and pregnancy.  This 
chapter reports the findings from the thematic analysis of the content of the court 
transcripts of the seven cases; the first form of data analysis outlined in the 
Chapter 2 – Methodology.  Analysis in this chapter considers how members of 
the court appear to construct and use preconceived ideas of mothering to judge 
the behaviours of the seven women.  Analysis of these cases considers the 
ways norms and ideals of motherhood and pregnancy appear to be understood 
and used within the legal process, alongside, and in conjunction with the 
principles of criminal law.  Consequently, this chapter is concerned with how the 
women are portrayed as individuals and what representations are deployed by 
the members of the court to explain the events surrounding the death of the 
foetus/child.  In-depth analysis of the functioning and structure of the law is 
presented in the next chapter, which considers the perceived criminal wrongs of 
the women’s actions.  These cases demonstrate that there is perceived to be a 
‘correct’ way to act as a pregnant woman, which is very much connected to the 
ideal of the ‘good’ mother, as encapsulated by the myths of motherhood.  Each 
of the seven women are judged as ‘mothers’, even though, in all but one case, 
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the baby died, therefore, arguably negating each woman’s status as a mother to 
that child.  As previously noted in the Chapter 2 – Methodology, Alice’s case is 
included to demonstrate a contrast in the judgement of a woman in an instance 
where the child could have but did not die.   
 
The assessment of a woman’s ‘motherly’ behaviour is not considered within the 
context of crisis pregnancy and the difficulties that women who experience this 
type of pregnancy face.  In fact, the courts seem unprepared and even naïve 
about crisis pregnancy and the phenomenon of concealed/denied pregnancy.  It 
is unclear if the lack of engagement with the phenomenon of crisis pregnancies 
is due to an unwillingness or inability by the courts to consider pregnancy as a 
negative life-event for some women, or due to failure to realise its significance in 
cases such as the seven presented.  Instead, pregnancy is conceptualised as a 
desirable event in the life of women.  As exploration of the literature of 
concealed/denied pregnancy in Chapter 3 demonstrates, not all women 
experience pregnancy in line with this conceptualisation way, including the 
seven women whose cases are explored here.  As the data analysis here will 
demonstrate, conceptualisation of motherhood and lack of understanding of 
crisis pregnancy has significant consequences on the perceptions of women’s 
culpability in cases of suspected perinatal killing.  
Conforming to the myths of 
motherhood 
As explored in Chapter 3, behaving in a way that is best for the foetus while 
pregnant is now a dominant idea, not only within medical practice and 
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expectation, but also within wider cultural norms.  There is no legal obligation for 
a woman to prioritise her unborn child over her own welfare, and the foetus has 
no legal personality in English law, as outlined Chapter 4.  Nevertheless, 
scholars have argued that application of the law has served to gradually erode 
these principle, appearing to position the foetus’ interests above the interests of 
the pregnant woman (Brazier, 1999; Fovargue and Miola, 1998).  One of the 
themes identified in the data is that pregnancy is considered synonymous with 
motherhood and motherly behaviour.  In five of the seven cases, the behaviour 
of the women is judged to conform to the myths of motherhood, and her 
behaviour is considered next to perceptions of the ideal mother.  The two cases 
where motherly responses are not mentioned, hinted at, or apparently 
considered are Tanya and Fiona’s cases.  Both women were sixteen at the time 
they killed their newborn children.  No mention is made by either the prosecution 
or defence about their role as mothers, or even that their responses to their 
babies were unmotherly.  The social crisis that surrounds teenagers as mothers, 
or ‘children raising children’ is well documented and critiqued within feminist 
literature (for example see Phoenix, 1991; Ayres, 2007, 2014).  Nevertheless, 
social concern over the appropriate minimum age at which it is considered 
legitimate for a woman to adopt the role of mother continues to dominate in 
wider society, as evident in media coverage of the ‘teen pregnancy rate’ (BBC 
News, 2016).  This social crisis could potentially offer one explanation as to why 
neither Tanya nor Fiona’s actions and behaviour are presented within narratives 
of motherhood or motherly behaviour.  If a perception exists that both women 
were too young to be mothers, then their actions of rejecting motherhood, may 
be perceived as legitimate, even if, the violence nature of rejection is not.  
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For the other five women, their appropriation to the role of mother appears to 
have been used as a benchmark for their behaviour and consequently their 
culpability and moral character.  In Alice’s case whilst her decision to conceal 
her pregnancy and to abandon her child was perceived negatively by the judge, 
due to the risk to the newborn child’s life, her actions were presented as an 
understandable, motherly response to her situation in relation to her other 
children.  In sentencing, the judge summarised Alice’s behaviour as an act of 
desperation and love for her existing children, 
When she realised she was pregnant, she feared her children would be 
removed.  That, regrettably but understandably, was reinforced by some 
observations made by members of the family, and thus she decided to 
conceal her pregnancy.  Although the family suspected she was pregnant, 
she denied it, and on [date] the baby was born and, in panic and 
desperation, she acted as she did (Alice, judge sentencing remarks). 
The judge also accepted that Alice did not want the child to be hurt and that she 
left the baby in a place where it would soon be found.  Further evidence of 
Alice’s motherly behaviour is drawn from the long-term plans held by social 
services to reunite Alice with all her children, including the child she abandoned.  
Therefore, while Alice’s act of abandonment of her child is considered to 
contradict the role of a mother and the accepted understanding of motherly 
behaviour, it can be interpreted that she maintained the position of a mother, as 
she was acting in a manner that she felt was best for her other children.  
Ultimately, Alice is considered to have failed as a mother, but her failure fits 
within the confines of ‘normal’ motherhood.  She has not rejected the principles 
of motherly behaviour, nor the expected norms by which to act as a mother.  
Instead she has failed to meet the standards required – to be a good mother 
who cares for her children to a reasonable standard.  This perception of her 
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children is seen to include her newest child and her motherly behaviour is 
expected to extend to her additional child, purely by the fact the child has been 
conceived.  This perception of Alice’s motherly behaviour and motives may be 
supported by the fact that the child did not die.  Therefore, Alice’s position as a 
‘mother’ has not been negated by the death of her child.  Alice’s case indicates 
that behaviour of mothers can be understood as a negotiation rather than a 
binary of categories of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ mothers, as suggested in feminist literature 
(Glenn, 1994; Thurer, 1994).  The case suggests that women can be judged in 
relation to the degree with which they meet the myths.  Alice’s behaviour does 
not directly challenge the myths, instead she fails to achieve success within the 
boundaries of the dominant discourse.   
 
In Hannah’s case, the prosecution and defence barristers sparred over her 
portrayal as a mother.  The prosecution’s case was built upon the notion that 
Hannah did not want the child, supported by evidence of her failed attempts to 
have an abortion and her decision to conceal her pregnancy from her family.  
The prosecution argued that the child died due to Hannah’s decision to not seek 
assistance during or after the birth and that this decision was based on the fact 
that she felt she could not have a child out of wedlock.  Furthermore, the 
prosecution barrister pointed to Hannah’s response following the death of the 
child as further evidence of her wrongdoing, exclaiming ‘And of course the 
defendant then simply returned immediately to her normal life and sought to 
keep her secret, it would appear, forever’ (Hannah, prosecution facts).  Hannah’s 
behaviour of resuming her day-to-day life was remarked upon several times by 
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the prosecution, implying that this was an abnormal response to the situation of 
a dead child and as such demonstrated her unmotherly responses.   
 
In her defence, Hannah’s barrister argued that the behaviour that the 
prosecution construed as unmotherly, namely carrying on with daily life, was in 
fact evidence of her motherly behaviour, 
But lest there be any misinterpretation about her behaviour, this is not, I 
would submit, before you a callous, hard-hearted individual who simply 
swept this aside and carried on as normal, because she is, after all, a 
grieving mother, this was her child and within two hours or so of giving birth 
her child had died (Hannah, defence mitigation). 
It is unclear from the transcript whether either side was successful in its 
portrayals of Hannah in line with socially expected ideals of motherhood, 
nevertheless it is significant that this is one of the standards by which her moral 
character was judged, as it suggests an unspoken assumption that as Hannah 
was pregnant she should have met a standard of ‘motherly’ behaviour.  Such an 
expectation exists even though Hannah acted in ways to suggest she had no 
desire to be a mother to the foetus with which she was pregnant.  The existence 
of Hannah’s pregnancy is considered synonymous with her roles as a mother.  
Furthermore, it would appear that within the court her moral character is 
constructed and judged alongside idealised images of motherhood, present in 
the myths of motherhood; this is in spite of her actions appearing to demonstrate 
her rejection of motherhood. 
 
Sally is deeply criticised in the pre-sentencing report for her life-style during the 
period she gave birth to the infants (Sally, court file).  Her parenting of her three 
living children during this period is noted to be absent.  The three children were 
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raised by the eldest child, they lived in squalid conditions and Sally was believed 
to often be drunk or high.  She is described as being promiscuous, noted to have 
had numerous sexual partners, including her daughter’s partner, and is alleged 
to have possibly had sex with her own brother, Sally denied this.  It is also stated 
in the report that it is believed that she would have sex with men while the 
children were in the same room as her, instructing them to turn the lights off.  As 
I did not have access to the prosecution’s case nor the mitigation provided by 
the defence, it is difficult to know if Sally’s behaviour was actively considered 
within the confines of the myths of motherhood.  However, from the sentencing 
remarks and the presentencing report it would appear that Sally is generally 
seen as failing to meet any of the standards of the ideal mother.  Her behaviour 
in general was considered unmotherly to her living children.  For her unborn 
children, the judge notes in the sentencing remarks that while she was not 
culpable for their deaths due to the acceptance that they were stillborn, he 
appears to imply that her behaviour prevented them from living, 
…whilst the circumstances and reasons for the stillborn births will never 
fully be able to be established, your chaotic lifestyle choices, including 
alcohol abuse and promiscuity at the time of your pregnancies was such as 
to put the good health of any unborn child at risk (Sally, judge sentencing 
remarks). 
Her actions during her pregnancies, which potentially did have negative 
consequences on the welfare of the unborn children, may have prevented Sally 
from being perceived positively in the role of a mother.  As noted in the Chapter 
3, previous studies have identified a strong link between the concept of the 
‘responsible’ pregnant woman and the ‘good’ mother (Brooks-Gardner, 2003; 
Lupton, 2011; Gregg, 1995; Harper and Rail, 2012; van Mulken et al., 2016).  
Sally’s reported behaviours while pregnant do not conform to current social, 
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cultural and medical standards expected of ‘responsible’ pregnant women.  
Certainly, the judge who heard the case deemed Sally’s behaviour to have been 
detrimental to her foetuses.  As such, this may have impacted perceptions of 
Sally’s role as a mother, and so her character as a defendant. 
 
In Lily’s case, the defence barrister drew on Lily’s record of being a good mother 
to her existing children as evidence of her good character.  This portrayal is 
accepted by the judge, who notes in sentencing, ‘you have two small children 
whom on the account of everyone you are… bringing up well’ (Lily, judge 
sentencing remarks).  Despite suggestion by the prosecution that Lily’s act of 
concealing her pregnancy, and potentially facilitating the death of the 
foetus/child, was due to her not wanting another child, the judge appears to 
reject these claims.  Instead, the judge accepts the argument that Lily 
experienced a crisis pregnancy due to her violent relationship with her partner, 
Alan.  The context of domestic abuse and Lily’s fear of Alan appears to have 
helped facilitate a sympathetic understanding of Lily’s behaviour before, during 
and after the birth, 
The circumstances in which this event took place can never to a finite 
degree ever be established. You say that you were subject to domestic 
violence from [Alan] and that on that particular day he had kicked you in the 
stomach, causing the loss of the child. The Prosecution do not accept this. 
There has been a veiled suggestion in the case, and I put it no higher than 
that, that there may have been something suspicious about the birth and 
your subsequent behaviour. You were never charged of course with any 
homicide, but what can be said is that you were already the mother of three 
children and you have cared for children subsequently and cared well, and 
I dismiss any suggestion, veiled or otherwise, that there was something 
sinister about your birth of the child and procuring its birth (Lily, judge 
sentencing remarks). 
 In complete contrast to Lily’s case, the judge in Hayley’s case rejected attempts 
to use evidence that she is a good mother to other children to demonstrate her 
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good character.  The defence referred to statements provided by social services 
and the school Hayley’s children attended, both concluding that Hayley is a 
supportive and loving mother.  The judge rejected these claims, drawing on 
evidence of Hayley’s past experiences of pregnancy and motherhood as a basis 
for why she should not have behaved as she did, due to her awareness of the 
process of pregnancy and childbirth, 
You have experience of childbirth, of abortion, and indeed of adoption, and 
you must have full knowledge of the developmental stages of the child in 
the womb as well as the lawful limits on abortion of which you were 
expressly told (Hayley, judge sentencing). 
The judge appears to believe that there is a normal, appropriate, and, arguably, 
natural response a woman will experience when she becomes pregnant, and 
Hayley’s prior knowledge of pregnancy should have led her to adhere to that 
response.  The judge concludes that with her previous experiences of 
pregnancy, her educational level and her lack of evidence of mental disorder, 
she has no mitigation, defining her action as, ‘to rob an apparently healthy child 
en ventre sa mere, vulnerable and defenceless, of the life which he was about to 
commence’ (Hayley, judge sentencing remarks).   
 
Lily and Hayley’s cases are not comparable.  The prosecution accepted that they 
had no way of knowing if Lily’s child was born alive, due to the condition of its 
body when discovered.  The prosecution did present ‘a veiled suggestion in the 
case… that there may have been something suspicious about the birth and 
[Lily’s] subsequent behaviour’ (Lily, judge sentencing remarks).  Nevertheless, 
the suggestion is rejected by the judge.  In complete contrast, Hayley was 
suspected of, and pleaded guilty to intentionally taking misoprostol to cause a 
miscarriage.  The court believed that the foetus could have been born alive if the 
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drugs had not been consumed.   The purpose of my comparison of the two 
responses by the judges is in recognition that both women have mothered other 
children, but evidence of their past behaviour as mothers is understood and 
treated very differently. 
 
The evaluation of the behaviour of these women against the perceived ideal 
motherly behaviour supported by the myths that surround motherhood is 
significant for a number of reasons.  Firstly, an assumption is made in each case 
that becoming pregnant and continuing to be pregnant until the final stages of 
gestation and foetal development will directly lead to motherhood and will result 
in a woman adopting the role of a mother, and consequently meeting the ideals 
that are subsumed within the myths of motherhood.  It is assumed that the 
physical capabilities of a woman to carry and give birth to a child, to ‘mother’ a 
child, will result in her being and acting like a mother.  The ‘naturalness’ of 
motherhood, and assumption that the role is inherent to women is not contended 
or questioned.  Secondly, these cases illustrate the strength of the ideals that 
surround motherhood.  Each of the women have actively rejected being mothers 
and have attempted to dispose of their foetus/child.  In all but one case the 
foetus/child has died and so, arguably, the women cease to be mothers of those 
foetuses/children.  Nevertheless, in the cases involving the adult women, there is 
apparent expectation that their actions will conform to the ideal, and 
interpretation of their behaviour using the ideal is considered a legitimate area 
for argument by both the defence and prosecution.  If the women were not 
expected to conform then they would not be judged against the standards 
constructed by the myths, as with Tanya and Fiona who are possibly considered 
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too young to be mothers.  Finally, the cases highlight the pervasiveness of the 
myths, as it appears that no participant in the court nor within the trial process 
questions why these women should be required to conform to the myths.  Within 
these cases it would appear that the judgements made against the characters of 
these seven women are based upon characterisation of their behaviour next to 
social and cultural ideals of motherhood constructed by the myths.  These 
findings reflect those of previous feminist work into the perceptions of female 
offenders within the court (Eaton, 1986; Carlen, 1983), suggesting that offending 
women continue to be judged in line with gendered stereotypes of domesticity 
and motherhood. 
Crisis pregnancy and culpability 
Pregnancy is presented in the cases as a ‘normal’ event in these women’s lives 
with an assumption that there are few reasons why becoming pregnant should 
cause any alarm for any woman.  The conclusion is drawn after examining the 
ways that the existence of the seven women’s pregnancies were discussed, 
explained, and perceived by the court during the hearings.  From the court 
proceedings, it appears that crisis pregnancies that result in a concealed/denied 
pregnancy are misunderstood by the courts.  The nature of, causes, and 
consequences of concealed/denied pregnancies are not presented as prominent 
features in any of the cases, but rather the denial and/or concealment of the 
pregnancy is presented merely as behaviour of the defendant when describing 
the context and circumstances of the case.  Furthermore, there also appears to 
be an unwillingness to understand the nature of a crisis pregnancy and the 
impact it can have upon a woman.  A consequence of lack of understanding 
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appears to be that culpability for the death of the child is assumed to be linked to 
knowledge of the pregnancy.  To support this conclusion, I present four of the 
cases: Fiona, who is believed to have been unaware of her pregnancy and is not 
considered culpable for the death of her child due to the shock experienced by 
the unexpected birth; Tanya, described as denying her pregnancy to herself and 
others while knowing she was pregnant, deemed to be culpable for the death as 
the child would likely have lived if she had told someone about her pregnancy; 
Hannah, who is presented as having purposefully concealed her pregnancy as 
she did not want her family to know, and is consequently considered to be 
culpable for the death of the child, despite the possibility she was unconscious at 
the time of the child’s death; and Sally, who, although she was deemed not to 
have caused the death of the foetuses/children as the court accepted they were 
stillborn, is noted to be, at least, partially responsible for preventing the foetuses 
from living due to her behaviour during pregnancy.  
Fiona 
Fiona was not considered to be culpable for the death of her infant.  After a live-
birth, Fiona stabbed the child 27 times.  The prosecution presented evidence 
that Fiona did not know she was pregnant.  The report produced by the 
psychiatrist/psychologist concluded that Fiona seemed to have been ‘genuinely 
unaware of her pregnancy’.  Unlike other cases, notably Tanya’s, no evidence is 
presented of Fiona having any indication of her pregnancy.  While Fiona is 
considered responsible for stabbing the baby, it is argued by the prosecution that 
she lacked criminal intent and was ‘driven by panic and the effects of both 
mental and physical shock’ (Fiona, prosecution facts).  Generally, the 
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conclusions presented in the hearing appear to lack the moral judgement and 
pointed blame of the other cases.  Indeed, there appears to be a level of pity and 
sympathy for Fiona.  Comments from the judge when sentencing suggest that 
historic understandings of newborn homicide that underpinned justification 
enactment of the Infanticide Acts1 were reflected in Fiona’s case, 
Because the law recognises that young ladies are deeply affected by 
childbirth and the circumstances of this case are unusual but not unique in 
the lack of awareness of the pregnancy and the very considerable trauma, 
both physically and emotionally, that giving birth would have brought about 
(Fiona, judge sentencing remarks). 
Later, in sentencing, the judge commented, 
You became pregnant but you were not aware of that and you gave birth in 
what must have been thoroughly frightening circumstances and, whilst the 
balance of your mind was disturbed, you killed your baby.  You have to live 
with that.  That is a heavy burden to carry.  But the law recognises that 
people in a similar predicament do, on occasions, kill their offspring whilst 
the balance of their mind is disturbed and the law recognises that it is 
important for the courts to act in a constructive way and mercifully, rather 
than to concentrate on punishment (Fiona, judge sentencing remarks). 
As noted in Chapter 4, scholars have argued that the offence of infanticide is an 
unofficial recognition that women kill infants due to socio-economic strains and 
other contextual factors that surround pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood 
(Brennan, 2007, 2013a; O'Donovan, 1984; Loughnan, 2012b).  I am unable to 
construe the reasoning for the acceptance of Fiona’s crisis pregnancy, due to 
the lack of discussion in the court hearing or access to any other documentation 
relating to the offence.  It could well be that neither she, nor those around her 
had any idea she was pregnant.  However, much of the literature appears to 
dispute this probability, or indeed possibility (see Meyer and Oberman, 2001; 
Spinelli, 2003; Amon et al., 2012; Beier et al., 2006).  Alternatively, there could 
be no evidence to suggest she knew about the pregnancy.  Regardless, her 
                                             
1 1922 (12 and 13 Geo.5, c.18); 1938 (1 and 2 Geo.6, c.36). 
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claim of unawareness of the pregnancy is accepted by the court and this 
appears to have facilitated a sympathetic understanding of Fiona’s behaviour.  
As the court accepts that she did not know she was pregnant, then the onset of 
birth and labour can also be presented as an unexpected occurrence for Fiona.  
Her alarm at the unexpected delivery, in conjunction with her age, appears to 
provide the basis for the lenient treatment, as the judge remarked, 
At the age of 16 you became pregnant but you were not aware of that and 
you gave birth in what must have been thoroughly frightening 
circumstances and, whilst the balance of your mind was disturbed, you 
killed your baby (Fiona, judge sentencing remarks). 
Certainly, this response to a crisis pregnancy is not mirrored in the second 
conviction for infanticide in the sample, Tanya’s case.  The significance of 
Fiona’s case lies in the fact that those involved in the case – judge, barristers, 
solicitors, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), psychiatrists – accepted she did 
not know she was pregnant and so they accepted that she would not have 
anticipated the birth of the child.  The perception of Fiona’s knowledge appears 
to have had an impact on the interpretations of her culpability.  
Tanya 
During Tanya’s trial the prosecution concluded that she denied her pregnancy to 
herself, her family and her doctor.  However, they also presented evidence that 
she knew she was pregnant.  Evidence from Tanya’s Google search history 
suggested that she had knowledge of her pregnancy from the early stages of 
gestation, she used search terms such as: ‘abortion’, ‘Night Nurse day and night 
capsules, take whilst pregnant’, ‘how early in pregnancy does milk production 
start?’, ‘why do I not have a baby bump?’, ‘how to cause a miscarriage at 4 
months’.  Although the prosecution did not argue that Tanya purposefully acted 
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to conceal her pregnancy, they did present evidence that she went to some 
lengths to hide her pregnancy from her family, and that she denied being 
pregnant when asked, 
The defendant started showing signs of having a slightly swollen stomach 
and took to wearing loose fitting tops. She was reluctant to undress in front 
of her mother (Tanya, prosecution facts). 
At no point during the hearing was evidence presented regarding the context of 
crisis pregnancy that leads to a concealment/denial.  As previous literature has 
argued, the distinction between concealment of pregnancy and denial of 
pregnancy cannot easily be drawn (Beier et al., 2006; Green and Manohar, 
1990; Meyer and Oberman, 2001).  Furthermore, the use of the language of 
‘denial’ and ‘concealment’ has an impact on criminal cases.  As Vellut et al. 
(2012) argue the term ‘concealment’ implies a woman acted deceitfully to stop 
others from discovering the pregnancy.  The level of Tanya’s awareness of her 
pregnancy is not explored during the hearing.  Instead evidence of her 
continuing to deny being pregnant is presented as evidence, 
In the early part of last year, you realised you were pregnant… You then 
denied it to yourself.  For months you denied it to yourself and to your 
mother, who was plainly very concerned about you and even to your 
brother to whom you are extremely close… It is apparent to me that you 
closed your eyes to the inevitable and tried to behave and behaved and 
interacted with all of those around you as though all was normal when you 
surely knew that it wasn't. The searches on your computer reveal a 
teenager in distress, trying to decide what to do and instead of confiding, 
you withdrew from your family and at one stage they thought your 
depression seemed to be improving but in truth you were maintaining a 
facade to prevent them from probing too hard as to what was happening.  It 
is quite clear that by the time the baby was due, you were in complete 
denial (Tanya, judge sentencing remarks). 
Tanya is not considered culpable for her act of suffocating the child with a tissue.  
Two psychiatrists concluded that she was not of sound or rational mind at the 
time of the killing.  As presented in Chapter 4, the basis of the offence of 
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infanticide is that a woman lacks criminal culpability due to the balance of her 
mind being disturbed due to not having fully recovered from the effects of giving 
birth.  Acceptance of Tanya’s plea demonstrates that the Crown does not believe 
she should be convicted of murder.  Nevertheless, despite Tanya not being 
considered culpable for her act of killing, I contend that there appears to be a 
perception that Tanya is blameworthy for the death of the child, precisely 
because she denied her pregnancy – the judge continued: 
…in the early hours of that morning you delivered the baby yourself in your 
bedroom at home, alone.  You didn't cry out.  You asked for no help. You 
were at home in your household. Right next door to you were members of 
your family who could have and would have helped you but you couldn't 
see that. You were not rational (Tanya, judge sentencing remarks). 
The insinuation made by the judge is that if Tanya had called out during the 
labour, or had admitted to being pregnant when asked by her family or her GP, 
then she could have prevented the death of the child.  Her liability for the death 
of the child appears to rest on her denial.  While this liability may not be based 
on a legal maternal obligation to the foetus/child, it nevertheless appears to 
exist.  Indeed, the judge notes, ‘had you been able to [confide] in someone 
during your pregnancy, all of this could have been avoided’ (Tanya, judge 
sentencing remarks).  Tanya’s case demonstrates a lack of understanding of the 
complexities and difficulties that surround a crisis pregnancy, resulting in a 
concealed/denied pregnancy. 
 
For Tanya, the lack of understanding of the nature of her crisis pregnancy does 
not seem to impede the outcome of her trial; lenient treatment occurs, most likely 
due to her infanticide conviction.  This outcome occurred despite the CPS 
initially rejecting her plea of infanticide, preferring to prosecute a murder charge.  
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The decision to accept the plea appears to have been made after two 
psychiatrists, the second for the Crown, concluded that it was a case of 
infanticide due to ‘suffering a severe depressive episode during pregnancy’ and 
she was,  
…in a state of derealisation and depersonalisation during delivery.  The act 
of killing her baby was not malicious, not planned or deliberate.  Putting the 
wipe in the baby's mouth was an impulsive, erratic response to hearing the 
baby making gurgling noises, given her psychological state at the time of 
the delivery and denial of the pregnancy up to that point (Tanya, 
prosecution opening facts). 
It is not possible to know what outcome would have occurred if Tanya’s plea had 
not been accepted, for it is very possible that evidence of her knowledge of her 
pregnancy may have been used against her in order to demonstrate intent, as 
has occurred in other cases (for example as reported in Vellut et al., 2012).  In 
sentencing, the judge concluded that Tanya was ‘not rational’ in her behaviour 
during her labour and delivery, and that her actions demonstrated her 
disturbance of mind – ‘In fact, it was the trauma of the birth itself in the context of 
your isolation and your depression that caused you to act as you did’ (Tanya, 
judge sentencing remarks).  Evidence presented in court emphasised the 
connection between Tanya’s mental state and the trauma she experienced 
during the sexual encounter that resulted in her becoming pregnant (rape, in 
Tanya’s eyes if not the court’s).  Scholars have commented that the Infanticide 
Act 1938 operates on a presumption that all women who kill their infants within 
12 months are mentally ill (Loughnan, 2012b; Barton, 1998; Morris and 
Wilczynski, 1993b, 1993a; Weare, 2016).  Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the act of killing is believed to demonstrate the existence of the mental 
disturbance, rather than that the mental disturbance causes the woman to act as 
she does – only ‘mad’ women kill their children (See Weare, 2013; Morris and 
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Wilczynski, 1993a; Edwards, 1984).  As I argue in Chapter 4, scholars have 
disputed this interpretation of the offence.  Nevertheless, it appears that in 
Tanya’s case the judge believed that her act of killing demonstrated her 
disturbance of mind.  What is important to note is that the lack of understanding 
of the consequences of crisis pregnancy meant that Tanya is considered 
responsible for the death of the child, not because she killed the child, but 
because she failed to tell people she was pregnant and therefore allow others to 
prevent her fatal act towards the child.  Thankfully for Tanya, the sympathetic 
understanding of her situation and her willingness to plead guilty to infanticide 
resulted in her avoiding the full weight of the law.  Not all women in this study 
were so fortunate. 
Hannah 
In Hannah’s case, evidence of her awareness of her pregnancy was presented 
by the prosecution.  Hannah confirmed she was pregnant to police officers when 
she was approximately twenty-four weeks pregnant.  She was also seen by a 
doctor at a walk-in centre when she was eight-months pregnant and stated she 
could feel the baby moving.  Evidence was also presented that Hannah booked 
an appointment to have an abortion, but did not attend.  In contrast to Tanya’s 
case, where the prosecution argued that Tanya denied her pregnancy, in 
Hannah’s case, the prosecution argued that she concealed her pregnancy 
because she did not want the world to know she was pregnant.  Hannah’s 
actions are presented as intentionally deceitful; it is noted that her religious and 
cultural background meant that she could not be pregnant outside of wedlock.  
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This cultural issue is presented as the reason for her not wanting the child and 
so purposefully hiding it from her family and the wider world, 
The Crown’s case is that she had made it plain she didn’t want the child 
and that she could not have a child out of wedlock.  She told no one for 
those reasons.  She sought no assistance with the birth as she sought to 
keep it a secret.  She sought no assistance for the newborn child and it 
died without any attempt, it would appear, by the defendant to give it the 
care the child required (Hannah, prosecution opening facts).   
In her defence, Hannah’s barrister highlighted the impact the family dynamic had 
upon Hannah’s experience during her pregnancy, noting that the options that 
most women have when they face an unwanted pregnancy ‘were simply not 
open to her’ (Hannah, defence mitigation).  Hannah’s barrister noted that 
Hannah made ‘poor’ and ‘bad’ decisions, that she was ‘foolish’, concluding that 
the baby may not have died if Hannah had been able to confide in her family.  
Despite Hannah’s family declaring that they would have supported and helped 
her had they known about the pregnancy, the defence barrister made it clear 
that Hannah was unaware of this at the time, 
[Hannah’s Aunt], thought that it was an open relationship, ‘I only wish she 
had come to me and confided in me as I would gladly have helped her with 
the situation and even moved her and our family out of this area and to 
another country if needed.’  Well, again, that is plainly what her view is and 
was then, but it was not something that the defendant felt was an available 
option to her.  So the options that are open to most of us, should we find 
ourselves in this situation, were simply not open to her (Hannah, defence 
mitigation).  
 
The presentation of Hannah’s response to her pregnancy by both the defence 
and prosecution suggests that Hannah intentionally acted to conceal her 
pregnancy.  From what is known about pregnancy concealment/denial, it 
appears unlikely that Hannah’s actions would have been so purposeful and 
intentional.  As explored in Chapter 3, the context of women’s lives and the 
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circumstances that can result in women concealing/denying their pregnancy and 
neonaticide occurring, are often very difficult and distressing.  The fear, shame 
and guilt women feel in connection to their pregnancy can be debilitating, and, 
as noted by many scholars, the level of Hannah’s awareness of her pregnancy 
may not have been consistent or constant (Beyer et al., 2008; Oberman, 2003b; 
Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Vellut et al., 2012).  It is not the aim of this thesis to 
evaluate Hannah’s psychological awareness of her pregnancy nor the reasoning 
for her action.  However, previous research into concealed/denied pregnancy 
would suggest that such a discussion is relevant and should have been included 
in the court hearing.  Discussion of this nature is missing from Hannah’s 
sentencing hearing.  Instead, the evidence presented by the prosecution 
suggests that Hannah acted purposefully to conceal the pregnancy and aimed to 
give birth alone, thus suggesting she is culpable for the baby’s death, even 
though she did not act to kill.  The defence provided by Hannah’s barrister may 
have portrayed convincing reasons why she concealed her pregnancy, but no 
attempt is made to consider the wider societal and cultural implications of the 
pregnancy for Hannah.  As such, perceptions of her intention for the baby to die 
and her culpability for the death are maintained. 
 
Hannah’s culpability is deemed to be based on her failure to seek medical 
attention for the child, 
…you have pleaded guilty to two offences before this court, to the 
concealment of birth of your daughter, and to child cruelty.  The basis of 
that plea is that you failed to seek medical assistance following the birth of 
your daughter.  The tragedy that followed is of the immense disaster for this 
child.  She died within two hours of her birth, and had you acted 
appropriately her life could have been saved.  There is no evidence that 
you ill-treated or assaulted the child, and it is still a mystery perhaps as to 
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the course of action that you took following her birth (Hannah, judge 
sentencing remarks).    
It may be the case that had Hannah not concealed/denied her pregnancy or 
given birth alone then the child might have lived.  Hannah maintains that she 
passed out after the birth, with the baby dying during her period of 
unconsciousness.  Hannah’s barrister noted that Hannah reported this version of 
events to a nurse following her arrest.  No further comment is made about this 
claim, and it is difficult to know whether Hannah was conscious following the 
birth.  If she was in fact unconscious then her culpability for the death of the child 
is questionable.  As is the accusation of negligence; she may not have been 
physically capable of preventing the death.  Collapsing from exhaustion post-
birth is documented in neonaticide literature (Oberman, 1996).  Nevertheless, 
the basis of Hannah’s criminal wrong-doing, under the offence of child cruelty, is 
her failure to seek medical assistance for the child and that this failure was wilful.  
As noted in the Chapter 2 – Methodology, the evidence available for analysis in 
this thesis does not allow for exploration of the decisions to prosecute nor the 
offence decided upon for prosecution and conviction.  Furthermore, I have no 
way of knowing why Hannah pleaded guilty.  However, what is significant is that 
if evidence of the nature of concealed/denied pregnancy and its potential impact 
on a woman’s behaviour while pregnant, in labour, and during the postpartum 
period had been heard then perceptions of Hannah’s criminal culpability may 
have been different.  If Hannah had in fact been unconscious after the birth, then 
it could be argued that she lacks the mens rea for the offence of child cruelty.  I 
contend that Hannah’s experience is not as clear-cut as the prosecution argued.  
Furthermore, if Hannah’s reaction to her pregnancy is considered in light of the 
context and circumstances of her life, as advocated by scholars (Oberman, 
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2003b; Ayres, 2007; Vellut et al., 2012) then her individual responsibility for the 
child’s life could be negated in favour of a collective responsibility held by 
society.  Few questions appear to have been asked as to why Hannah was 
determined to keep her pregnancy secret from her family.  Instead, her response 
and her beliefs are presented as ‘foolish’ and ‘poor’.  By failing to explore the 
nature and significance of the concealed/denied pregnancy, Hannah’s actions 
are reduced to being selfish, self-preserving behaviour, that can be interpreted 
as intentional, making her culpable for the death.  It may be correct to say that 
the baby died because Hannah did not tell anyone she was pregnant, but this 
assertion cannot come close to explaining the wider social and cultural 
circumstances, or the personal difficulties Hannah appeared to face.   
Sally 
The psychological report presented to the judge in Sally’s case, concluded that 
she experienced ‘affective denial’ with all four pregnancies, which resulted in 
stillbirths (Sally, court file).  Miller (2003) defines affective denial as a person 
having an intellectual awareness of pregnancy, but none or few of the emotions 
or behavioural changes.  The author of the psychological report noted that 
affective denial is experienced by many women who have substance abuse 
issues.  The nature of Sally’s case meant that it would not have been possible to 
hold Sally to account for the deaths.  The prolonged period between the 
birth/death of the infants and the discovery of their bodies meant that neither 
evidence of live-birth nor cause of death was determinable.  Consequently, the 
prosecution had little option but to accept Sally’s claim that all four children were 
born dead.  However, a note exists in the presentencing report that Sally took no 
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action to save the lives of the unborn children, nor sought medical attention 
when she realised the babies were not breathing (Sally, court file).  A document 
also exists in the court file, stating that according to the obstetrician contacted 
about the case, four stillbirths are unusual, particularly after a woman has 
experienced three live-births of healthy children.  As noted above, the judge in 
Sally’s case concluded that her ‘chaotic lifestyle… was such as to put the good 
health of any unborn child at risk’ (Sally, judge sentencing remarks).  Similarly, 
the author of the presentencing report assumes that each foetus would have had 
a better prognosis and chance of live-birth if Sally had sought antenatal care and 
had not consumed alcohol or drugs.   
 
An emphasis on Sally’s concealment exists within this case.  There is an 
assumption that the babies would have lived if a third-party had known she was 
pregnant, if for no other reason that this would have allowed for the medical 
system to manage Sally’s pregnancies and potentially have intervened to 
facilitate live-birth, professionals would have managed the risk Sally posed to the 
foetuses (Phelan, 1991; Halliday).  However, what this assumption fails to 
consider is the context of Sally’s life in which the concealments/denials of 
pregnancies took place.  From the presentencing report, it appears that Sally’s 
life-style was chaotic for a ten-year period; heavy drink and drug-use, living in 
poverty, raising her children alone.  It is also possible that Sally experienced 
domestic abuse in one of her marriages, although no evidence of this is 
presented during the hearing and the judge does not consider it when 
sentencing.  At the time of the pregnancies, Sally was a vulnerable woman.  It 
may be that child protection services would have acted on behalf of the welfare 
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of Sally’s living children if they had been aware of her living situation.  Her 
actions during her pregnancy may well have caused the stillbirths of the children, 
certainly this is the opinion held by the court.  Nevertheless, the nature of 
English law makes this suspicion irrelevant.  Sally’s case raises questions as to 
what and why punishment occurs in such circumstances and what criminal 
wrongs have been identified.  As outlined in Chapter 4, there is no legal 
obligation on a woman in England to seek medical assistance during a 
pregnancy, labour, or delivery.  Neither is there a legal obligation on a woman to 
cease or reduce behaviour that may harm an unborn child, such as drinking or 
taking drugs.  Thus, the focus on Sally’s act of concealment of her pregnancy as 
a factor in her culpability for the deaths of the foetuses/infants should be 
redundant.  A further debate as to how and why Sally has been criminalised is 
developed in Chapter 6.  However, at this point it should be stressed that no 
attempt was made to understand concealed/denied birth, nor is the context of 
Sally’s life explored when judging her culpability.  Instead, the 
concealment/denial and behaviour she demonstrated while pregnant are 
considered to have impacted the unborn children and their chance of being 
stillborn. 
The ‘normality’ of pregnancy 
A further theme identified following analysis of these cases is the concept of 
pregnancy as a ‘normal’, and so desirable, event in women’s lives.  This idea 
draws together the two previously discussed themes, acting motherly, and 
understanding crisis pregnancy.  The preconception that a woman should act in 
a motherly way and that this behaviour is inherent, natural, and directly 
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connected with the ability to get pregnant appears to underlie the workings of the 
court in each of these cases.  When coupled with, what appears to be a lack of 
understanding of crisis pregnancy, the result is an expectation that becoming 
pregnant is a normal event in a woman’s life, consequently it is perceived as ‘no 
big deal’.  The impact of such a perception is a failure to appreciate the 
complexities and difficulties women experience in these cases, as demonstrated 
by the exploration of the cases of Fiona, Tanya, Hannah, and Sally above, but 
also to assume a woman will exhibit and demonstrate certain responses to the 
discovery of her pregnancy.  This assumption of a standard response, is not only 
inaccurate, but appears to result in punitive and harsh treatment.  Hayley’s case 
demonstrates the impact of behavioural expectations of pregnant women and is 
examined below.  
 
Evidence presented at Hayley’s sentencing hearing demonstrates that she has a 
history of crisis pregnancies, having experienced four such previous 
pregnancies.  In the first she gave birth in hospital without receiving any prior 
medical treatment; the second pregnancy was terminated very close to the 24-
week legal abortion limit; during her third pregnancy, she received no antenatal 
care and after an abortion was refused due to her being over the legal time-limit, 
she and her husband kept the child; limited information is provided about the 
circumstances of her fourth pregnancy other than that Hayley and her husband 
kept the child.  This history, I argue, demonstrates Hayley’s complications and 
struggles with pregnancy.  However, as with the other cases presented above, 
no evidence of the nature and effect of concealed/denied pregnancy or crisis 
pregnancy was adduced during the hearing.  Furthermore, evidence presented 
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by Hayley’s barrister that the ‘complicated obstetric history’ may require further 
psychological assessment was rejected by the judge, 
JUDGE: The view I take is this was a deliberate calculated decision to 
break the law in relation to a child which she would have anticipated could 
have been born alive within the next few days. 
DEFENCE BARRISTER:  My Lord, I hear clearly what you say, is my Lord 
minded to even consider the possibility of adjourning for a psychological 
assessment? 
JUDGE:  I just do not see how it is going to help (Hayley, discussion during 
defence mitigation). 
Instead, the judge considered Hayley’s history to be evidence of her knowledge 
of pregnancy, demonstrating her intent and culpability for her actions.  Rather 
than appreciating that pregnancy can and does create a crisis for some women, 
and that this can result in a woman failing to act decisively to deal with the 
pregnancy, the judge assumes that knowledge of pregnancy will result in certain, 
‘appropriate’ behaviours.  This assumption appears to be based on two beliefs, 
firstly, that pregnancy is a normal, and so desirable event in women’s lives; 
consequently, it is nothing to cause alarm and concern.  Secondly, that the 
responses to pregnancy that are legal (abortion before 24 weeks, adoption, 
keeping the child) are easily understood and acted upon by all women, despite 
the context of the pregnancy.  The judge appears to hold the belief that only 
women who are mentally ill would take any other form of action, and as there is 
no evidence that Hayley experiences a formal mental disorder her actions are 
deemed to signify intent and clear culpability for ending the pregnancy, 
You are a woman who obtained sufficient A-Levels to attend … University, 
although you gave up your course in … your second year. You have 
experience of childbirth, of abortion, and indeed of adoption, and you must 
have full knowledge of the developmental stages of the child in the womb 
as well as the lawful limits on abortion of which you were expressly told. 
You do not suffer from any mental disorder of any kind (judge, sentencing 
remarks). 
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The consequence of negating the significance, impact, and consequences of a 
crisis pregnancy in Hayley’s case results in her actions being interpreted as 
deceitful, manipulative, and selfish.  The prosecution presented evidence 
demonstrating that Hayley lied about her due date at abortion clinics in an 
attempt to terminate the pregnancy, and then lied to her GP, saying she had had 
an abortion and was no longer pregnant.  The Crown also presented evidence 
that Hayley was promiscuous.  They argued that her reason for wanting to 
terminate the baby was because she had had an affair with a co-worker and 
wanted to hide the pregnancy from her husband.  Evidence was also presented 
that Hayley continued to have the affair even when she was heavily pregnant, 
just prior to taking the misoprostol.  The judge gives the impression that Hayley’s 
husband had weathered a great deal from Hayley and continued to support her, 
noting also that one of her previous pregnancies was terminated with his 
agreement, but another pregnancy was concealed from him until delivery.  In 
relation to the pregnancy she illegally aborted, the judge commented, 
You concealed the pregnancy from your husband, as you had done once 
before, though he had been both supportive and understanding following 
the delivery of that child, unexpected, as it was, to him. He is still supportive 
of you now (Hayley, judge sentencing remarks). 
The suggestion here is that Hayley’s husband has the right to knowledge about 
Hayley’s body.  The idea completely opposes the principles of bodily autonomy, 
an important campaign for feminists (see for example Faludi, 1992; Bordo, 
2003).  It is also suggested that morally correct reasons exist to justify an 
abortion (Sheldon, 2016b), and that Hayley’s reasons do not qualify.  
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The judge understood Hayley’s actions to be equivalent to homicide, although 
noting that it was not a homicide case, 
…the seriousness of the criminality here is that, at whatever stage life can 
be said to begin, the child in the womb was so near to birth that in my 
judgement all right thinking people would consider this offence more 
serious than that of unintentional manslaughter or any offence on the 
calendar other than murder. 
With no real mitigation and no remorse that I can detect, though undoubted 
emotional distress of the kind that any woman would suffer in relation to the 
sequence of events, I have to sentence on the basis that a substantial 
period of imprisonment is required, regardless of the effect that I know this 
will have on your family (Hayley, judge sentencing remarks). 
Without consideration and understanding of a crisis pregnancy, Hayley’s actions 
can be interpreted as deliberate and active – a choice, made by a rational 
individual.  And yet, previous research into neonaticide has highlighted the 
difficulties faced by women who find themselves pregnant when they believe 
they cannot be (Vellut et al., 2012).  The distinction between Hayley’s case and 
other reported cases of neonaticide in the literature is that Hayley took actions to 
end the life of the foetus before it was born, while most cases of neonaticide 
involve a woman killing the child through an act or omission following a solo 
birth.  Nevertheless, the key to these cases is the context in which a woman 
finds herself to be pregnant and the impact of experiencing a crisis pregnancy 
(Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Vellut et al., 2012; Alder and Baker, 1997; Amon et 
al., 2012; Beyer et al., 2008; Ayres, 2007; Fazio and Comito, 1999; Maier-Katkin 
and Ogle, 1993).  The details of Hayley’s pregnancy and how she felt about it 
are not presented in the court hearing; they are not a factor of the case that the 
judge considers worthy of exploration.  It would appear the judge believes that if 
women have the capacity to be impregnated then they should have the ability to 
make legal, ‘rational’ decisions about the fate of that pregnancy and any 
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subsequent foetus/child.  In this sense, pregnancy is seen as a ‘normal’ life 
occurrence that women experience.  This opinion negates the experiences of 
many women, for whom the discovery of pregnancy can be terrifying and 
disastrous.  Without consideration of this legitimate experience, any 
interpretation of Hayley’s actions misses the complexities and the wider social 
implications of her experience.  Pregnancy is not a simple life occurrence for all 
women, it is layered with meaning; that meaning influences how women 
understand the experience of pregnancy and what action they take, or fail to 
take in response to the foetus.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the judgements made against seven English women 
as they were sentenced for offences relating to their crisis pregnancies resulting 
in suspicious perinatal deaths.  These women are judged in line with gender 
biases that exist in relation to the role of ‘mother’.  The myths of motherhood are 
used and perpetuated by both the prosecution and defence barristers, and the 
judges to draw conclusions about the women’s behaviour and character.  As 
such idealised images of the mother and popular perceptions of the role of a 
‘good’ mother are drawn upon and used as a standard of comparison.  Within 
the cases there appears to be a perception that there is a ‘correct’ way to 
experience being pregnant.  As such, appropriate behaviour is presumed to exist 
and deemed to be instinctual and natural, occurring as soon as a woman 
comprehends the existence of a foetus within her.  As noted in Chapter 1 – 
Introduction, the ideal of the ‘good’ mother is inherently flawed and unrealistic, 
unachievable for the vast majority of women.  However, in light of crisis 
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pregnancies that result in a concealed/denied pregnancy, the idealised image of 
motherhood contained within the myths has very little bearing on such 
experiences of pregnancy.  As argued in Chapter 3, women who experience 
such pregnancies can have few or none of the symptoms of pregnancy; they 
might have some level of awareness that they are pregnant, but this awareness 
may be quickly supressed or negated.  Women who have experienced crisis 
pregnancies have reported being terrified of the consequences of the people 
around them discovering their pregnancy, and the context of their lives are 
believed to have significant impact on their belief that the foetus cannot exist 
(Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Vellut et al., 2012; Beyer et al., 2008; Amon et al., 
2012).  The case studies presented here suggest that the phenomenon of 
concealed/denied pregnancy is little understood within the English courts.  
Furthermore, it would appear that there is little appetite among professionals 
who work within the criminal justice system to appreciate the significance or 
impact of crisis pregnancy and how it can influence a woman’s behaviour.  The 
consequence of this is that often the nature of the circumstances of the death of 
the foetus/child is not fully understood.  Explanations of the behaviour exhibited 
by the seven women are reduced to assessments of psychiatric disturbance, 
poor judgement, or callousness and selfishness.  This chapter demonstrates that 
these seven cases are far more complex and cannot be reduced to such simple 
conclusions.  It is my contention that this lack of understanding impacts the 
perception of criminal wrong in these cases, notably Hannah, Hayley, and Sally.  
This assertion is not to down-play the significance of the deaths of the 
foetuses/children resulting from these women’s actions.  However, I do advocate 
that a contextual understanding of these cases is required.  Furthermore, in the 
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next chapter I argue that any decision to criminalise women involved in cases of 
suspicious perinatal deaths need to be made in line with the limits of the law and 
the evidence available to support criminal conviction. 
 
Chapter 6 Punishing mothers who do not conform 160 
Chapter 6 Punishing mothers 
who do not conform 
English criminal law can respond to suspicious perinatal death using several 
different offences.  These offences, the scope and parameters of which are 
outlined in Chapter 4, are procuring a miscarriage, child destruction, 
concealment of birth and, if live-birth can be established, homicide offences and 
offences against the person.  From the seven cases in the sample, we can see 
that although the actions of the women are generally similar, hidden pregnancy 
and solo birth, with a similar result, a dead child who was either live- or stillborn 
(with exception of Alice’s case), the nature of criminalisation differs.  Analysis of 
these cases suggests that prosecutors have a menu of offences they can draw 
upon to criminalise women suspected of perinatal killing, depending upon the 
evidence available in the case.  As already outlined, one of the key evidential 
factors includes indication of live-birth and separate existence.  One conclusion 
drawn from the analysis of these cases is that the desire to criminalise these 
women is strong.  As I argue in this chapter, desire to criminalise seems, in 
some cases, to negate the principles of criminal law and the evidence available 
in the cases.  As such, it is important to consider what wrongs are perceived to 
exist that warrant criminal sanctions.  Analysis of the cases focuses on the 
perceived criminal wrongs that were presented in court as justification of 
conviction.  These are identified as: putting the foetus at risk; failure as a mother 
to put the foetus first; and preventing the foetus/child from living.  One theme 
that threads through the cases is the notion of the failure of women to conform to 
the expected behaviour of mothers and pregnant women.  As outlined in Chapter 
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1 – Introduction, legal philosophers have argued that for a moral wrong to be 
determined as criminal, additional factors are needs to justify the state’s coercion 
into people’s lives (Simester and Von Hirsch, 2011; Jones, 2017).  This chapter 
assesses the perceptions of criminal wrongs held by members of the criminal 
system and the second half critically assesses the role of the criminal offence of 
concealment of birth, when I ask what action this offence is criminalising and if it 
is appropriate for it to continue to be used today.  Focus on this offence 
specifically comes from lack of academic engagement with the application of the 
offence in the twenty-first-century1 and the ambiguous history that surrounds the 
creation and use of the offence in the nineteenth-century, as outlined in Chapter 
4. 
 
The aim of this chapter is not to specifically question the impetus and desire to 
criminalise women who intentionally harm a foetus or newborn child.  The law as 
it currently stands has clear function – to protect any human being who is 
considered to have legal personality, this can and should apply to all people, 
even those who have just been born.  Similarly, the law offers some protection to 
the foetus, through s58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,2 which 
criminalises people who procure a miscarriage when not carried out under 
medical orders, and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 19293, which criminalises 
individuals who end the life of a foetus capable of being born alive.  
Nevertheless, as outlined in Chapter 4, two factors need to be considered.  
Firstly, that evidence of an offence occurring needs to be demonstrated prior to 
                                             
1 The one exception here is a brief mention of the offence in Sheldon (2016B).  However, further 
analysis is warranted.  
2 24 and 25 Vict. c.100. 
3 19 and 20, Geo.5, c.34. 
Chapter 6 Punishing mothers who do not conform 162 
conviction.  Secondly, that while the impetuous to criminalise action that is 
deemed morally heinous may be strong, application of the law must reflect legal 
principles over moral concerns.  It is with these two principles in mind that the 
following analysis is presented.  
Foetus at risk 
Concern over the wellbeing of the foetus has been a prominent feature of the 
twentieth- and twenty-first-centuries.  As discussed in Chapter 3, feminists have 
expressed concern over the conceptualisation of pregnancy as a state that 
requires careful and managed risk prevention, particularly as the risk 
management is predominantly focused on the risk to the foetus, rather than to 
the pregnant female body (Weir, 1996; Ruhl, 1999; Lupton, 2012b; Helén, 2004).  
The individualised risk model constructs the pregnant woman as her foetus’ 
most ardent protector, but also its greatest threat (Ruhl, 1999).  It is the security 
of the foetus that is of predominant concern to medical professionals (Phelan, 
1991; Halliday; Ruhl, 1999).  When a woman hides a pregnancy from the wider 
world, generally she will receive no antenatal care, reflected in the cases in the 
sample.  None of the women sought medical assistance with their pregnancies 
and all went through labour without the assistance of a medical professional.  As 
their pregnancies remained hidden from the wider world, third parties were 
unable to protect the foetuses from the mothers’ actions (or inactions).  No one 
was able to manage the foetuses’ security.  An element of Tanya’s culpability 
noted by the judge was her failure to protect the foetus by not disclosing her 
pregnancy, as previously noted in Chapter 5.  The judge stated, ‘had you been 
able to [confide] in someone during your pregnancy, all of this could have been 
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avoided’ (Tanya, judge sentencing remarks).  The remarks demonstrate a 
presumption that had others known about Tanya’s pregnancy then they could 
have stopped the death of the child by ensuring that Tanya was not able to kill 
the child post-birth.  The literature on neonaticide, presented in Chapter 3, 
assumes that a concealed/denied pregnancy is a risk factor of neonaticide (Beier 
et al., 2006; Beyer et al., 2008; Friedman et al., 2005; Meyer and Oberman, 
2001).  Such conclusions exist despite evidence contradicting such perceptions, 
as I presented in Chapter 3, and argued by Vellut et al. (2012).  If these women’s 
pregnancies had been uncovered by professionals responsible for the 
safeguarding of children then it is possible that child protection agencies may 
have become involved.  For example, the Safeguarding Children Boards of 
Brighton & Hove, East Sussex and West Sussex, have a section in their child 
protection manual focused on concealed pregnancy.  Within it, they advise that 
concealment of pregnancy ‘can lead to a fatal outcome, regardless of the 
mother’s intentions’; lack of antenatal care may lead to a number of 
consequences, including that ‘health and development of the baby during 
pregnancy and labour may not have been monitored and foetal abnormalities not 
detected’ (Pan Sussex Child Protection and Safeguarding Procedures Manual, 
2012: section 8.10.10).  The guidance notes that where concerns may occur, 
such as in lack of engagement or substance misuse, then a referral should be 
dealt with using child protection procedure and possibly a pre-birth child 
protection conference.   
 
Conversely, in four of the cases, pregnancy was known or suspected – Tanya, 
Hannah, Hayley, and Lily.  Very little evidence is available relating to public 
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awareness of Lily’s pregnancy as it is only mentioned in court and no Serious 
Case Review (SCR) appears to exist.  Tanya’s family strongly suspected that 
she was pregnant and her mother told the GP of her suspicions.  However, upon 
direct questioning by her GP, Tanya denied the possibility.  The SCR into the 
death of Tanya’s baby concluding: 
The service delivery provided by the GP was mostly reactive rather than 
proactive, with a greater degree of professional curiosity required to get a 
sense of [Tanya’s] lifestyle and sexual history. However, the explanations 
provided by [Tanya], the support provided by her mother and her 
presenting symptoms all reasonably indicated an alternative diagnosis to 
that of pregnancy. In addition, when directly asked about the possibility of 
pregnancy, [Tanya] clearly responded that this was not a possibility. It 
appears that the service provided by the GP was consistent and timely, 
with evidence that the GP did listen to [Tanya’s] presenting needs and 
wanted to offer her choice regarding her treatment. Also, [Tanya’s] last 
consultation with the GP prior to the birth of Baby W was positive and 
illustrated a picture of a young woman’s difficulties essentially under control 
(Tanya, SCR Overview Report: 26-7). 
The report identifies that the ‘missed opportunity’ lies in the lack of engagement 
with Tanya to counsel her about her sexual activity prior to conception of her 
child, therefore preventing the pregnancy from occurring.  Nevertheless, it is 
concluded that as Tanya ‘either consciously or unconsciously did not share the 
full extent of her needs with the GP’ she prevented services from meeting her 
needs (Tanya, SCR Overview Report: 33).  In Hannah’s case, several 
professionals knew about her pregnancy.  Police officers were made aware of 
her pregnancy when Hannah was in approximately the 23rd week of gestation.  
She advised the officers she had a termination scheduled for the end of the 
week.  The SCR concludes that it would have been appropriate to refer Hannah 
to the Public Protection Investigation Unit (PPIU),  
This would [have] allowed a specialist and local risk assessment to take 
place and may in turn have raised issues about the pregnancy and how this 
impacted upon [Hannah] and her relationships within the wider family and 
the community. It may also have raised questions about [Hannah’s] contact 
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with medical staff and the arrangements for the birth of the baby (Hannah, 
SCR Overview Report: 10-1). 
A significant amount of detail has been redacted or amended in the SCR to 
prevent potential identification, therefore it is difficult to interpret the reasoning 
for the Police officers’ decision to not refer Hannah to the PPIU, but it appear 
that this was due to their belief that the termination was going to go ahead.  
Hannah also twice presented to a Health Walk-in-Centre during her pregnancy; 
she was 8 months pregnant the second time.  Information was sent to Hannah’s 
GP about her visit to the Walk-in-Centre.  However, as the SCR makes clear, a 
GP surgery may not be aware that a patient is pregnant nor of her access to 
antenatal care due to such care being provided directly by community midwives.  
The SCR concluded, 
With hindsight [Hannah] was a potentially vulnerable, single, pregnant 
woman and although her presentation at the Centre was unconnected to 
the pregnancy, it would have been reasonable, in the view of the Overview 
Report author, to have taken a more holistic approach and at least 
sensitively raised the issue of the pregnancy and birth arrangements (given 
that [Hannah] was 8 months pregnant) (Hannah, SCR Overview Report: 
12). 
The NHS Community Services involved in production of the SCR concluded that 
there were no indications that Hannah was vulnerable, nor that she was 
concealing her pregnancy.  The SCR notes that the GP surgery could have 
established that Hannah had not sought antenatal services through 
communication with the community midwifery team.  A referral may have led to 
awareness being drawn to Hannah’s vulnerabilities.  As outlined in Chapter 5, 
the courts do not consider the context and consequences of concealed/denied 
pregnancy, and limited attention is paid to the vulnerability of these women, 
particularly Hannah.  The emphasis in the court hearing is upon the defendant’s 
failure to reveal their pregnancy and manage the risk to their foetus.  
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Other examples of concern about risk to the foetus can be identified in Hayley’s 
case.  From the transcript, it would appear that her illegal act of procuring a 
miscarriage was detected by the police after they had been informed of the case 
by doctors who were aware of her pregnancy.  As Hayley had attempted to 
obtain a legal abortion and had been denied due to being over the legal limit of 
24 weeks (she was just under 30 weeks pregnant at the time), the health 
authorities were aware she was pregnant and so expected to be contacted by 
her to arrange antenatal care.  After receiving no word from Hayley for over two 
months, the hospital midwifery team contacted her and she advised she had had 
a legal termination at a clinic.  Three weeks later Hayley’s general practitioner 
contacted her and Hayley again advised that she had had a legal termination 
some months previous.  A number of days later the designated nurse from the 
Safeguarding Children’s Services received the same account from Hayley.  
Hayley was first questioned by the police 6 weeks later.  This action by the 
medical community demonstrates concern held over the safety of the foetus.  
The legitimacy of this concern is not being disputed here.  However, it does 
suggest that the failure by a woman to mitigate risk to her foetus is one aspect of 
the wrong perpetrated that requires criminal sanction.  
 
A final indication that the harm identified in these cases of suspicious perinatal 
death relates to the women’s failure to mitigate risk to their foetuses, lies in 
discussion of the risk women may pose to future children.  The conclusion of the 
pre-sentencing report outlined by appellate judges during Hayley’s appeal was, 
‘She was known to conceal pregnancies and to mislead professionals and she 
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might well conceal a future or current pregnancy’ (Hayley, Court of Appeal 
sentence hearing), thus, suggesting that Hayley will pose a risk to any future 
foetus she may conceive.  In contrast, a mitigating factor presented in Sally’s 
case was that as she is no longer fertile, due to reaching the menopausal age; 
consequently she is considered to pose no future risk to other foetuses.   
 
A focus in these cases of the risk posed to the foetus suggests that this is one of 
the wrongs committed by the defendants that is deemed to warrant criminal 
sanction.  This concern over risk posed to the foetus appears to be warranted.  
Each woman did fail to manage the risk to their foetus by not engaging with 
prenatal medical care.  As outlined in Chapter 3, the medical community and 
wider society has deemed prenatal care to be of upmost importance to the 
health and wellbeing of a foetus (Gregg, 1995; Lupton, 2012b; Ruhl, 1999; Weir, 
2006).  Whilst it is very possible that lack of engagement with medical 
professionals did lead to the death of the foetus/child, support may have been 
provided to bolster the women’s vulnerabilities, thus preventing the situations 
that lead to death of the foetus/child.  However, this failure to manage risk does 
not in and of itself warrant criminalisation.  As outlined in Chapter 4, a woman is 
under no legal obligation to put the needs of her foetus before her own.  
Therefore, concealment of a pregnancy that results in a woman giving birth on 
her own does not constitute any criminal offence in England, even if it does 
result in the death of the foetus during birth.  Only upon live-birth and the 
establishment of separate existence does the woman gain parental responsibility 
and therefore a legal obligation to provide for the child.  A further discussion of 
the women’s legal responsibility will be developed later in this chapter.  
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Demonstration of these women’s wrongdoing through their failure to manage the 
foetus’ risk should not constitute a criminal wrong.  Nevertheless, it is presented, 
at best, as evidence of their wider criminality (such as intent to harm the foetus), 
and, at worse, as a wrong deserving criminal sanction in and of itself.   
Failure as a mother to put the foetus first 
Associated with the theme of putting the foetus at risk, is a woman, or mother’s, 
role in management of that risk.  Feminists have outlined the links made 
between expectation to conform to the health and risk discourse as constructed 
by the medical community, and the perception of the ‘good’ mother (Lupton, 
2011; Gregg, 1995; Harper and Rail, 2012).  The ‘responsible mother’ is the 
woman who puts the needs of the foetus/child before her own, and the 
behaviour of a pregnant woman and her self-regulation are seen as symbols of 
her love and evidence of her role as a ‘good’ mother (Brooks-Gardner, 2003).  
As argued in Chapter 5, all the women who are above the age of majority have 
their behaviour judged against an idealised image of motherhood, and 
pregnancy is considered synonymous with motherhood.  The two women whose 
behaviour was most clearly presented as being ‘unmotherly’ in the cases were 
Hannah and Hayley.  Both women were deemed to put their own needs before 
that of their foetus/child, and so failed to meet the criteria of the myths of 
motherhood, or of the responsible pregnant woman.  Hannah was deemed to be 
putting her need not to be pregnant outside of marriage before the needs of the 
foetus, as the prosecution argued, ‘she didn’t want the child and that she could 
not have a child out of wedlock.  She told no one for those reasons.  She sought 
no assistance with the birth as she sought to keep it a secret’ (Hannah, 
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prosecution opening facts).  Similarly, Hayley’s act of procuring an illegal 
miscarriage was believed to be due to her desire to conceal the extra-marital 
affair she had been having, as the judge notes: 
Despite marrying your long-term partner in May 20XX, it seems, on your 
own say so, that you conducted an on-off seven-year affair with a work 
colleague before becoming pregnant. You clearly decided, or you clearly 
thought, I should say, that the child was his because you told him, but not 
your husband, of the pregnancy in October 20XX. He offered to leave his 
wife to start a family with you, but you declined. You broke off the 
relationship with him in January, saying that there was no child and it was 
none of his business. You told the Probation Officer, however, that it was 
not until March 20XX that you decided you wanted to remain with your 
husband and to have an abortion (Hayley, judge sentencing remarks).  
At the point at which Hayley decided to have her abortion, she was 
approximately 30 weeks pregnant.  It cannot be denied that both women did act 
in ways that prioritised their needs rather than the needs of their foetus.  
However, it is difficult to know if their actions were as calculated and intentionally 
done as argued during their hearings, or if they were as a result of a 
disconnection with the pregnancy and fear and panic of the consequences of 
discovery as outlined in research by Vellut et al. (2012) and others (Beyer et al., 
2008; Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Spinelli, 2003; Alder and Baker, 1997).  
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, there is no legal requirement on a 
woman to put the needs of the foetus before her own.  This focus in the 
sentencing hearings on the women’s decisions to put their own needs first, and 
so prevent risk to the foetus, would suggest a tension exists in the principles of 
the law and its application in cases of suspicious perinatal death.  While a 
pregnant woman’s decision to act in a way that may be contrary to the wellbeing 
of her foetus may not be ideal, it is not necessarily criminal.  As outlined in 
Chapter 4, a woman only breaks the law under the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 if she acts with intention to end her pregnancy, and the law is only 
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broken under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 is she intends to kill the 
foetus.  Without these intentions, a woman’s negligence towards her foetus can 
be extensive and have extremely negative consequences for the foetus, but she 
still has not broken the law.  This legal principle is not clearly outlined in either 
Hayley or Hannah’s cases.  
 
In several cases in the sample, there is a sense that it is perceived by members 
of the court that if the women were unprepared to be mothers, then they should 
not have been pregnant in the first place, and as such it is their sexual activity 
that is at fault.  Certainly, focussing on the women’s sexual activity is a point that 
should arguably be redundant in these cases, as none of the laws in question 
are concerned with the nature of a woman’s pregnancy, or the paternity of the 
child, although, as outlined in Chapter 4, concern over single women’s sexuality 
was of historic significance for the offence of concealment.  In both Hayley and 
Hannah’s cases the prosecution point to the unsuitability of their relationships 
with those who impregnated them – Hayley due to her affair, Hannah due to her 
family believing her partner unsuitable.  Reference is also made to the fact that 
both women had experienced previous abortions, suggesting that this was not 
the first time they had been pregnant when they were unprepared to be mothers.  
Similarly, Sally is defined by the judge as being ‘promiscuous’.  The judge 
appears to draw this conclusion from the pre-sentencing report, which provides a 
list of sexual activity that could be interpreted as sexually immoral: twice 
divorced before entering the ‘chaotic’ period when she had numerous sexual 
partners, four of whom impregnated her; the father of the second stillborn child 
was the partner of her teenage daughter – he impregnated both Sally and her 
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daughter at similar times;  there was an accusation that Sally may have had sex 
with her brother; and that she had sexual intercourse while her children were 
present in the same room.   
 
Such concern over sexuality is also seen in Tanya’s case.  As argued in Chapter 
5, Tanya was not constructed by either the prosecution or defence as a mother, 
possibly due to her age.  However, the sexual encounter that resulted in her 
becoming pregnant is referred to throughout the trial.  Part of the reason for this 
reference is likely to be due to it providing an explanation for Tanya’s behaviour 
in her concealment/denial of the pregnancy, and in her post-partum 
panic/trauma that led her to kill the child. Nevertheless, referring to her sexual 
encounter, the judge commented, 
I don’t need to resolve the precise circumstances of this baby’s conception.  
It is plain to me from what you said to Dr [name] that however much you 
may have flirted with this man, you felt forced into having sex with him, 
although he may not have realised this.  I need say no more about it, but it 
was not something that you remembered with anything other than revulsion 
(Tanya, judges sentencing remarks).  
While the court is generally sympathetic to Tanya’s situation, there is a 
suggestion here that Tanya is responsible for the sexual encounter that resulted 
in her becoming pregnant.  The experience of having sex with this man is 
defined as being unpleasant due to both the dubious consent, but also the 
outcome – pregnancy.  There does appear to be a veiled suggestion from 
members of the court that if Tanya had not flirted with this man, then she would 
not have had sex and would not have become pregnant and therefore would not 
have killed the child.  Similarly, as noted above, the SCR concludes that an 
opportunity was lost in preventing the death of Tanya’s child by her GP not 
providing counselling on sexual health prior to the child being conceived.   
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The connection between inappropriate sexuality, pregnancy and lack of desire to 
become a mother is only ever suggested.  At no point is it blatantly stated by 
members of the court.  Nevertheless, belief in the inappropriateness of these 
women’s pregnancies does appear to be a feature of these cases.  The wider 
belief that pregnancy should only occur if motherhood is sought and desired, is a 
feature of the myths of motherhood, outlined in Chapter 1 – Introduction.  The 
disapproval of unwanted pregnancy is but one feature of the women’s behaviour 
that appears to be deemed to demonstrate lack of willingness to put the foetus 
first and so act like a mother.  The construction of the ‘good’ mother, as outlined 
in Chapter 3 (Hays, 1996; Smart, 1996; Thurer, 1994), appears to have strong 
impact on these cases.  It appears that failure to act like a ‘good’ mother, or a 
mother at all, is one of the wrongs deemed to warrant criminalisation.  Belief of 
expected motherly behaviour exists despite maternal neglect towards a foetus 
not being a criminal wrong that is covered by any offence.   
Preventing the foetus/child from living 
In each of the cases examined, the woman acted in a way that put the 
foetus/child’s life in danger and potentially prevented it from living.  The intention 
of that act and the culpability for it differs from case to case.  I remind the reader 
that I am not attempting to argue that a woman should not be criminalised for 
preventing a newborn child from living.  Similarly, I am understanding of the 
desire to punish women who intentionally act to end the life of a foetus in the late 
stages of pregnancy.   However, the desire to criminalise must be tempered by 
the limits of the law and the availability of evidence to prove an offence has been 
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committed.  Furthermore, the appropriateness of the law needs to be 
considered.  Here I wish to comment on how the cases of Hannah, Sally and 
Hayley were addressed by members of the criminal justice system, resulting in 
prosecution, conviction and sentencing.   
 
In Hannah’s case, her decision to give birth alone in order to hide her pregnancy 
is believed to have resulted in the child being prevented from living.  What is 
unclear in Hannah’s case is why she was convicted of child neglect rather than 
infanticide.  It is unknown why child cruelty was charged, it could be due to plea 
bargaining.  However, if Hannah’s comments about passing-out post-birth, 
described in Chapter 5, are to be believed then a homicide conviction could 
arguably not be proven, as being unconscious would mean that she lacked the 
physical ability to provide the child with the assistance it required and so it is not 
possible to hold her liable for the death of the child.  However, such logic would 
also apply to child neglect under the offence of child cruelty.  As outlined in 
Chapter 4, the mens rea of child neglect is based on the term ‘wilful’, requiring 
that the defendant either was aware at the time that the child’s health might be at 
risk if the aid required were not provided, or that the defendant was unaware of 
the aid needed due to not caring whether the child’s health was at risk.  If 
Hannah was unconscious, then it seems unlikely that she could have committed 
the offence as she would not have ‘wilfully’ acted, or failed to act.  As with all the 
women in these cases, Hannah pleaded guilty, and so there was no need for the 
Crown to prove their case.  If the case had proceeded to trial then the 
prosecution would have been required to demonstrate that Hannah had been 
conscious following birth and that she had wilfully neglected the child.  In such a 
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case, it would have been in Hannah’s interests to provide evidence that she had 
passed out, but the burden of proof would have been on the prosecution.  With 
this consideration in mind, it is possible to surmise that had Hannah not pleaded 
guilty to child cruelty she may have been acquitted at trial.  However, such a 
suggestion needs to be tempered by the knowledge that a jury may have 
convicted her regardless of lack of evidence to support Hannah’s wilful neglect in 
the post-partum period.  Juries do not need to justify their decision to convict, 
and what limited research that exists on the decisions of jurors would suggest 
that their verdicts do not necessarily reflect the evidence presented in court, nor 
the principles of law (Darbyshire, 1991).  Hannah was initially investigated for 
murder, and it is possible that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) agreed to 
prosecute Hannah for child cruelty rather than murder because she agreed to 
plead guilty.  Such comments cannot be more than speculation due to the 
absence of data available.  Nevertheless, it appears that the available evidence 
does not support a conviction for either child cruelty or homicide.  
 
Neither Sally nor Hayley were convicted of an offence against the person and 
yet both were deemed to be acting in a way that prevented their foetus from 
surviving.  Sally was not formally punished for this behaviour, as her conviction 
was for concealment of birth.  Nevertheless, it is apparent from the transcript that 
her actions while pregnant were suspected to have contributed to the stillbirths.  
The author of the presentencing report noted that while Sally did not cause the 
death of the babies, she took no precautionary actions to save their lives.  
Similarly, Sally is criticised by the judge during sentencing for engaging in 
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behaviour while pregnant that was deemed to have a negative, and possibly 
fatal consequence for a foetus: 
Whilst the circumstances and reasons for the stillborn births will never fully 
be able to be established, your chaotic lifestyle choices, including alcohol 
abuse and promiscuity at the time of your pregnancies was such as to put 
the good health of any unborn child at risk (Sally, judge sentencing 
remarks). 
The suggestion may be true.  However, as noted, there is no legal obligation on 
a woman to act in a way that will ensure the good health of her foetus.  Similarly, 
there is no legal sanction against a woman who causes unintentional harm to 
her foetus.  Nevertheless, as outlined above, the sentiment is manifested 
through subtler legal mechanisms.  If Sally’s acts did cause the foetuses to be 
stillborn then the only offence open to the crown to criminalise her actions would 
be child destruction.  However, as outlined in Chapter 4, to convict Sally of this 
offence would require evidence that the foetus died prior to living a separate 
existence, and that she intentionally acted to cause the death of the foetus.  
Alternately, if Sally’s acts while pregnant caused any of the foetuses to be born 
alive and then to die as a result of the injury sustained in utero, then she could, 
in theory, be convicted of manslaughter under the A-G Ref, as outlined by Cave 
(2004).  However, as it was not possible to determine if the foetuses were born 
dead or alive, neither of these convictions could be sought.  Consequently, 
without such evidence, Sally’s actions while pregnant do not warrant any form of 
criminal sanction.  Furthermore, mentioning these acts during sentencing Sally 
for concealment is unnecessary, as the offence of concealment has no bearing 
on the nature of death, nor whether live-birth occurred.  Although, as argued in 
Chapter 4, use of the offence during the nineteenth-century often occurred in 
instances where it was believed wrong-doing had occurred, but murder could not 
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be proven.  From the cases analysed here, it seems the criminal offence 
continues to be used in a similar manner today, further explored below.   
 
It is widely accepted by the court that Hayley’s act of taking Misoprostol caused 
the death of her foetus.  What is unknown, due to the body of the foetus never 
being located, is whether live-birth occurred and the child died following delivery, 
or if the foetus died prior to being born.  As outlined in Chapter 4, the offence of 
procuring an illegal miscarriage, under the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861, was enacted, in part, to condemn the intentional destruction of foetal life.  
However, the offence does not punish a person for causing harm or death to a 
foetus, as a foetus’ lack of legal personality prevents this.  During her trial, the 
judge hearing Hayley’s case equates her actions with murder on several 
occasions: 
As matters stand in English law, none of those offences could be 
committed in relation to an unborn child, but the seriousness of the 
criminality here is that, at whatever stage life can be said to begin, the child 
in the womb was so near to birth that in my judgement all right thinking 
people would consider this offence more serious than that of unintentional 
manslaughter or any offence on the calendar other than murder (Hayley, 
judge sentencing remarks). 
Similarly, while hearing the sentencing appeal, the Court of Appeal judges 
considered that Hayley’s culpability and harm to be the ‘the extinguishing of a life 
about to begin’ (Sally, Court of Appeal sentencing hearing).  As noted in Chapter 
4, the foetus is offered some legal protection under English criminal law; 
however, the law has never equated the ending of the life of a foetus with the 
killing of an individual with legal personality.  Consequently, the law distinguishes 
between a homicide offence and the offence of an illegal abortion.  
 
Chapter 6 Punishing mothers who do not conform 177 
One query raised by the judge during Hayley’s sentencing hearing, was why the 
offence of child destruction under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 was not 
utilised.  In response to this query, the prosecution replied that as it could not be 
proven whether the foetus was stillborn or born alive, the requirements of the 
offence had not been met.  The judge concluded that as the gravity of the 
offence of child destruction is the same as the offence of procuring an illegal 
abortion, then the decision on the charge is unimportant.  Hayley’s defence 
barrister was keen to argue that there was a distinction between the two 
offences, as this section of the transcript demonstrates,  
DEFENCE: ‘Well, in my respectful submission there is a fundamental 
difference. In 1861 abortion was illegal, it is now no longer so. What 
[Hayley] has done is failed to obtain a legal abortion within the specified 
time limit as the law now stands. That is in no way to her mitigation, but 
that's the gravamen of it.  This is not child destruction.  This may be the 
elephant in the room which I have to address, this idea of what has 
happened to this child, but the Crown have taken the decision to charge 
under Section 58, administering a noxious substance, the drug Misoprostol, 
to herself. Distinguish, my Lord, many cases now under that section where 
it is another with who administers for whatever reason, to procure a 
miscarriage and abortion. This is a highly unusual case in the 21st Century, 
to which we're looking at a 19th Century statute.’ 
… 
JUDGE: This is a child who, on the face of it, prospectively was capable of 
being born alive in the next few days… 
… But it doesn't change the nature of the conduct and the sentencing 
powers are exactly the same whether one looks at the 1861 statute or the 
1929 statute, and I am afraid you are going to have persuade me, if you 
wish to do so, that I am looking at this through the wrong lens, because at 
present it seems to me, as I say, that we are very much at the upper scale 
of criminality (Hayley, defence mitigation). 
As it transpires, the defence failed to persuade the judge and Hayley was 
sentenced to 12-years’ imprisonment, although the court of appeal reduced the 
sentence to 3½-years. 
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Considering the intent of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 and s58 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the arguments presented by the defence 
are incorrect.  The offence of procuring a miscarriage was intent on protecting 
foetal life, as well as the welfare of a pregnant woman (due to the dangers of 
abortion during the Victorian period).  As outlined in Chapter 4, and argued by 
Sheldon (2016b), the two offences overlap as child destruction has been used 
by prosecutors as a substitute of s58 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 
and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act appears to have never been used as 
intended when enacted – to capture the killing of a foetus following spontaneous 
birth but before separate existence had been achieved.  Regardless of these 
legal specifics, it is clear that the desire to criminalise Hayley stems from her act 
of preventing a foetus/child from living.  Now, as already noted, it is not the aim 
of my analysis to question the desire to criminalise women who intentionally 
ending the life of a foetus capable of being born alive.  However, use of the 
offences of procuring an illegal abortion, or child destruction, as the mechanisms 
for allowing this punishment to occur needs to be critiqued.  
 
In this case, the application of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 was 
applied to the letter of the law.  As Hayley pleaded guilty there was no need for 
the prosecution to prove its case – by demonstrating evidence that the drugs 
had been taken (the only evidence available was that Hayley ordered it online), 
or discovery of the body and determining cause of death.  Similarly, the judge 
was within his rights to sentence Hayley for up-to life imprisonment, as the 
statute allows.  As Hayley’s foetus was at or close to full-term, and it is very 
possible it would have been born alive in a matter of days, then the judge was 
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justified in seeing the seriousness of her actions and therefore imposing a 
stringent sentence.  The judge’s conservative views and beliefs surrounding 
abortion appear to have influenced his sentencing decision,   
There is no mitigation available to you by reference to the Abortion Act, 
whatever view one takes of its provisions, which are wrongly so liberally 
constructed in practice as to make abortion available essentially on 
demand prior to 24 weeks, subject to medical practitioners’ approval 
(Hayley, judge sentencing remarks). 
The judge had no jurisprudence nor statute to assist with sentencing, as the 
Court of Appeal judges noted during the sentencing appeal.  Their review of the 
case dramatically reduced the sentence starting point from 12 years to 3½ 
years.  As such, the appellant judges redressed the culpability and harm of 
Hayley’s actions, moving them far from the region of murder.   
 
A key issue in this case lies in the purpose of the offence of procuring a 
miscarriage and child destruction.  As noted in Chapter 4, in recent years 
advocated have outlined strong objection to the continued criminalisation of 
abortion and related offences.  As Sheldon (2016b, 1997) argues, if the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861is read in conjunction with the Abortion Act 19674, 
the law does not express that abortion is a moral wrong that should be 
condemned at all stages of gestation.  Instead, it considers abortion a serious 
wrong when not carried out under medical supervision in line with the best 
medical practice of the 1960s.  When considering Sheldon’s (2016b) critique of 
the law together with Hayley’s case, a number of points need to be considered.  
The first is that if restrictions on obtaining an abortion were not limited in time to 
24 weeks, then it is possible that Hayley may have been able to access an 
                                             
4 1967, c.87. 
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abortion through medical services when she first presented for medical 
examination.  It is also possible that had the legal restrictions on accessing to an 
abortion not been in place, then Hayley might have successfully obtained an 
abortion before the 30th week of her pregnancy (when she first presented).  As 
Sheldon (2016a) argues, the involvement of criminal law in abortion services 
acts to stigmatise the procedure and may negatively impact women’s ability to 
access services.  Secondly, the positive outcome of criminalising women who 
procure a miscarriage outside of the legal defence provided by the Abortion Act 
needs to be questioned.  Sheldon (2016b: 349) provides evidence that women 
obtain illegal abortions across the UK, with very few ever being prosecuted.  It 
appears that prosecutions are only sought when post-viable foetuses are 
aborted.  As already argued, one of the key ideas that was raised in both the 
sentencing hearing and appeal in Hayley’s case was that her actions prevented 
a foetus from living.  However, it must be remembered that any act of abortion 
prevents a foetus from living, so it needs to be considered why the focus of 
criminalisation in England is upon women who purposefully end the lives of 
foetuses in the later stages of development.  It is the case that a foetus in this 
stage of pregnancy is most like a human born alive, and is most capable of 
surviving outside of the womb.  However, that principle is not specifically 
recognised under English criminal law, nor has it ever been, if the Infant Life 
(Preservation) Act 1929 is interpreted together with the intent of the law when 
enacted rather than how it is applied.  If the incentive in Hayley’s case is to 
punish her purely because she purposefully ended the life of a foetus at a time 
when it was capable of living a separate existence, then legislation should be 
enacted in order to clearly reflect this desire in law, rather than using outdated 
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legislation that, as outlined in Chapter 4, ‘fails to fulfil any demonstrable modern 
purpose’ (Sheldon, 2016b: 356).  The enactment of such legislation would 
remove the principles of the born alive rule, and as Lord Dyson concluded in the 
most recent case relating to prenatal harm,  
Since the relationship between a pregnant woman and her foetus is an 
area in which Parliament has made a (limited) intervention, I consider that 
the court should be slow to interpret general criminal legislation as applying 
to it.5 
Using the offence of procuring a miscarriage to criminalise Hayley’s actions of 
intentionally ending the life of her foetus does just what Lord Dyson advocates 
against – applying the law in ways that Parliament had not intended.  It may well 
be that it is appropriate to criminalise women who act to kill a foetus during the 
late stages of pregnancy.  However, as no specific criminal offence currently 
exists to criminalise such action by pregnant women, and as Parliament has yet 
to pass such statute, current application of the law in cases such as Hayley’s, 
fails to meet the spirit of the law.  If a desire to criminalise such action exists, I 
contend that, following Lord Dyson’s logic, legislation should be enacted to 
capture the perceived criminal wrong.  Such statute would fundamentally change 
the law to provide the foetus with legal personhood. 
 
A further consideration is that punitive punishment of women who intentionally 
end the life of a foetus in the late stages of pregnancy is also out of step with the 
responses by the criminal justice system to the killing of newborn children.  
Through my initial data collection, and subsequent review of all identified cases 
of newborn child killing from 2002 to 2015, it appears that no woman has gone to 
                                             
5 Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) 
(British Pregnancy Advisory Service and others intervening) [2014] EWCA Civ 1554; [2015] QB 
459: 479. 
Chapter 6 Punishing mothers who do not conform 182 
jail for killing her newborn child over this period.  Most of these cases resulted in 
a conviction of infanticide, for which imprisonment is extremely rare.  The only 
case identified that did not result in an infanticide conviction, ended in a 
conviction for manslaughter (case 35 in Table 7 Appendix 1); this resulted in a 
two-year community order with supervision requirements, rather than 
imprisonment.  No woman who has killed a newborn child in this period has 
been convicted of murder.  As noted in Chapter 4, the Infanticide Act 19386 
facilitates lenient treatment, recognising the socio-economic pressures that could 
lead a woman to kill her infant, while framing this leniency in medical terminology 
(Ward, 1999; Brennan, 2007; O'Donovan, 1984; Kramar and Watson, 2008, 
2006; Grey, 2014).  Continued use of the Infanticide Act 1938 in the late 
twentieth- and twenty-first-centuries, including in the cases of Fiona and Tanya, 
reflects continuation of the belief that such vulnerable women may require a 
demonstration of leniency, as the judge ruled in Fiona’s case, 
But the law recognises that people in a similar predicament do, on 
occasions, kill their offspring whilst the balance of their mind is disturbed 
and the law recognises that it is important for the courts to act in a 
constructive way and mercifully, rather than to concentrate on punishment 
(Fiona, judge sentencing remarks). 
As noted in Chapter 4, wording of the Infanticide Act 1938, ‘balance of her mind 
was disturbed’ has been interpreted in the broadest sense and generously 
applied, covering a range of situations whereby a woman has killed her born 
alive child soon after birth.  If the law is prepared to accept that women kill 
newborn children due to socio-economic pressures, such an acceptance should, 
surely, be extended to women who kill foetuses in the latter stages of pregnancy.  
                                             
6 1 and 2 Geo.6, c.36. 
Chapter 6 Punishing mothers who do not conform 183 
As Weir (2006) argues, the distinction between a foetus in late gestation and a 
newborn child is location, hence construction of the ‘perinatal’ period.  
 
It should be noted that if the body of Hayley’s foetus had been found and it could 
be proven that it was born alive and had subsequently died through an act or 
omission on Hayley’s part, it is very likely that she would have been charged with 
murder, and it seems unlikely that the defence of infanticide would have been 
open to her.  The prosecution argued, but did not prove, that Hayley took 
medication to end her pregnancy.  As such, her act against her foetus/child 
occurred before the birth took place.  For infanticide to be committed, it must be 
proven that the ‘disturbance of mind’ that caused her to act was due to her ‘not 
having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of 
the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child’.7  As the birth of 
Hayley’s child was induced by medication, and not as a result of spontaneous 
labour, her action cannot be considered a result of a disturbance of mind due to 
not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth.  Although it could be 
argued that she was suffering from a ‘disturbance of mind’, it occurred the wrong 
side of birth.  Hayley undoubtedly suffered a crisis pregnancy.  Indeed, there is 
evidence that this was the fourth, if not fifth crisis pregnancy she suffered (see 
review in Chapter 5).  Her complicated obstetric history has resulted in three 
previous concealed/denied pregnancies.  From the literature review of 
concealed/denied pregnancy and neonaticide provided in Chapter 3, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Hayley was suffering from a ‘disturbance of mind’, 
as broadly defined by the Infanticide Act 1938, but that this disturbance of mind 
                                             
7 Infanticide Act 1938, s1. 
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was as a result of the pregnancy, rather than the birth.  It is possible that if 
Hayley had experienced a spontaneous birth, given birth to a live-born child, and 
either actively killed the child or allowed it to die, she could have been convicted 
of infanticide on the basis that her complex obstetric history and 
concealed/denied pregnancy demonstrates that she was disturbed of mind.  If an 
infanticide conviction had been obtained, then it is very likely that she would 
have received a community sentence, and so spared jail.  Hayley’s case 
highlights an inconsistency in criminal law.  It seems counterintuitive to imprison 
a woman who caused the death of a foetus prior to birth, when there is limited 
desire to imprison women who kill children soon after birth, particularly as a 
foetus does not have legal personality.  Granted, the Infanticide Act 1938 and 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 are two distinct pieces of legislation, 
with very different intentions and incentives – the Infanticide Act is a clear 
demonstration of leniency, in comparison to the s58 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act, which offers stringent punishment to any woman who ends a 
pregnancy.  However, such a discrepancy in law would suggest that a foetus has 
greater moral significance than a newborn child.   Whether it is believed that 
Hayley’s foetus died because of her act of procuring a miscarriage, or if it was 
born alive and subsequently killed or allowed to die, her punishment 3½ years, 
reduced from 12 years, is disproportionately severe compared to women who 
have killed children born alive.  Much concern over the whereabouts of the 
foetus’ body is made during Hayley’s sentencing hearing and appeal; the 
appellant judges noted this ‘…prevented post-mortem examination with its 
potential to determine the cause and timing of death’ (Hayley, Court of Appeal 
sentencing hearing).  Whether Hayley purposefully concealed the body due to 
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awareness that it would demonstrate an act of homicide cannot be speculated.  
As such, without this evidence, punishment for an act of killing cannot be given.  
Regardless of whether Hayley’s acts are comparable with an act of homicide of 
a newborn child, she appears to have been disproportionately punished.  
 
After reviewing and analysing the legal practice of prosecutors in cases of 
suspicious perinatal death, together with the scholarship on this area of criminal 
law, I have identified that application of the law reflects neither the principles nor 
the spirit of the law.  Professionals working within the criminal justice system are 
identifying wrongs that they perceive to warrant criminal sanction.  As such, out-
dated criminal law is utilised by prosecutors to criminalise women.  Throughout 
these cases, the women are judged next to the standard of the idealised mother, 
encapsulated by the myths of motherhood.  The narratives presented in court 
about the women’s motherly behaviour, outlined in Chapter 5, demonstrate the 
comparison of the women next to the ideal.  The ideals of the ‘good’ mother are 
also reflected in the perceived criminal wrongs outlined here – failure to protect 
the foetus from risk, failure as a mother to put the foetus first, and preventing the 
foetus/child from living.  Each of these perceived wrongs stem from the principle 
that a ‘good’ mother is a responsible pregnant woman who puts the health and 
wellbeing of her child, and by extension her foetus, first.  Each of the women in 
the cases examined failed to do that.  This failure underlies the desire to 
criminalise, even in cases where criminal wrong, dictated by the letter of the law, 
does not appear to exist.  An example of criminalising without clear criminal 
wrong is apparent in the offence of concealment of birth.  In this final section of 
the chapter, I outline the offence and query what criminal wrongs exist. 
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Concealment of birth 
As outlined in Chapter 4, concealment of birth (hereafter ‘concealment’) is 
categorised as a miscellaneous crime against society; it criminalises the hiding 
of a dead body for the purpose of concealing the fact that a child was ever born.  
A conviction is not reliant upon proof of live-birth or the cause of death.  The 
offence has historically been used to criminalise women in instances where 
wrong-doing was suspected but a murder conviction could not be made, as no 
evidence of live-birth was available (Jackson, 1996b; Kilday, 2013; 
Higginbotham, 1989; Loughnan, 2012a).  Three of the seven women in the 
sample were convicted of concealment – Hannah, Lily and Sally.  These women 
were not convicted of homicide offences.  In Lily and Sally’s cases it was 
concluded that their foetuses were stillborn.  In Hannah’s case, after originally 
being arrested for murder, she was convicted of child cruelty based on her 
failure to seek medical attention.  While Hannah was considered to be neglectful 
towards her child, and it is that act of neglect that resulted in the death of the 
child, the use of the concealment offence is not designed to punish that 
behaviour; this is the purpose of the child cruelty conviction.  Hence, the offence 
of concealment is deemed to punish Hannah for actions beyond neglect of the 
child.  With the facts of the three cases in mind, I question what criminal wrong is 
identifiable in each case.  As such, I consider the purpose of the concealment 
offence, and whether it is still required.  I propose five wrongs that might be 
deemed to require criminalisation: unproven homicide; improper disposal of a 
body; hiding pregnancy and birth; failure to register a birth or stillbirth; and 
Chapter 6 Punishing mothers who do not conform 187 
hindering a criminal investigation.  I will draw on Sally, Hannah and Lily’s cases 
to assist with this analysis.  
Unproven homicide 
In all the cases analysed here that resulted in a concealment conviction it was 
suspected, but could not be proven, that the women were responsible for the 
deaths of their foetuses or newborn children.  As already noted, to be a victim of 
homicide a child must be born alive.  Thus, to secure a homicide conviction it is 
not only necessary to demonstrate cause of death, but also live-birth.  During 
Lily’s sentencing hearing, it was stated that the when the body was discovered, it 
was not possible to tell if the ‘child had been born alive or was stillborn’ (Lily, 
prosecution opening facts).  The judge noted, ‘There has been a veiled 
suggestion in the case, and I put it no higher than that, that there may have been 
something suspicious about the birth and your subsequent behaviour’ (Lily, 
judge sentencing remarks).  Similarly, in Sally’s case, as already noted in this 
chapter, it is perceived that her actions while pregnant were ‘such as to put the 
good health of any unborn child at risk’ (Sally, judge sentencing remarks).  As 
with Lily’s case, it was not possible to determine whether Sally’s foetuses were 
born alive due to the state of decomposition once the foetuses’ bodies had been 
discovered.  
 
Hannah’s case is different in nature.  The post-mortem concluded that her child 
was born alive and died within two hours of birth.  There were no signs of injury 
to the child and no cause of death could be ascertained.  Hannah maintained 
that she fell unconscious post-birth and that the child had died before she 
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regained consciousness.  As already noted in this chapter, Hannah’s claim of not 
being conscious may explain why she did not face a homicide offence, notably 
infanticide.  Similarly, for this reason, if she had not pleaded guilty to the child 
cruelty charge, she may have been acquitted at trial as the prosecution would 
have been required to prove she had not passed out.  The prosecution noted 
Hannah’s claim to have passed-out in their opening facts, although they make 
no reference to this point when concluding their case, noting, ‘She sought no 
assistance with the birth as she sought to keep it a secret.  She sought no 
assistance for the newborn child and it died without any attempt, it would appear, 
by the defendant to give it the care the child required’ (Hannah, prosecution 
opening facts).  I feel it important to note that had Hannah been unconscious 
then she would have been unable to provide any form of assistance.  The 
ambiguity surrounding Hannah’s state of consciousness during the time the child 
lived may explain why a concealment charge was sought in this case.  As 
already noted, the offence of concealment is not concerned with how the child 
died, only what happens to the body post-death.  Inclusion of the offence of 
concealment on the charge list would mean that even if a conviction of child 
cruelty could not be secured, then at least a conviction for concealment could be 
made.  As it transpires, it would appear that Hannah’s disposal of her child’s 
body does not meet the requirements of the offence of concealment, explored 
below.  As such, it is possible that Hannah might have avoided criminal 
conviction due to the unavailability of evidence and the principles of criminal law 
surrounding parental responsibility.   
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In all three of these cases the actions of the women appear suspicious.  
Furthermore, as noted in this and previous chapters, an expectation exists that a 
pregnant woman will do all in her power to ensure the health and wellbeing of 
her foetus/child.  As a healthy child was not the outcome in these cases, 
suspicion would appear understandable.  However, a fundamental principle of 
criminal law is that evidence of wrong-doing must support a conviction.  Use of 
an offence to punish behaviour that is suspected, but cannot be proven 
challenges the presumption of innocence.  It appears that the offence of 
concealment is still being used as it was intended to be used when enacted in 
1803, to capture women who could not be convicted of homicide and to target a 
pattern of behaviour that was deemed to require punishment, although was not 
technically criminal (Jackson, 1996b).  Application of law for this purpose has 
serious implications for defendants.  Concealment is significantly easier to prove 
than a homicide offence and so can facilitate criminalisation where none might 
be warranted.  Furthermore, if a homicide offence is suspected but unproven 
and concealment is used instead, then the label attached to the criminality and 
punishment handed down does not match the wrong and harm that was initially 
identified by officials.  The principle here stands – if homicide is suspected then it 
should be charged and proven by the prosecution.  Concealment as a substitute 
offence to criminalise behaviour that may be homicide, but cannot be proven to 
be, undermines the principles and the spirit of the law.  
Improper disposal of a body 
One of the key concerns that may arise from such cases is that the body of a 
newborn child has been improperly disposed of.  Both Sally and Lily placed the 
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bodies in locations where they were unlikely to be found.  Sally kept the bodies 
of her four infants in her wardrobe for over a decade.  The judge in the case 
noted that she used air fresheners to ‘conceal what she had done’ and moved 
the bodies several times in the course of changing address; further stating, that 
Sally had not just put the existence of the bodies out of her mind, but she had 
‘continuing thoughts about their concealment’ (Sally, judge sentencing remarks).  
Lily buried the body of her child in the garden of the house where she was 
residing.  The body was discovered several years later when builders excavated 
the garden.  In contrast, Hannah left the body of her infant in the front garden of 
her friend’s house.  The location of this abandonment raises questions as to 
whether she actually committed the offence of concealment, as there is 
significant precedent set by case law that secret disposal of a body in a location 
where it is unlikely to be found is one of the ingredients of the offence, see 
Chapter 4.  Indeed, in R v Clark8, the judge ruled that leaving the body of an 
infant in the street where it could be found did not constitute a concealment.  The 
body of Hannah’s infant was found soon after she left it.  As such, the offence of 
concealment had potentially not occurred as the child’s body was easily found by 
her friend.  Nevertheless, she, Sally and Lily, all disposed of the bodies of their 
infants in ways that contradict the accepted norm.  While this is a moral wrong, it 
may not meet the requirements to warrant criminal sanction. 
   
Concern may exist in relation to public health measures relating to the disposal 
of a body.  However, as Sheldon (2016b) notes, such justification for criminal 
sanction would support classifying concealment as an administrative offence, 
                                             
8 [1883] 15 Cox CC 171. 
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rather than a moral one, this would imply a far lower sentence.  It is illegal to 
dispose of a body in an improper manner.  Preventing lawful and decent burial is 
a common-law offence.  Lily was convicted of this offence, as well as of 
concealment.  Jones and Quigley (2016) acknowledge two reasons why 
concealing a dead body and so preventing a burial might justify criminal 
sanction.  Firstly, as it offends public decency.  Secondly, as it causes harms 
that stretch beyond public health concerns – notably it fails to recognise the 
wishes of the deceased in terms of their post-death plans, and causes distress 
to friends and family members of the deceased due to them not knowing the fate 
of the person.  However, Jones and Quigley are critical of both reasons, arguing 
that neither can justify criminal sanction.  In relation to offending public decency, 
a failure to inform authorities of a dead body and so to facilitate a socially 
accepted form of disposal, does go against social norms and is arguably wholly 
objectionable.  Nevertheless, Jones and Quigley argue that social norms do not 
present an objective nor consistent standard against which to measure action 
that should be criminal.  They argue that something should not be illegal just 
because someone finds it offensive, notably as people’s opinions as to morally 
wrong behaviour differ.  Similarly, in relation to potential harms, Jones and 
Quigley argue that this cannot warrant use of a criminal offence.  A dead person 
is not able to be a victim of a crime, the nature of death means that they are 
unable to be recipients of either benefit or harm.  While harm through distress 
may be caused to family of the deceased, Jones and Quigley doubt the level of 
distress is sufficient enough to warrant criminalisation, and this would represent 
a worrying extension of the use of criminal law.  They conclude that there is little 
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justification and need for the offence to continue to exist, advocating that other, 
more appropriate offences could be utilised to address such a transgression. 
 
In relation to the concealment cases, the harms outlined by Jones and Quigley 
arguably do not exist.  In relation to the harm caused to a foetus/child in failure to 
meet their post-death plans for their body, this cannot be considered a harm as 
the neither a foetus nor a newborn child has the capability of conceptualising 
death, nor what happens to their body post-death.  Awareness of self, desires, 
existence as a member of the human community, and consideration of its own 
existence and ability to die are not held by a foetus or newborn child (Tooley, 
1972; Warren, 1973; Engelhardt, 1974; Dworkin, 1993).  In all three cases 
examined here, the women concealed/denied their pregnancy, meaning few 
people were aware of the existence of the child and therefore would arguably fail 
to be concerned as to the way its remains were disposed.  In Sally’s case, the 
presentencing report notes that the fathers of the four infants were victims of 
Sally’s actions, as they were unaware of the existence of their children or their 
fate.  The judge highlights this point, noting that three of the four fathers had 
been identified and they ‘indicate high levels of shock at the revelation of what 
has happened’ (Sally, judge sentencing remarks).  In rebuttal to this, Sally’s 
barrister argued that the fathers showed Sally no concern after the conception of 
each child took place, although the judge qualifies this, noting that Sally’s failure 
to tell them of her positive pregnancy status did not allow for a test of their 
concern.  The judge further noted that Sally’s children felt an embarrassment, 
shame and guilt at their mother’s behaviour, identifying them as victims of Sally’s 
conduct.  While such distress is understandable, I refer to Jones and Quigley’s 
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argument that it cannot provide a basis for criminal liability for the nature in 
which the foetus’ bodies were disposed.  Nor can embarrassment and shame at 
the actions of a family member justify criminal sanction.  Thus, while the nature 
of the disposal of the body may shock and offend public sentiment, it is difficult 
to identify this as a criminal wrong.  With the logic of Jones and Quigley’s (2016), 
the improper disposal of a body as a wrong does not warrant criminalisation.  
Hiding pregnancy and birth 
As noted in Chapter 3, a presumption exists that medical management of 
pregnancy is best.  I have already argued that the women’s behaviour of putting 
the foetus at risk is perceived as a criminal wrong by members of the criminal 
justice system.  Concealing a pregnancy and a subsequent birth is perceived as 
risky behaviour.  All three of the women convicted of concealment were deemed 
to put their foetus/child at risk due to not seeking medical attention during their 
pregnancy, or labour and delivery.  However, in England it is not, nor has it ever 
been, illegal to conceal a pregnancy, nor give birth alone.  While the offence of 
concealment does not specifically criminalise concealing a pregnancy and the 
birth of the child, the nature of cases likely to result in a concealment charge are 
those that occur in a context of a solo birth following a concealed/denied 
pregnancy.  As this behaviour is deemed risky and to be dangerous for the 
unborn child, this might be identified as a wrong that warrants criminalisation. 
 
There is a growing movement in the UK (free birthing) and the US (UC-ers, or 
unassisted childbirthers) to give birth without medical assistance (Groskop, 
2007; see also Dahlen et al., 2011; Dannaway and Dietz, 2013; Hickman, 2010; 
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Miller, 2009; Shanley, 1994).  The acts of hiding pregnancy and giving birth 
alone are not illegal.  If the child were to survive the birth then concealment has 
not been committed.  Similarly, if the child were to die in the course of the birth 
or soon after but the stillbirth or live-birth and subsequent death were reported to 
the authorities, then concealment has not been committed.  It is illegal for a 
person who is not a registered midwife or a registered medical practitioner to 
attend to a woman in childbirth, except in a case of sudden or urgent necessity, 
or if the person who attends is in training to become a medical practitioner or a 
midwife and the attendance is part of that training; the punishment for which is a 
fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, £5000.9  An unqualified person 
may be present at the birth, but may not assume responsibility, assist with the 
birth, or assume the role of a registered midwife or a registered medical 
practitioner.   
 
It is estimated that between 20 and 30 women have free births every year 
(Moorhead, 2013).  It is not known how many free births result in the death of the 
child.  While not seeking medical attention during pregnancy and labour may not 
be considered the safest course of action for a pregnant woman, there is no 
fundamental criminal behaviour in this act, even if the pregnancy and birth have 
been concealed from the authorities in the process.  While the action may be 
seen as suspicious and risky, there is no law, common-law or statute, that 
constructs this behaviour as illegal.  Death of a foetus/child in the course of an 
unassisted labour following a pregnancy that has been concealed from the wider 
world is tragic, particularly if the death is deemed to have occurred due to the 
                                             
9 The Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 SI 2002. 258.  
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decision to conceal the pregnancy, and labour and delivery.  However, the 
undesirable nature of this behaviour does not warrant application of criminal law 
in the form of the offence of concealment.  If it is deemed that solo birth is a 
criminal wrong, then this should be specifically addressed in criminal law, and 
not informally criminalised using the offence of concealment.  Furthermore, 
considering the feminist critique of the medicalisation of pregnancy and the 
governance of pregnancy outlined in Chapter 3, and feminist concerns over 
maternal obligation to the foetus, many feminists would be fundamentally 
opposed to the principle of compelling women to conform to the advice provided 
by the medical community in relation to their pregnancies due to the impact this 
would have on autonomy and liberty (Brazier, 1999; Fovargue and Miola, 1998; 
Oberman, 2000).  
Failure to register a birth 
The offence of concealment may be identifying the failure to register a birth or a 
stillbirth as a wrong warranting criminalisation.  The Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 195310, currently states that every child born must be registered 
within 42 days of birth by a qualified person: mother or father; the occupier of the 
house in which the child was to the knowledge of that occupier born; any person 
present at the birth; any person having charge of the child; in the case of a 
stillborn child found exposed, the person who found the child.  Under s11, in 
instances where the child is stillborn, a qualified informant shall,  
(a) deliver to the registrar a certificate in the prescribed form signed by a 
registered medical practitioner who was present at the birth or has 
examined the body of the child, or, if no registered medical practitioner was 
so present or has examined the body, by a registered midwife who was so 
                                             
10 1 and 2 Eliz.2, c.20. 
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present or has examined the body, being a certificate stating that the child 
was not born alive and, where possible, stating to the best of the 
knowledge and belief of the person signing it the cause of death and the 
estimated duration of the pregnancy; or 
(b) make a declaration in the prescribed form to the effect that no 
registered medical practitioner or registered midwife was present at the 
birth or has examined the body, or that his or her certificate cannot be 
obtained, and that the child was not born alive. 
A stillbirth is defined under s41 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, 
and s1 of the Still-Birth (Definition) Act 199211 as,  
a child which has issued forth from its mother after the twenty-fourth week 
of pregnancy and which did not at any time after being completely expelled 
from its mother breathe or show any other signs of life, and the expression 
‘still–birth’ shall be construed accordingly.   
As such, it there is no requirement to register the stillbirth of a foetus born 
without signs of life before the twenty-fourth weeks of gestation.  In March 2016 
the Government indicated it had no plans to change the definition of stillbirth, 
which is based on viability (Fairbairn, 2016).  If a foetus is born without signs of 
life prior to the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy, then it is deemed that the 
woman has experienced a miscarriage, not a stillbirth.  As there is no legal 
requirement to register the birth of a child born without signs of life before 24 
weeks of pregnancy have occurred, then it would appear logical that the offence 
of concealment cannot be committed through the secret disposal of the body of 
such a foetus.  Case law supports this suggestion, ruling that the foetus must 
have had a reasonable chance of surviving outside of the womb for the offence 
to occur.12   
 
While failure to register a birth or stillbirth has been outlined by Parliament as a 
criminal wrong punishable by a fine, maximum penalty of £200, it is classified as 
                                             
11 c.29. 
12 R v Berriman [1854] 6 Cox CC 388. 
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an administrative offence, not a moral offence.  In opposition to this, 
concealment is classified as a moral offence, with a maximum of 2-years’ 
imprisonment.  Hannah, Lily and Sally committed this offence as none of them 
registered the birth or stillbirth of their children; Sally’s pre-sentencing report 
noted this.  However, as this criminal wrong can be recognised under the Births 
and Deaths Registration Act 1953, the offence of concealment must be 
identifying further wrongs.  Furthermore, the wrong must be of greater 
significance as concealment is considered a moral offence. 
Hindering a criminal investigation 
A further apparent wrong committed by the actions of the three women convicted 
of concealment is that their acts prevented, or had the potential to prevent, a full 
investigation of the circumstances relating to the birth and death of their infants.  
In Lily and Sally’s cases, the time lapse between the birth of the child and the 
discovery of the body prevented a post-mortem examination from determining 
whether the child was born alive or the subsequent cause of death.  The 
consequence is that the ability to determine if the child lived an independent 
existence was lost.  In Lily’s case, both the judge and the prosecution barrister 
noted that Lily’s actions prevented an investigation into the death of the child, 
These offences, and I refer particularly first of all to the offences relating to 
the birth, are serious because it means that the authorities can never 
establish in circumstances such as this what has happened to the child, 
and that is something that everybody is entitled to know about, and the 
seriousness of the offence is that by doing what you did, that could not 
happen (Lily, judge sentencing remarks). 
In Hannah’s case, if her actions of concealing the dead body had been 
successful then she too may have prevented such an investigation.  As her 
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disposal of the body reflected an abandonment, rather than a secret disposal,13 
the body was easily found and an investigation into death occurred.  
 
In their review of the offence of preventing lawful and decent burial, Jones and 
Quigley (2016) identify obstructing a coroner and perverting the course of justice 
as two offences that could capture the criminal wrong committed by individuals 
who conceal a dead body in order to prevent a post-mortem from taking place.  
As Jones and Quigley argue, there is a strong public interest in ensuring that 
coroners are able to carry out their duties, as it allows for an investigation into 
deaths that may have occurred as a result of a criminal acts.  Disposal of a 
corpse with intent to obstruct or prevent a coroner's inquest when there is a duty 
to hold one is a common-law offence, triable only on indictment, and carries a 
maximum penalty of life imprisonment and/or a fine (Crown Prosecution Service, 
2017).  Perverting the course of justice is also a common-law offence with the 
same punishment.  Jones and Quigley note that both offences would be more 
difficult to prove than preventing lawful and decent burial, as they require proof 
of intent.  Nevertheless, they conclude that the intention-based offences more 
accurately reflect the wrong committed and thus requiring punishment – the 
defendants hid the bodies in order, it would seem, to prevent criminal activities 
from being discovered.  They conclude that it is important to distinguish between 
the morally wrong behaviour of concealing a body, and the criminally wrong 
behaviour of obstructing a coroner/justice.  Use of these offences would also 
distinguish between individuals who hide a body with intention to conceal it, and 
those who act without intention, due to shock or grief.  
                                             
13 R v Brown [1870] LR 1 CCR 244; see also R v Sleep [1864] 9 Cox CC 559; R v Cook [1870] 
11 Cox CC 542; R v George [1868] 11 Cox CC 41; R v Waterage [1846] 1 Cox CC 338. 
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When applying the logic outlined by Jones and Quigley to the offence of 
concealment a similar conclusion can be drawn.  Sally and Lily’s acts prevented 
a post-mortem from being completed and thus prevented discovery of whether 
criminal acts had occurred.  If their actions of hiding the bodies were intentional 
to prevent a coroner’s inquest, and this intent can be proven, then it seems fitting 
that such actions be punished.  In Sally’s case, it would seem that her actions 
were in fact intentional.  As the judge noted, she kept the bodies hidden for a 
number of years, using air freshener to mask the smell, and moving the bodies 
several times in the course of moving home.  Furthermore, one of Sally’s living 
daughters found the body of one of the babies and she and Sally then buried the 
remains in the family grave 12 years before Sally appeared in court.  However, 
Sally did not reveal the existence of the other bodies at that time.  Sally advised 
the author of the pre-sentencing report that she had planned to take the babies 
to the hospital post-birth, but upon realisation that they were dead decided she 
could not attend the hospital due to the questions that would be asked.  She did 
not know what to do and so ‘hid’ the bodies (Sally, presentencing report).  
Considering this evidence, it appears likely that a conviction of obstructing a 
coroner could have been secured. 
 
In Lily and Hannah’s cases, it is less certain if the offence of obstructing a 
coroner was committed.  Lily’s defence barrister presented a significant amount 
of evidence to demonstrate that Lily was living within an abusive and controlling 
relationship at the time of the birth of the child.  It is argued that Lily concealed 
her pregnancy from her partner, who is described as volatile and a drunk, due to 
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fear of his violent reaction and previous accusations that she had been having 
relationships with other men.  Lily maintains that the baby was stillborn following 
a violent assault and resuscitation was unsuccessful: 
..she was, she accepts, traumatised by the whole experience and was not 
thinking straight, and when I asked her specifically why she buried it in the 
garden, she indicated she just wanted to know that it was near. 
She accepts that in the cold light of day sitting in a courtroom and thinking 
about it, of course she should have called for help and of course she 
should have contacted people and ensured that there was a proper burial, 
but even if your Honour puts aside the beating, your Honour is still left in a 
situation where a woman late at night gives birth alone in a property with 
only a two year old child present. It must on any view be a traumatic 
experience, and I would certainly ask your Honour to say that it is such a 
traumatic experience that what she did then can be explained by that, 
rather by any deliberate intention on her part to actually conceal the birth 
and the death for any ulterior motive (Lily, defence mitigation). 
The Judge accepts this account,  
…you were a woman in desperate circumstances who knew what you were 
doing was wrong, but nonetheless were in a complete panic in the situation 
in which you found yourself. It is not to your credit that you did not admit the 
offence for a period of time, but you did when you came before the court 
(Lily, judge sentencing). 
Considering this evidence, it seems likely that Lily did not act with intent to 
pervert the cause of justice or prevent a coroner’s investigation.  Certainly, it 
appears there would be limited evidence to support such an accusation.  
Instead, Lily’s behaviour reflects that of a woman acting out of shock and 
desperation due to her victimisation from her abusive partner.   
 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from Hannah’s case.  As previously noted, 
Hannah did not conceal the body of her baby, instead she appears to ‘abandon’ 
it, 
She said she had taken the baby to her friend’s house because she 
thought her friend would know what to do, though she said her friend did 
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not know she had been pregnant or that she had left the baby there 
(Hannah, prosecution opening facts). 
As already noted, such action seems to fail to meet the requirements of 
concealment.  Furthermore, it strongly suggests that Hannah did not act with 
intent to prevent a coroner’s investigation, but more out of shock.   
 
On the basis of this review of the perceived wrongs in Hannah, Lily and Sally’s 
cases of concealment of birth, I question continued use of the offence.  There 
are a number of identified wrongs in the behaviour of the three women, as 
outlined above.  Several those wrongs are defined as warranting criminal 
sanction and are captured under other offences – failure to register a birth and 
obstructing a coroner or obstructing justice.  However, the actual wrong outlined 
in s60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is the concealment of a body 
to conceal the birth.  While concealing pregnancy, labour and the dead body of a 
baby may seem like a wrong to wider society, whether the wrong is significant 
enough to warrant criminal is less clear (Simester and Von Hirsch, 2011; Jones, 
2017).  Using the offence of concealment to capture a suspected, but unproven, 
homicide, as has historically been the function of the offence, goes against the 
principles and spirit of law.  For these reasons, the offence of concealment 
would appear to be an outdated and redundant offence, and so I draw the 
conclusion that s60 of the Offences Against the Person should be repealed.  
Conclusion 
The incentive to punish the women in the cases presented here is strong.  On 
the surface, such incentive to punish appears reasonable – the women have 
hidden their pregnancies, given birth alone, resulting in the deaths of the 
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foetuses/children.  However, when the details and the context of these cases are 
examined, and the wrongs perceived to be criminal are identified, the 
appropriateness of criminalisation is less clear.  Further doubt of the 
appropriateness of criminalisation is cast over these cases when an examination 
of the application of the offences of procuring a miscarriage and concealment of 
birth are analysed.  In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that all seven women 
experienced a crisis pregnancy and the impact of their concealed/denied 
pregnancy was not taken into consideration by the court.  There are questions 
as to the suitability of criminalisation in these cases, considering the 
vulnerabilities of the women, and the impact of a concealed/denied pregnancy 
on the reaction of women during pregnancy, labour and in the post-partum 
period (Beyer et al., 2008; Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Spinelli, 2003; Vellut et 
al., 2012).  In this chapter, I have provided evidence that the identified wrongs in 
these cases may not warrant criminalisation.  Each of the women has put her 
foetus at risk, failed to put the needs of her foetus before her own, and may have 
prevented the foetus/child from living.  While this behaviour is far from ideal, I 
have argued that it does not necessarily indicate a criminal offence, as per 
English criminal law.  Under English law, behaviour during pregnancy is only 
illegal if action is completed with intent to end the pregnancy or to kill the viable 
foetus, in which cases the offence of procuring a miscarriage or child destruction 
has been committed.  Any action while pregnant that may put the foetus at risk 
or even cause harm to the foetus, that is done without intent to end the 
pregnancy or kill the viable foetus fails to meet the requirements of any English 
criminal law.  It is only once a child is born alive and a separate existence has 
been established that a woman has a parental responsibility and therefore she 
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can be liable for a criminal offence if she fails to meet the needs of her child, or if 
she causes harm to the person or death through an act or omission.  These 
long-standing, fundamental principles of criminal law, captured in the born alive 
rule, were rarely acknowledged, nor clearly defined within the seven cases in the 
sample.  Instead, the behaviour of the women during their pregnancies is used 
as evidence of their intent, or their wider transgressions.  Judgement of their 
actions is made against the standards of the ideal mother, and, by extension, 
pregnant woman, employing the myths of motherhood.  
 
A second conclusion drawn from analysis of these cases is that prosecutors are 
making use of out-dated offences to criminalise the actions of women who 
experience suspicious perinatal deaths – procuring a miscarriage, and child 
destruction by extension, and concealment of birth.  What the cases examined 
here demonstrate is that the law is a patchwork of legal measures from different 
periods, with different incentives.  On one hand is the Infanticide Act 1938, 
recognising the socio-economic circumstances that might cause a woman to kill 
her born alive child, and formally recognising leniency, couched in medical 
terms.  This leniency exists in complete contrast with the offences of procuring a 
miscarriage, child destruction, and concealment of birth.  The three offences 
offer sanctions against women who act in ways that fail to conform to standards 
associated with motherhood and pregnancy.  If an incentive truly exists to punish 
women who act in ways contrary to the wellbeing of a foetus then, I argue, 
legislation must specifically demonstrate this.  If it is the will of legislators to 
protect foetal life, then foetal protection laws would be the most appropriate 
recognition of this wrong, codifying it into criminal law.  Recognition of criminal 
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wrong needs to be explicitly stated in criminal law through the sanction of 
Parliament.  It cannot be left to the discretion of individual prosecutors to use 
obsolete offences to capture perceived criminal wrongs that may otherwise not 
be against the law – namely harming a foetus.   
 
In the next chapter I present a review of legal developments in the US.  In many 
states in the US, criminal law has been extended to include the foetus as a 
potential victim.  As such, in many states criminal law can now be legitimately 
used to capture the perceived wrongs of women who harm their foetuses – 
intentionally or not.  However, as will be presented in the next chapter, this 
extension of criminal law has had consequences on the rights and liberties of not 
only pregnant women, but all women of childbearing age and, as such, brings 
into question the appropriateness of recognising the foetus as a legal person 
with equal rights and protection under law.   
 
Chapter 7 Pregnancy, politics, rights and law in America 205 
Chapter 7 Pregnancy, politics, 
rights and laws in America 
In the previous chapter I outlined the moral wrongs identified by professionals 
within criminal justice and deemed to warrant criminalisation in cases of 
suspicious perinatal death.  My analysis of the principles of the law and its 
application led me to question the appropriateness of the use of current criminal 
offences; I identified that criminalisation using out-dated offences is not the most 
suitable way to capture the moral wrongs of women who are suspected of 
perinatal killing.  As I concluded at the end of Chapter 6, if it is deemed 
appropriate to criminalise and punish women for harm committed towards a 
foetus, whether purposefully or accidentally, then such legal changes should be 
mandated by Parliament in the form of foetal protection laws.  Such laws would 
remove the principles of the born alive rule outlined in Chapter 4.  Such a 
fundamental shift in English law should be fully considered before 
implementation.  To illustrate the impact of foetal homicide laws, this chapter 
draws upon the legal developments within the United States of America (US).  
As outlined in the methodology, this chapter is not designed as a comparison of 
legal systems.  While much state law from the US does originate from historic 
English common-law and statute, the legal systems and legislative bodies are 
different; for example, most US states have a penal code, unlike the legal 
jurisdictions in the UK.  The US also operates a both Federal and state 
governmental and legal system, which is not reflected in the dynamic between 
the countries of the UK.  Instead, this chapter considers the impact of legislation 
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designed to protect the foetus from harm upon the rights of women and the 
experience of pregnancy and childbirth.   
 
The illustration provided by US states is particularly relevant when considering 
legal developments in England, as until the latter half of the twentieth century, 
the US upheld the common-law principle of the born alive rule, as England does 
today.  Developments in American laws have since led to that principle being 
removed in favour of providing the foetus with legal ‘personhood’ in numerous 
states; Connolly (2002) argues that as of 2002 only half of all states had retained 
the born alive principle intact.  This change in legal principle and the impact upon 
pregnant women will be explored in this chapter.  If such dramatic changes can 
occur in states that have a similar legal history, and had similar legal principles 
to England, it is reasonable to assume that such changes could occur in 
England.  A review of changes in the US will allow for consideration of the costs 
and benefits of developing foetal protections laws.  In relation to cases of 
suspicious perinatal death in England, this review will facilitate a discussion as to 
whether the enactment of foetal protections laws could be a suitable means to 
criminalise the wrongs committed by women such as the English seven in the 
thesis sample.  
 
First I will outline how foetal protection laws operate in the US and interact with 
the right to obtain an abortion, then I will consider a small number of cases to 
illustrate the impact of these offences.  The analysis presented here is not 
designed as a systematic review of the state legislation relating to foetal 
wellbeing.  As such, key examples have been purposefully selected to consider 
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the impact of such laws.  This chapter draws heavily on secondary literature 
from the US.  Due to the political nature of this area of law, the issues discussed 
here have been widely debated and theorised, making my use of such literature, 
critical analysis of the law and actions of the criminal justice system appropriate 
and useful for this debate.  
Foetal protection laws 
As in England, states in America historically adhered to the common-law 
principle of the born alive rule.  A small number of specific instances occurred in 
law that recognised the rights of the foetus, but all were contingent upon live-
birth occurring, for example inheritance could be granted to a foetus if its father 
died before its birth (see Johnsen, 1986).  The creation of foetal protection1 laws 
overturned this.  For many, this change in law was considered a positive 
development.  A number of scholars argue that the born alive rule was an 
evidentiary rule, rather than substantive rule of ‘personhood’ or of what 
constitutes a ‘human being’.  This argument is based on the principle that 
historically it was difficult to prove what might have caused the death of a foetus 
before birth (Forsythe, 1986; Forsythe and Arago, 2016; Kime, 1995).  This was 
the opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme court in Commonwealth v Cass,2 
Medical science now may provide competent proof as to whether the foetus 
was alive at the time of a defendant's conduct and whether his conduct was 
the cause of death. We have long since concluded that fear of speculation 
is not a sufficient ground for denying a civil right of action for prenatal 
injuries.3  
                                             
1 I purposefully refer to the laws as ‘protection’ laws, rather than homicide laws, as several states 
criminalise behaviour even if it does not result in death of the foetus/born alive child. 
2 467 NE 2d 1324 – Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 1984. 
3 Ibid: 806. 
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It should be noted that while this argument has been made in relation to English 
law (Casey, 2005; Grace, 1999), it is not a position adopted by the courts which 
have continually upheld the principle of the born alive rule, as discussed in 
Chapter 4.4  Changes to law have been made at Federal and state level.  The 
Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (hereafter ‘UVVA’)5 followed the murder 
of Laci Peterson by her husband while she was eight months pregnant with her 
son Connor (Murphy, 2014).  The UVVA recognises a foetus as a victim 
separate to the pregnant woman, if it is killed or experiences bodily injury in the 
commission of a Federal crime of violence.  A child in utero is defined as a 
‘member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is 
carried in the womb’.6  The Act specifically states that a woman cannot be 
prosecuted in relation to her own child,7 therefore only third parties can be 
convicted of Federal violent crimes against foetuses.   
 
The development of foetal protection laws is often accredited to the desire to 
protect pregnant women from violent acts committed by third parties; many 
commentators commending such a legal aim (Murphy, 2014; Johnsen, 1986).  
The first state foetal homicide law was introduced in California in 1970 after it 
was ruled that Robert Keeler could not be convicted of murdering the viable 
foetus of his ex-wife Teresa Keeler, whom he kneed in the abdomen while 
declaring ‘I’m going to stamp it out of you’.  The attack resulted in the child being 
stillborn.  The Superior Court of California ruled that to be a victim of murder a 
                                             
4 Attorney General's Reference (No.3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245; [1997] 3 WLR 421; Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Authority v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) (British 
Pregnancy Advisory Service and others intervening) [2014] EWCA Civ 1554; [2015] QB 459. 
5 Public Law No: 108-212, 118 Stat. 568. 1 April 2004. 
6 Ibid: (d). 
7 Ibid: (c)(3). 
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human being must be born alive.8  The state legislature acted quickly to amend 
the law, adding a ‘foetus’ as a possible victim of unlawful killing.  The statute now 
reads: ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a foetus, with malice 
aforethought’.9  The penal code was changed so that a foetus that had passed 
the embryonic stage (approximately 6-8-weeks’ gestation) could be a victim of 
murder.  California marked the first of many states to amend their penal codes: 
currently 38 states have foetal homicide laws; the following summary is based 
on the review of state law by Murphy (2014); Ramsey (2006); Tsao (1998); 
Smith (1999) and National Conference of State Legislatures (2015).  Twenty-five 
states apply these laws to any stage of development of the foetus or embryo; for 
examples, Mississippi includes an unborn child ‘at every stage of gestation from 
conception until live-birth’ in the definition of ‘human being’ for the purposes of 
homicide and assault offences.10  Other states apply their laws to foetuses that 
have reached a certain stage of gestational development: specifically referring to 
a ‘foetus’ rather than an ‘embryo’ and so not applying to a pregnancy within the 
first 8-weeks post conception (such as California11); requiring the foetus to have 
‘quickened’ (such as Washington State12); to only applying to a ‘viable’ foetus 
(for example Maryland,13 defining ‘viable’ as ‘that stage when, in the best 
medical judgment of the attending physician based on the particular facts of the 
case before the physician, there is a reasonable likelihood of the foetus’s 
sustained survival outside the womb’14).  In some states, the stage of gestational 
                                             
8 Keeler v Superior Court, 470 P. 2d 617 – Cal: Supreme Court 1970. 
9 California Penal Code § 8-187(a). 
10 Mississippi Code Ann. § 97-3-37. 
11 California Penal Code § 187 (a). 
12 Washington Revised Code Ann. § 9A.32.060 
13 Maryland Criminal Law Code Ann. § 2-103.  
14 Maryland Health-General Code Ann. § 20-209. 
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development at which criminal liability for harm inflicted on a foetus can occur is 
dependent upon the offence committed. 
 
Protection of foetal life under criminal law has occurred in several different ways.  
Some states have extended their existing penal code to include foetuses as 
potential victims, of homicide and, in some states, other offences against the 
person.  For example, Utah state criminal code defines homicide as occurring 
when, 
…a person commits criminal homicide if the person intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental 
state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the 
death of another human being, including an unborn child at any stage of its 
development.15 
In contrast, some states have defined a foetus as a ‘person’ or ‘human beings’ 
so that a foetus is captured in existing legislation relating to persons or human 
beings.  In Kansas, homicide and battery offences apply to ‘persons’, which 
include, ‘unborn child’, defined as ‘a living individual organism of the species 
homo sapiens, in utero, at any stage of gestation from fertilization to birth’.16  
Other states have passed statute that make it a specific offence to injure or kill a 
foetus, or to commit ‘foeticide’, for example Louisiana specifies that the offence 
of foeticide is the ‘killing of an unborn child by the act, procurement, or culpable 
omission of a person other than the mother of the unborn child’.17  In contrast to 
all other states, Massachusetts recognises foetuses as victims of homicide 
through case law alone.18  
                                             
15 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201. 
16 Kansas State Ann. § 21-5419, in conjunction with Kansas State Ann. § 21-5401 through § 21-
5406 and § 21-5413. 
17 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:32.5 
18 Commonwealth v Cass, 467 NE 2d 1324 – Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 1984; 
Commonwealth v Lawrence, 536 NE 2d 571 – Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 1989. 
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Application of homicide offences is not the only legal method of criminalising 
individuals who cause harm to foetuses.  Interpretation of what constitutes a 
‘child’ in child endangerment/abuse legislation has led to the imprisonment of 
hundreds of women who have used controlled substances during pregnancy, 
particularly poor women of colour (Ehrlich, 2008).  In South Carolina, in Whitner 
v State19 the state supreme court ruled 3-2 that a viable foetus is included in the 
definition of the word ‘child’, as used in the Children’s Code that legislated 
against child abuse and endangerment.  As such, the court upheld Cornelia 
Whitner’s conviction of criminal child neglect for causing her baby to be born with 
cocaine metabolites in its system due to Whitner's use of crack cocaine during 
the third trimester of her pregnancy.  Seventeen states consider substance 
abuse during pregnancy a form of child abuse.  Furthermore, several states 
mandate that health professionals must report suspected drug-use during 
pregnancy and/or test for prenatal drug exposure (Murphy, 2014: 862). 
 
Twenty-four states that recognise a foetus as a potential victim of a crime have 
included language in their statutes that expressly exempts pregnant women from 
being prosecuted for causing injury to their own foetus, as with the UVVA 
(Murphy, 2014). Georgia, for example, legislates that the offence of feticide is 
committed by those who, ‘willfully and without legal justification [cause] the death 
of an unborn child by any injury to the mother of such child’,20 but is not 
permitted to be used to prosecute a ‘woman with respect to her unborn child’.21  
Murphy’s review identifies a further four states that would appear to be unlikely 
                                             
19 492 SE 2d 777 - SC: Supreme Court 1997 
20 Georgia Code Ann. § 16-5-80(b). 
21 Ibid (f)(3). 
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to prosecute pregnant women for harm against their own foetus due to the 
wording of their legislation.  Other states are silent on whether or not a pregnant 
woman can be prosecuted for crimes against their foetus, for example in Rhode 
Island,  
The willful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of the 
child, which would be murder if it resulted in the death of the mother; the 
administration to any woman pregnant with a quick child of any medication, 
drug, or substance or the use of any instrument or device or other means, 
with intent to destroy the child, unless it is necessary to preserve the life of 
the mother; in the event of the death of the child; shall be deemed 
manslaughter.22 
In his review of the application of the applicability of foetal homicide laws to 
pregnant women, Murphy argues that this lack of specific exception for pregnant 
women may result in them being at risk of facing criminal procedure, as 
prosecutors have demonstrated willingness to advocate for broad interpretation 
of such statutes.  He is critical of this, arguing that decisions as to whether a 
woman should face criminal sanction if she harms or kills her own foetus should 
be determined through the legislative body, rather than statute interpretation.  
Murphy argues that laws intended to protect pregnant women are being 
extended by prosecutors and members of the judiciary beyond their initially 
designed scope to punish behaviour.  Murphy concludes that if it had been 
known how foetal homicide laws would be used at the time of enactment, then it 
is possible that some statutes would not have been enacted.  
 
Over 800 women have been arrested, detained and forced to have medical 
interventions up to 2005 (Paltrow and Flavin, 2013; for further examples of 
criminalisation of pregnant women see Johnsen, 1989).  These arrests and 
                                             
22 Rhode Island General Laws § 11-23-5. 
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detainments have taken the form of enforced Caesarean sections (In re AC23), 
and imprisonment following the stillbirth or miscarriage of a baby (Hayes, 2010; 
Newman, 2010), and in cases where death has occurred shortly after live-birth in 
instances where women’s actions have been believed to have caused the death 
of that foetus/child, or due to a pregnant woman not following medical advice 
(BBC News, 2004; Thomson, 2004).  Women have also been imprisoned if a 
live-born child has tested positive for an illegal substance (Whitner v State24; 
Bassett, 2014), and homicide convictions have been sought in instances where 
a lost pregnancy has been believed to be an illegal abortion (Hunt, 1995; 
Pilkington, 2012).   
 
Interaction between foetal homicide laws and the right to have an abortion is 
important here and needs to be considered.  Women’s right to have an abortion 
was first established in the Supreme Court Case Roe v Wade,25 and was 
reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v Casey.26  Roe 
established two principles that are relevant to foetal protection laws: foetal 
personhood, and states’ interests in the foetus and the interplay with viability.  It 
was ruled in Roe that a foetus is not a ‘person’ within the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and so does not have equal rights and protection under 
law.  While this position has been doubted by scholars (Forsythe and Arago, 
2016; Roden, 2010), it nevertheless remains a legal principle today.  The ruling 
leads to queries as to whether or not foetal protection laws are unconstitutional – 
                                             
23 573 A. 2d 1235 – DC: Court of Appeals 1990, Angela Carder was forced to undergo a life-
threatening Caesarean section against her wishes and the wishes of her family and doctor, in an 
unsuccessful attempt to save the life of her foetus. 
24 492 SE 2d 777 – SC: Supreme Court 1997 
25 410 US 113 – Supreme Court 1973. 
26 505 US 833 - Supreme Court 1992. 
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if the foetus is not a ‘person’ how can it be protected under law (Tsao, 1998).  
This contradiction is able to occur as the ruling in Roe only applies to the 
abortion context (Johnsen, 1986; Forsythe and Arago, 2016).  Furthermore, it 
has been ruled in Webster v Reproductive Health Services27 that states have the 
right to determine when life begins as a value judgement.  The decision about 
foetal legal personhood does not interfere with a woman’s right to choose to 
abort a foetus, as such statute does not by its own terms regulate abortion or 
impose an undue interference on a woman’s right to choose; this would only be 
due to the applicability rather than the nature of the statute (Ramsey, 2006; 
Forsythe and Arago, 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, pro-choice scholars have argued that determination that a foetus 
is a legal ‘person’ and the development of foetal protection laws have acted as a 
means to limit access to abortion and overturn Roe, as they are seen to make 
the foetus an autonomous entity with rights equivalent to that of the pregnant 
woman and so adverse to her (MacKinnon, 1991; Paltrow, 1999; Johnsen, 1989; 
Bhattacharjee, 2002; Brown, 2005; Bruchs, 2004; De Ville and Kopelman, 1999; 
Folger, 1994; Kole and Kadetsky, 2002; Schroedel et al., 2000).  However, Ely 
(1973) argues that even if a foetus was considered to be a legal person or a 
constitutional person, it would not preclude a woman’s right to terminate a 
pregnancy as Justice Blackmun assumed in Roe.  If a foetus were considered a 
person under the Fourteenth Amendment the court would have to weigh the 
competing rights of each person and decide who had the greatest right.  Ely 
argues that a pregnant woman’s rights would prevail as state-compelled 
                                             
27 492 US 490 - Supreme Court 1989. 
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pregnancy would require a woman to give her body to the service of an invader 
(see also Dorf, 2003; Lynch, 1995).  Nevertheless, while the foetal protection 
laws cannot directly implicate Roe there is legitimate concern that the statutes 
will contribute to pro-life cultural messages surrounding the immorality of 
abortion (for analysis of this cultural message see Sanger, 2006; for review of 
this debate see Ramsey, 2006). 
 
State interest in the foetus is a further point of consideration together with foetal 
protection laws.  Roe recognised that states have an ‘important and legitimate 
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life’,28 as well as the health of a 
pregnant woman; however, these interests become ‘compelling’ at different 
times.  The ‘compelling’ point of a state’s interest in potential life is the point of 
viability of the foetus as it is then presumed capable of a meaningful life outside 
the womb.  As such, the state may proscribe abortion after the point of viability, 
except where it is necessary to preserve the health of the pregnant woman.  
Prior to viability, a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion without 
undue interference from the state based on privacy from state interference with a 
person’s decisions about bodily functions.  Casey reaffirmed these essential 
holdings.  It is partly this interest in potential life that has facilitated foetal 
protection laws and intervention of the state in decisions surrounding foetal 
health.  For example, in Pemberton v Tallahassee Memorial Regional Center29 
the court dismissed a woman’s civil suit against the hospital that sought a court-
order to over-rule her consent for a Caesarean section.  In dismissing the suit, 
the court ruled that the state’s interest in preserving the right of the unborn 
                                             
28 Roe: 162. 
29 U.S. District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division, 1999.  See also analysis of Ex parte 
Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397 - Ala: Supreme Court 2013 below. 
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outweighed the woman’s personal constitutional rights, and that this principle 
was confirmed by Roe.  The ruling has been criticised by feminists.  Rhoden 
(1986) and Gallagher (1987) argue that such a principle cannot be justified using 
Roe and subsequent cases, as these judgments have maintained that foetal 
welfare cannot be placed above maternal health, even if the foetus is viable and 
the state has an interest in protecting foetal life.  Gallagher (1987: 42) concludes 
that to interpret Roe’s ruling of state interest in the foetus post-viability as an 
affirmative granting of legal rights and entitlements to the foetus ‘confer[s] more 
than the very Fourteenth Amendment personhood statute the Supreme Court 
explicitly found inapplicable’.  The consequence would be to ‘virtually appropriate 
the woman’s body and life, to the affirmative service of the foetus’.  
Nevertheless, the principle has been used to promote foetal health and 
wellbeing over that of pregnant women (Johnsen, 1989). 
 
Legal commenters have questioned how it can be acceptable for a woman to 
legally abort a foetus, but not for a third party, ‘If we are prosecuting a third party 
for killing an unborn child, it's schizophrenic that a woman can choose an 
abortion for a child at the same date and we don't call abortion murder’ 
(Schuyler, 1994: 48; cited in Tsao, 1998: 459).  It should be noted here that the 
challenge is to a woman’s right to abort, rather than a third party’s right to harm a 
foetus.  However, it must be remembered that a woman’s right to abort is based 
on the principle that a woman has the right to privacy from undue state 
interference in her decision to determine what happens to her own body; the 
decision to abort is hers and no one else’s.  Thus, a third party who attacks a 
pregnant woman, causing the termination of the pregnancy is not similarly 
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situated with a pregnant woman; ‘The woman has a constitutionally protected 
right to bodily autonomy, but the third party has no right to terminate the 
woman's pregnancy’ (Tsao, 1998: 459; see also Ramsey, 2006).  Such 
arguments do not successfully account for application of foetal protection laws to 
pregnant women; however, this is the basis of analysis in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
Case studies 
In their review of arrests and forced interventions of pregnant women 1973-2005 
Paltrow and Flavin (2013: 309) identified that the vast majority of cases originate 
in a select number of states, mostly in the South – South Carolina, Florida, 
Missouri, Georgia, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Illinois, Nevada, New York, and 
Texas.  These states accounted for two-thirds of the total number of cases.  It 
should be noted that Paltrow and Flavin include court-ordered Caesarean 
sections in their review, rather than just criminal action.  As outlined above, not 
all states target pregnant women, with some specifically stating that a pregnant 
woman cannot commit a homicide offence against their own foetus.  So while 
the development of foetal personhood legislation and protection statute has 
been witnessed across most of the US, women are not being targeted uniformly 
across the country, indeed in six states no cases against pregnant women 
appear to have occurred up to 2005 – Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and West Virginia (Paltrow and Flavin, 2013: 309).   
 
I have selected three different types of cases for review.  The first is a case of an 
illegal abortion in Indiana; the second a case of reckless homicide relating to a 
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car crash in New York; and the third involves women who test positive for illegal 
substances during or shortly after pregnancy in Alabama.  The specifics and 
relevance of each will be discussed in turn.  Following this I will explore the 
implications of targeting pregnant women using criminal law when harm occurs 
to the foetus, focusing upon the critique of such laws.   
Feticide 
In 2013, Purvi Patel purchased Mifepristone and Misoprostol online and 
consumed the drugs to terminate her pregnancy at home; she was twenty-five to 
thirty-weeks pregnant at the time.  Patel left the aborted foetus’ body in a 
dumpster near her family’s restaurant.  She then attended the emergency room 
for medical assistance due to substantial bleeding.  She advised a doctor that 
she had been 12-weeks pregnant and has missed two periods.  However, based 
on the size of the umbilical cord, still in her body, and the results of a physical 
examination, the doctor estimated she would have been at least 26-weeks’ 
pregnant.  The doctors pressed Patel to tell them where the ‘baby’ was, and after 
she revealed the location of the body, they left the hospital with the aim of saving 
its life.  The body was found by law enforcement officers and a doctor examined 
it on-sight, concluding that it was viable and appeared normal and healthy, 
approximately 30-weeks developed.  When questioned, Patel claimed she 
believed she was only 12-weeks pregnant, that she did not perform CPR on the 
child because it was not moving and did not cry.  The forensic pathologist 
concluded the foetus was approximately of 25-weeks’ gestation and ‘more likely 
than not’ was born alive and had breathed after birth.  However, it should be 
noted that the conclusion of live-birth was made after performing a notoriously 
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unreliable born alive test, as the forensic pathologist acknowledged during 
Patel’s trial.  For the purpose of the appeal, Patel stipulated that the child was 
born alive, and during the appeal it is presented that the baby died due to loss of 
blood from the severed umbilical cord.  Patel was charged with class A felony 
neglect of a dependent alleging that she failed to provide any medical care to her 
baby immediately after its birth, which resulted in its death.  She was also later 
charged with the class B felony feticide; prosecutors alleged that Patel knowingly 
terminated her pregnancy with the intention other than to produce a live-birth or 
to remove a dead foetus.  At trial, Patel was found guilty as charged; she was 
sentenced to thirty years of imprisonment for neglect of a dependent, with twenty 
years executed and ten years suspended, and a concurrent executed term of six 
years for feticide.  In 2016 she appealed both of her convictions.30  
 
Patel appealed her neglect conviction on the basis of the State failing to prove 
sufficient evidence to prove the conviction beyond reasonable doubt.  At the time 
the events occurred, the neglect statute31 read: 
(a) A person having the care of a dependent, whether assumed voluntarily 
or because of a legal obligation, who knowingly or intentionally: 
(1) places the dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent's life 
or health; 
… 
commits neglect of a dependent, a Class D felony. 
(b) However, the offense is: 
… 
                                             
30 Case details from Patel v State, Ind: Court of Appeals 2016. 
31 Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4. 
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(3) a Class A felony if it is committed under subsection (a)(1) … by a 
person at least eighteen (18) years of age and results in the death of a 
dependent who is less than fourteen (14) years of age. 
The basis of Patel’s neglect charge was that she knowingly placed the baby in 
danger by failing to provide any medical care immediately after birth resulting in 
the death of the baby.  To establish that Patel committed neglect, the State had 
to prove that she knowingly endangered her baby; and so proving she had 
committed a class D felony, punishable by imprisonment for between six months 
and three years.  In order to prove Patel had committed a class A felony, with a 
sentence of between twenty and fifty years, the State was required to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that her failure to provide medical care resulted in the 
death of the child.  Patel appealed her conviction on the basis that the 
prosecution did not prove this, and the Court of Appeal agreed with Patel.  The 
State failed to ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the baby’s death could not 
have occurred but for Patel’s failure to provide medical care immediately after its 
birth’.32  While Patel’s acts of deliberately inducing labour and giving birth without 
medical assistance were deemed to put her foetus in a dangerous situation, the 
offence of neglect only applied to a child born alive,  
…the plain language of the neglect statute ‘contemplates only acts that 
place one who is a dependent at the time of the conduct at issue in a 
dangerous situation — not acts that place a future dependent in a 
dangerous situation’.33   
Consequently, it was only her postpartum behaviour that could be considered 
neglectful.  Testimony against Patel was only able to establish that there was a 
possibility, rather than a certainty, that Patel’s baby would not have died but for 
her failure to provide medical care immediacy after birth.  As such, Patel’s 
                                             
32 Patel v State. 
33 Ibid.  
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conviction for the class A felony neglect of a dependent was vacated and she 
was convicted of a class D felony neglect instead.   
 
Patel also appealed her foeticide conviction on the basis that the statute did not 
apply to her conduct.  At the time of the events of Patel’s pregnancy ending, the 
foeticide34 offence read: 
A person who knowingly or intentionally terminates a human pregnancy 
with an intention other than to produce a live-birth or to remove a dead 
foetus commits feticide, a Class B felony.   
Patel appealed on the basis that the offence of feticide requires the foetus to die 
and her child was born alive.  The Court of Appeal disagreed with this point, 
arguing that the plain language of the statute indicated otherwise.  However, 
they did note that the language of the foeticide statute has constructed, 
…the apparently absurd outcome [of] a woman being convicted under both 
the neglect of a dependent statute, which requires a live infant, and the 
feticide statute, which does not require a dead infant.35 
Patel further appealed the conviction on the basis that her actions were not a 
foeticide, but an abortion that was not permitted under the circumstances of legal 
abortion.36  Indiana Code Section §16-34-2-1(a) provides that ‘[a]bortion shall in 
all instances be a criminal act, except when performed under’ certain specified 
circumstances’.  The statute then outlines the requirements for an abortion to be 
legal.  Patel maintained that the feticide statute was not the law that ‘governs 
unlawful abortions; rather, unlawful abortions are governed by the Unlawful 
Abortion Statute, Ind. Code §16-34-2-7’.37  The Court of Appeal ruled that the 
State legislatures had purposefully drawn a clear distinction between foeticide 
                                             
34 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-6. 
35 Patel v State. 
36 Ind. Code § 16-34. 
37 Patel v State. 
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and illegal abortion.  The court noted that since enactment in 1979, the foeticide 
statute has been used to prosecute third parties who knowingly terminate 
pregnancies by using violence against a pregnant woman without her consent.  
Patel’s case was believed to be the first case of the statute being used to 
prosecute a pregnant woman or anyone else for performing an illegal abortion.  
Patel further contended that the legislation prohibiting abortion not performed 
under certain specified circumstances was intended to punish medical 
professionals, not women who performed their own abortions.  The Court of 
Appeal supported Patel’s argument and accordingly overturned her foeticide 
conviction, concluding that the legislature never intended for the foeticide statute 
to apply to pregnant women.  As such, Patel was remanded to the trial court for 
resentencing for her conviction of class D felony neglect of a dependent.  She 
was sentenced to 18 months; due to time already spent in jail, Patel was 
released immediately.  
 
Patel’s case reflects that of Hayley’s, presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  Their 
decisions to terminate their pregnancies were met with extreme hostility due to 
the gestational age of the foetuses and the circumstances under which the 
termination occurred – procuring drugs that resulted in the foetus being expelled 
from the uterus.  In both cases, the response by the prosecution appears to be 
to punish the women as if they had committed an act of homicide against their 
foetus.  In Patel’s case prosecutors perceived that this was possible due to the 
state’s foeticide offence.  In Hayley’s case, it was known this was not possible 
due to the requirement to prove live-birth.  Nevertheless, when sentencing, the 
judge in Hayley’s case held her action to be between murder and manslaughter 
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in seriousness (see discussion in Chapter 6).  Both cases provide examples of 
how the law can be, and has been used to punish women for terminating their 
pregnancies.  In Patel’s case the use of the statue was ruled to be wrong and in 
opposition to the intent of the legislatures.  In Hayley’s case the law was applied 
correctly, but as I have argued in Chapter 6, the statute regulating abortion38 is 
not fit for purpose in modern society.  As the Court of Appeal argued in Patel’s 
case, if the legislature wished to consider women who end their own 
pregnancies as performing an act of foeticide, then they would have made this 
evident in the statute.  Application of the law to include such conduct into the 
homicide offence goes beyond the scope of the law, which is precisely the 
conclusion I draw from analysis of Hayley’s case in Chapter 6.  However, as 
other cases explored in this chapter will demonstrate, judicial interpretation can 
also work to uphold prosecutors’ stretching of the law in criminalising the 
behaviour of pregnant women. 
Reckless homicide 
Jennifer Jorgensen was 34-weeks’ pregnant when her car hit that of Robert and 
Mary Kelly head on, killing them both.  She was taken to an emergency room 
and due to signs of foetal distress, she consented to an emergency Caesarean 
section.  The baby died 6 days after birth and the cause of death was deemed to 
be due to injuries sustained in the car crash.39  Jorgensen was indicted on three 
counts of manslaughter in the second degree ‘recklessly [causing] the death of 
another person’,40 ‘Recklessly is defined as: 
                                             
38 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vict. c.100) s58. 
39 Case details from People v Jorgensen, 26 NY 3d 85 - NY: Court of Appeals 2015; People v 
Jorgensen, 2010 NY Slip Op 50348 - NY: Supreme Court 2010. 
40 NY Penal Law § 125.15 [1].   
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A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance 
described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result 
will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature 
and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the 
situation.  A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely 
by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect 
thereto.41 
She was also charged with one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, 
‘engages in reckless driving’,42 and one count of operating a motor vehicle while 
under the combined influence of alcohol or drugs.43  Prior to her first trial, 
Jorgensen’s defence successfully moved for the dismissal of three further 
offences: operating a motor vehicle while using a mobile telephone, speeding, 
and endangering the welfare of a child.  Endangering the welfare of a child was 
dismissed as the court held that this crime did not apply to unborn children and if 
the legislature intended so it would have included language to reflect this, as it 
has in the case of homicide, defined as,  
…conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn child with 
which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks under 
circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first degree, 
manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, abortion 
in the first degree or self-abortion in the first degree.44   
 
At her trial, the prosecution argued that Jorgensen was travelling over 50 miles 
per-hour in a 30 mile per-hour zone, was under the influence of prescription 
drugs and alcohol, swerved into the on-coming traffic, hitting the Kelly’s car.  The 
collision resulted in Jorgensen, who was not wearing a seatbelt, to hit the 
steering wheel, causing injury to her foetus.  The jury in the first trial failed to 
                                             
41 NY Penal Law § 15.05. 
42 NY Penal Law § 125.14. 
43 NY Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192 [4-a]. 
44 NY Penal Law § 125.00. 
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reach a unanimous verdict.  The jury in the second trial found Jorgensen not 
guilty on all counts, except manslaughter in the second degree for the death of 
her child.  The conviction was upheld by the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of New York, Second Department, dismissing Jorgensen’s contentions 
that the weight of evidence was insufficient to convict, evidence was wrongly 
admitted, and comments of the prosecution were improper.45  Jorgensen was 
given leave to appeal.   
 
The Court of Appeals heard the case in September 2015, the sole purpose to 
decide ‘whether a woman can be convicted of manslaughter for reckless conduct 
that she engaged in while pregnant that caused injury to the foetus in utero 
where the child was born alive but died as a result of that injury days later’.46  
Therefore, the facts of the case were not disputed, but rather, the question for 
the court was whether reckless manslaughter can apply to a woman in relation 
to her foetus.  The court ruled that it could not and that the legislature, when 
enacting foetal homicide statute, only intended to hold ‘pregnant women 
criminally responsible for conduct with respect to themselves and their unborn 
foetuses unless such conduct is done intentionally’.47  The conviction was 
overturned in a five-to-one ruling.  The basis for the dismissal of the indictment 
was interpretation of statute.  New York’s foetal homicide offences are based on 
the inclusion of the term ‘unborn child’ in the homicide definition: 
Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn 
child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four 
weeks.48 
                                             
45 People v Jorgensen 113 AD3d 793 [2d Dept 2014]. 
46 People v Jorgensen, 26 NY 3d 85 - NY: Court of Appeals 2015: 89. 
47 Ibid. 
48 NY Penal Law § 125.00. 
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However, the offence Jorgensen was convicted of was ‘recklessly causing the 
death of another person’.49  The definition of ‘person’, ‘when referring to the 
victim of a homicide, means a human being who has been born and is alive’.50  
Therefore, reckless manslaughter only applies to those who have been born 
alive.  As Jorgensen’s child was in utero at the time of the reckless act that later 
led to the death of the child born alive and later dying, the statute does not apply 
to her act, nor would it have applied if the foetus had died in utero.  As Judge 
Pigott stated: 
The question is, did the legislature, through its enactment of the two 
statutory provisions, intend to hold pregnant women criminally responsible 
for engaging in reckless conduct against themselves and their unborn 
foetuses, such that they should be subject to criminal liability for prenatal 
conduct that results in postnatal death? Under the current statutory 
scheme, the answer to this question is no.51 
Pigott concluded that if the legislature had specifically intended to criminalise a 
pregnant woman for conduct towards her foetus it would have clearly mandated 
this in statute.  Furthermore, Pigott outlined that the prosecution would not have 
charged Jorgensen with reckless manslaughter if her child had not been born 
alive.  As such upholding Jorgensen’s conviction would have created, 
…a perverse incentive for a pregnant woman to refuse a Caesarean 
section out of fear that if her baby is born alive she would face criminal 
charges for her alleged reckless conduct, jeopardizing the health of the 
woman and the unborn foetus.52 
 
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Fahey argues that the conviction could have 
been upheld due to the definition of homicide in PL § 125.00.  As such, he 
disagreed with the temporal qualification that Jorgensen could not be convicted 
                                             
49 NY Penal Law § 125.15 [1]. 
50 NY Penal Law § 125.05 [1]. 
51 People v Jorgensen, 26 NY 3d 85 - NY: Court of Appeals 2015: 89-90. 
52 Ibid: 91. 
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of a crime as her allegedly reckless action occurred before the baby was born 
alive and as such was not a person.  Fahey concluded that the baby was a 
person when she died and the fact that the reckless action occurred before she 
was a person should not be relevant.  Thus, the interpretation of the case could 
have been different and Jorgensen could have spent up-to nine years 
imprisoned for the death of her wanted child due to her ‘reckless’ action while 
pregnant.   
 
The judicial reading of New York homicide laws in Jorgensen’s case relating to 
behaviour of a pregnant woman towards her foetus, resulting in death of a child 
born alive and subsequently dying, indicates that a pregnant woman can only be 
convicted of self-abortion acts, and this is not considered a homicide.  As such, 
New York does not have foetal homicide laws per se, as an act that will result in 
the death of a foetus would be considered an abortion, or a self-abortion.53  
Therefore, New York’s homicide law reflects that of England – one must be born 
alive to be a victim of homicide.  Being killed whilst in the womb is not an act of 
homicide, rather it is an illegal abortion.  For this reason, Jorgensen’s case is of 
particular relevance when considering the implication of foetal protection laws on 
the process of criminal law and how this relates to English cases.  The incentive 
to punish Jorgensen for her acts of negligence that resulted in the deaths of 
three people – her child and the Kelly’s, was sufficiently strong that prosecutors 
were prepared to adopt legislation and use it beyond the scope of that intended 
by legislators in order to criminalise her actions in regards to her child.  In the 
concluding remarks Judge Pigott stated that the decision to hold pregnant 
                                             
53 NY Penal Law § 125.40-125.55. 
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women criminally responsible for acts committed against a foetus that is later 
born alive should be defined by legislature; ‘It should also not be left to the whim 
of the prosecutor’.54  This case, along with Patel’s illustrate Murphy’s (2014) 
argument that prosecutors have demonstrated willingness to advocate for broad 
interpretation of statute in order to punish pregnant women for wrongs against 
their foetuses that are perceived to be criminal.   
 
A similar charge to the one brought against Jorgensen could quite possibly be 
brought against a woman in England.  Following the decision in A-G Ref, as 
Cave (2004: 62) argues, outlined in Chapter 4, it is theoretically possible a 
woman could be charged with manslaughter if there was an obvious and serious 
risk of causing physical injury to a child when it was born, which the defendant 
disregarded or failed to consider.  Cave’s argument is theoretical, and it is not 
possible to determine if the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) would respond in 
such a way, or if the English courts would uphold such use of the law.  
Nevertheless, the important points to consider from Jorgensen’s case are the 
willingness and determination to prosecute a woman whose actions, which were 
far from the ‘ideal’ of a mother or pregnant woman, resulted in her losing a 
wanted child.  The significance of the application of law is starker when 
considering what the consequences of Jorgensen’s case might have been if her 
conviction had been upheld.  The ruling would have meant that women could be 
held criminally liable for any action considered ‘reckless’ that resulted in the 
death of the child born alive; this could include ‘disregard her obstetrician's 
specific orders concerning bed rest; take prescription and/or illicit drugs; shovel a 
                                             
54 People v Jorgensen, 26 NY 3d 85 - NY: Court of Appeals 2015: 92. 
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walkway; engage in a contact sport; carry groceries; or disregard dietary 
restrictions’.55  Such a change in legislation would have a profound effect on 
pregnant women’s lives.  An example of that effect can be seen in the next case 
study.  
Chemical endangerment 
In 2008, Amanda Kimbrough’s son was born after an emergency Caesarean 
section; she was 25-weeks and 5-days pregnant at the time.  Kimbrough’s 
obstetrician diagnosed her with preterm labour and ‘occult cord prolapse’, 
descent of the umbilical cord through the birth canal before the foetus, restricting 
blood flow through the umbilical cord.  The child, Timmy, was born not breathing 
and with a low heart-rate and he died 19 minutes after birth.  Kimbrough’s urine 
was screened for drugs and tested positive for methamphetamine.  The 
paediatrician who treated Timmy opined that he had died from ‘respiratory arrest 
secondary to prematurity’. However, a medical examiner with the Alabama 
Department of Forensic Sciences who performed an autopsy on Timmy, 
determined that he died from ‘acute methamphetamine intoxication’.  Kimbrough 
later admitted that she had smoked methamphetamine with a friend three days 
before she had experienced labour pains.  Kimbrough pleaded guilty to the 
chemical endangerment of a child, reserving the right to appeal; the trial court 
sentenced her to 10 years' imprisonment the mandatory minimum sentence due 
to the death of the child.56 
 
                                             
55 Ibid: 92. 
56 Case details from Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397 - Ala: Supreme Court 2013. 
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In 2009 Hope Ankrom, gave birth to a son.  Medical records demonstrated that 
she tested positive for cocaine several times during her pregnancy and that the 
child tested positive for cocaine post-birth.  Subsequently, Ankrom admitted she 
had used marijuana while she was pregnant but denied using cocaine.  In 2010, 
Ankrom pleaded guilty to chemical endangerment of a child, reserving an issue 
for appellate review, and was sentenced to three years in prison, her sentence 
was suspended and she was placed on probation for one year.57 
 
Chemical endangerment of a child is the exposure of a child to an environment 
in which her or she, 
Knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally causes or permits a child to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled 
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in.58 
The state law was enacted in 2006 following concern that children were being 
exposed to dangerous chemicals used in the production of drugs such as 
methamphetamines in so-called ‘meth labs’.  However, the rise in the number of 
babies testing positive for drugs at birth led prosecutors to ‘[take] it upon 
themselves to begin applying the chemical endangerment law in a new manner’ 
(Suppé, 2014: 55).  Prosecutors argued that the word ‘child’ in the statute 
included foetuses as well as born children.  
 
Both Kimbrough and Ankrom appealed their convictions to the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals.  Ankrom argued that ‘[t]he plain language of § 26-15-3.2, 
Ala.Code 1975, shows that the legislature intended for the statute to apply only 
to a child, not a foetus’ and that courts in other states with similar legislation 
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have ruled that statutes do not apply to prenatal conduct that allegedly harms a 
foetus.59  The court ruled that the plain meaning of the term ‘child’, as used in the 
statute, includes an unborn child.  This ruling was based on the State’s inclusion 
of a viable foetus in the term ‘child’ in other contexts; the dictionary definition of 
‘child’ explicitly includes an unborn person or a foetus; and in everyday language 
there is nothing extraordinary about using the term ‘child’ to include a viable 
foetus.60  Kimbrough’s appeal was not published.61  Ankrom and Kimbrough 
petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court and the cases were consolidated and the 
debate as to whether or not a ‘child’ included a foetus was settled in Ex parte 
Ankrom.62  Deferring to the ruling in Ankrom,63 the court cited the judgement 
from Ankrom and concluded, ‘We find this reasoning persuasive and agree with 
the Court of Criminal Appeals that the plain meaning of the word ‘child’ in the 
chemical-endangerment statute includes unborn children’.64  However, the 
Supreme Court went further, arguing that the adoption of the viability distinction 
in the plain meaning of the word ‘child’ was inconsistent with the State’s laws.  
Consequently, the Supreme Court rejected the Court of Criminal Appeals limited 
application of the chemical engagement to a viable foetus in Ankrom,65 and ruled 
that the statute applied to all foetuses, regardless of viability; 66 this judgement 
was reconfirmed in Hicks v State.67 Kimbrough further challenged the conviction 
on the principle that the majority of states had refused to apply chemical 
endangerment statute to unborn children and that Alabama should do the same.  
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In response to this challenge, the court agreed that they had followed the course 
of South Carolina, the first state to uphold a criminal child abuse conviction 
based on a woman’s substance abuse during pregnancy.68  Nevertheless the 
Supreme Court ruled that Alabama’s child abuse statute defined a ‘child’ as a 
person under 18, not a person ages between birth and 18; citing Casey, they 
concluded that from the outset of pregnancy the state has legitimate interests in 
the life of the foetus that may become a child.  Consequently, the convictions of 
both women held. 
 
Suppé (2014) provides a detailed analysis of these two cases, concluding that 
the court was incorrect in holding that the term ‘child’ was unambiguous and as 
such the Supreme Court was wrong to conclude that the plain meaning of the 
word ‘child’ is broad enough to encompass unborn children.  Furthermore, she 
argues that due to Ex parte Ankrom it is now a felony for pregnant women to 
take many prescription drugs which are legally prescribed to them, regardless of 
whether the prescription is harmful to the foetus.  The ban would even include 
Methadone, the drug used as a standard of care for opioid dependent pregnant 
women.  A further consequence of the ruling is that a woman may be breaking 
the law even if she does not know she is pregnant (National Advocates for 
Pregnant Women, 2014).   
 
The ruling has received substantial criticism, partly due to the inconclusive 
evidence that drug-use during pregnancy does in fact cause harm to the foetus 
(Roberts, 1997; Sunderlin and Huss, 2014; Rosenbaum and Murphy, 2005).  In 
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instances where the pregnancy ends in a miscarriage or stillbirth, frequently the 
cause of foetal death is unknown and drug-use cannot be definitively determined 
as the cause of the death of the foetus (Frank et al., 2001; Kellett, 2014; 
Mohapatra, 2011; Murphy, 2014).  Chemical endangerment laws when applied 
to a foetus have also been criticised as they punish women for activity that is 
questionable, but would otherwise be legal if conducted by a person who was 
not pregnant.  Suppé (2014) argues that while possession or sale of illegal 
narcotics is a crime in Alabama, use of those same narcotics is not.  As, 
generally speaking, only women can become pregnant (see discussion in 
Chapter 1) and because the Alabama Supreme Court held that the chemical 
exposure statute applies to narcotics use during pregnancy, the statute punishes 
women but not men who use illegal narcotics, as well as those who use 
medication lawfully for example, prescription drugs.  As the punishment can 
result in sentence of up-to life imprisonment, Suppé argues that the statute’s 
gender disparity is of grave severity.  Concern has also been raised regarding 
the ‘slippery-slope’ of such convictions.  Commentators have argued that 
punishment of one type of ‘deviant’ behaviour during pregnancy under the veil of 
foetal protection makes it possible that the state will progress to punish women 
for other acts during pregnancy, such as women who drink alcohol, smoke 
cigarettes, eat unhealthily, do not seek prenatal care, drive recklessly, work at a 
location that exposes them to toxic fumes, attempt suicide, or stay in a physically 
abusive relationship.  ‘Punishing women solely due to their pregnancy status is a 
dangerous step towards future erosion of women's rights’ (Suppé, 2014: 69; see 
also Paltrow, 1999; Johnsen, 1986; Kellett, 2014; Adams, 2014; Solinger, 2005). 
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The criminalisation of women for these offences is further questioned when the 
vulnerability of the women who have been targeted for prosecution is examined.  
Women of colour, especially African-American women, and women of low-
income are overrepresented among those who have been arrested or subjected 
to equivalent deprivations of liberty (Paltrow and Flavin, 2013; Roberts, 1997; 
Mohapatra, 2011; Fentiman, 2006; Paltrow, 1999).  Women who are deemed to 
fit the stereotype of ‘white trash’ are also criminalised at a higher rate (Howard, 
2014).  Siegel (1992) argues that the targeting of the convictions is due, firstly, to 
public clinics and hospitals that serve low-income, often minority women, being 
more likely to comply with drug reporting regulation than private hospitals.  The 
second reason for targeting is due to doctors being influenced, either 
consciously or unconsciously, by drug-user profiles, which are based on racial 
stereotypes.  As such, Black women are much more likely to be reported than 
White women, despite comparable patterns of drug-use.  Some have argued 
that application of laws and policies of criminalisation reflect discrimination 
based on race, ethnicity, and class.  For example, Chasnoff et al. (1990), who 
reviewed the reporting rate of pregnant women who tested positive for illegal 
substances found that despite the frequency of a positive result being similar 
among White women and Black women, Black women were reported at a rate 
10 times higher than for White women, and poor women of any ethnicity were 
more likely than others to be reported.  Faludi (1992) reports similar findings.  
Roberts (1997) has argued that Black women have been the focus of arrests as 
targeting them is more palatable to the American public than focusing on White 
women.  Roberts further argues that while convictions are seen as a means to 
legitimise foetal rights, there is a lack of political will to criminalise White women 
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who use alcohol and cigarettes; society is much more willing to condone poor, 
Black women who fail to meet the middle-class ideals of motherhood.  As 
already noted in the Introduction, the idealised images of motherhood, 
constructed through the myths of motherhood, are class and race/ethnicity 
biased (Collins, 1994, 2000); application of the law in this context supports this 
argument.  Roberts argues that the consequences are that the criminal justice 
system focuses on women whom society deems undeserving to be mothers (see 
also Solinger, 2005).   
 
Legal responses to pregnant drug-users also reflects US policy relating to the 
so-called ‘war on drugs’ and the popular view that drug-use is a crime, rather 
than a medical condition (Mohapatra, 2011).  The policy operates despite the 
World Health Organisation and the American Psychiatric Association classifying 
substance abuse as a disease (Suppé, 2014: 74).  Paltrow (1999: 1002) argues 
that the focus of arrests is upon people and issues that are the hardest to defend 
‘in the court of public opinion’.  Nevertheless, the belief persists that 
criminalisation of pregnant women will deter them from activity that will harm 
their foetus, or encourage women who use drugs to quit prior to pregnancy, as 
does public horror and outrage that any woman would act in a way that would 
hurt a child – whether born, or not (Adams, 2014; Marano, 2013).  
Criminalisation of such women has received particular scrutiny due to the poor 
health outcomes experienced by pregnant women who are imprisoned in 
attempts to curb their drug-use during pregnancy.  It is widely argued that 
medical treatment and support for women with substance abuse issues would be 
far more appropriate, safer and result in better outcomes for both women and 
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their unborn children (Adams, 2014; Brody and McMillin, 2001; Cave, 2007; De 
Ville and Kopelman, 1999; Fentiman, 2006; Flavin, 2009; Kampschmidt, 2015; 
Mohapatra, 2011; Murphy, 2014; Note, 1988).  Of course, treatment of pregnant 
drug-users would require financial commitment to provide reproductive services 
to women throughout their lives with specific targeted treatment for those who 
are most vulnerable and most at risk.  There is a lack of available treatment 
programs for pregnant drug-users across the US due to stigma, lack of financial 
resources, private health insurance refusing cover for cover for alcohol and drug 
treatment, and many rehab programmes being unable or unwilling to provide 
pregnant women with both addiction treatment and prenatal medical care 
(Suppé, 2014).  As Fentiman (2006) argues, it is far easier and far cheaper to 
point to a vulnerable woman with a positive-drug test who has given birth to a 
stillborn child and announce that it is she alone, who is to blame for the death of 
her child.  Similarly, Rosenbaum and Murphy (2005: 1080) argue that the state 
has scapegoated vulnerable women through foetal protection laws related to 
drug-use to provide political cover for the larger social issues, particularly in 
relation to so-called ‘crack’ babies of the 1980s: the failed ‘post-Reagan social 
experiment’ which cut social welfare programmes, and complex social conditions 
that would require major political change.  The lack of availability of state funded 
welfare and health services undoubtedly play a role in this debate in ways that 
may be, at least partially, mitigated in the UK through the provision of services 
from the welfare state and National Health Service.  
 
However, feminist scholars have further contended that concern of US 
governments and the public over pregnant drug-users reflects concerns over the 
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behaviour of women and mothers, rather than the wellbeing of foetuses and 
children.  Solinger (2005) argues that if the state values pregnant women and 
children, then it would fund treatment for pregnant women.  As such, Solinger 
argues, this state-intervention says far more about the ‘type’ of woman that it is 
deemed should be a mother; those women who take illegal drugs do not fit that 
typology.  It has been argued that the concern is not that women use drugs, but 
rather that women who use drugs have become pregnant.  The decisions by 
some courts to require women who take drugs to take long-term contraception to 
prevent them becoming pregnant indicates that concern here lies in the woman’s 
ability to get pregnant, as treatment for their drug-use in general is not the focus 
of the system (Flavin, 2009; Roberts, 1997).  This perception is further reflected 
in non-governmental programmes which give financial incentives to drug addicts 
to be sterilised (Paltrow, 2012).  Cherry (2007: 198) argues, that where 
behaviour of pregnant women has been curbed through threat of imprisonment 
for the sake of the health of the foetus, a defined identity is being imposed, ‘a 
state legitimised form of motherhood’, which requires women to be selfless and 
mother’s to be self-sacrificing; failure to conform results in state detention.  
Similarly, Johnsen (1989: 612) argues that foetal homicide laws used against 
women act to proscribe behaviour of women during pregnancy ‘the state 
compels women who desire children to reorganise their lives in accordance with 
judicially defined norms of behaviour’.  Tuerkheimer (2006) also argues the laws 
target women who fail to conform to the maternal ideal.  
 
The arguments, above, reflect concerns expressed within feminist literature 
regarding risk management and the governance of pregnancy reflected in 
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Chapter 3.  The liberal governance of pregnancy outlined by Ruhl (1999) is 
reflected in cases of pregnant drug-users.  The state and public expect that, 
when pregnant, a woman will manage her foetuses’ risk, following guidance 
provided by the medical community.  Paradoxically, whilst individual risk factors 
relating to the behaviour and health of the pregnant woman are understood to 
have the greatest impact on the wellbeing of the foetus, the impact of social and 
economic factors on the welfare of pregnant women and their foetuses is 
disregarded (Lupton, 1999a; Chavkin, 1992; Bordo, 2003; Lane, 2008; Lazarus, 
1994).  Criminal cases such as Kimbrough and Ankrom’s would suggest that 
feminist theorists have been correct when arguing that the foetus is the focus of 
intervention in pregnancy (Bordo, 2003; Martin, 1987; Young, 1990; Chavkin, 
1992; Lupton, 1999b; Longhurst, 2001).  Initially, such intervention was medical.  
However, as the cases analysed here demonstrate, the intervention, for some 
women, is now conducted by the criminal justice system and criminal law.  As 
outlined in Chapter 3, the governance of pregnancy has constructed the 
pregnant woman as a potential threat to the foetus, whose security needs to be 
managed by third parties (Phelan, 1991; Halliday, 2016).  Traditionally this 
protection has been conceptualised as the role of medical professionals, but 
foetal protection laws in the US demonstrate that this is now a legitimate role for 
the state.  Furthermore, feminists’ arguments that the law has specifically 
targeted women who least represent the ‘ideal’ mother reflects the interaction 
between the ‘responsible’ pregnant woman who manages her own risk, and 
ideas of the ‘good’ mother, as outlined by theorists such as Lupton (2011), 
Gregg (1995) and Harper and Rail (2012).  Self-regulation and maternal sacrifice 
are perceived to demonstrate a woman’s ‘love’ and devotion to her foetus and 
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future child (Bessett, 2010; Brooks-Gardner, 2003; Lupton, 2012b).  The 
response by states such as Alabama to pregnant women who use drugs, would 
suggest that failure to demonstrate such sacrifice and self-regulation is child 
abuse; the child abuser being the antipathy of the ‘good’ mother cultivated by the 
myths of motherhood (Turton, 2008).  
 
Criminalisation of women who fall short of the ideal of motherhood is the most 
extreme aspect of the governance of pregnancy.  As explored in Chapter 3, the 
majority of women self-regulate, rather than being forcibly regulated by the state.  
Rhetoric encouraging self-regulation is palpable.  For example, in 2016, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published the following press 
release,  
Sexually active women who stop using birth control should stop drinking 
alcohol, but most keep drinking… 
Alcohol use during pregnancy, even within the first few weeks and before a 
woman knows she is pregnant, can cause lasting physical, behavioural, 
and intellectual disabilities that can last for a child’s lifetime. These 
disabilities are known as foetal alcohol spectrum disorders (FASDs). There 
is no known safe amount of alcohol – even beer or wine – that is safe for a 
woman to drink at any stage of pregnancy. 
‘Alcohol can permanently harm a developing baby before a woman knows 
she is pregnant,’ said CDC Principal Deputy Director Anne Schuchat, M.D. 
‘About half of all pregnancies in the United States are unplanned, and even 
if planned, most women won’t know they are pregnant for the first month or 
so, when they might still be drinking. The risk is real. Why take the 
chance?’ (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). 
Such a health recommendation is not abnormal.  For example, the US Public 
Health Services and the CDC advise that all women of childbearing age should 
take folic acid to reduce the number of cases of spina bifida, as more than half of 
all pregnancies in the US are unplanned and the birth defects happen in the 
early stages of pregnancy before a woman might know she was pregnant 
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(Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 1992).  Such public health advice, 
targeting all women of childbearing age, rather than only women who are 
pregnant or those attempting to conceive, suggests that the concept of women 
self-regulating for the betterment of a future child is widely understood as 
positive and a legitimate message to present, as organisations such as the CDC 
would not feel able to present such messages unless believing they would 
receive public acceptance, if not support.  That is not to say that the message 
was accepted without criticism, a number of commenters were highly critical of 
the press release and a social media storm ensued (Chia, 2016).  The result was 
that the CDC retracted their initial guidelines (a copy available in appendix 5), 
republishing with an altered message, apparently due to the public outrage at 
the initial message.  The guidelines that were removed advised pregnant women 
that drinking too much could cause a miscarriage, stillbirth, prematurity, foetal 
alcohol spectrum disorder and sudden infant death syndrome.  It had warned 
that ‘for any woman’ drinking too much could cause injuries/violence, heart 
disease, cancer, sexually transmitted diseases, fertility problems, and 
unintended pregnancy.  The CDC’s message has been defended by some as 
nothing more than sensible advice (Schumaker, 2016).  However, the advice 
(perhaps inadvertently and unintentionally) does suggests that the only function 
for women’s bodies is to get pregnant, and consequently women need to control 
their behaviour and bodily function in order to protect foetal life, even if that 
foetal life has not yet been conceived and a woman has no plans for it to be 
conceived.  For example, Alexandra Petri (2016), feminist opinion writer for the 
Washington Post quipped, ‘That’s the last time I drink merlot alone in my 
apartment. I don’t want herpes’.  She further commented, 
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No alcohol for you, young women! The most important fact about you is not 
that you are people but that you might potentially contain people one day. 
After all, pregnancies are often unplanned, so now it’s not just women who 
are trying to become pregnant but women who aren’t who need to lay off 
the alcohol, because ‘You never know when pregnancy might strike!’ and 
‘Think of the children!’ (2016). 
Whether or not the CDC intended to treat women as object bodies that ‘might 
potentially contain people’, the willingness to address women in such ways 
demonstrates the extent to which society is permeated with the belief that the 
foetus is a subject in its own right that does need to be cared for and protected.  
The fact that this subject exists within another subject – the pregnant woman, 
who has an existence, rights to live her life as she sees fit and to make choices 
over her own body, seems to have been forgotten.  As Bordo (2003) argues, the 
foetus has become a super-subject and the woman a foetal container, or 
incubator.  Within this context, it is not particularly surprising that the law steps in 
when a woman fails to heed these warnings and breaches the rights and 
wellbeing of the subject within her.  
Impact 
As already indicated, opposition to foetal protection laws and the criminalisation 
of pregnant women is strong in the US.  For many activists and scholars, foetal 
protection laws are political in nature.  As already noted, many pro-choice 
activists have argued that constructing the foetus as a legal person is an attempt 
to recriminalise abortion (Paltrow, 1999; MacKinnon, 1991; Flavin, 2009).  It is 
not the aim of this chapter to determine if foetal protection laws are political, or to 
consider the impact of the laws on women’s abilities to obtain an abortion.  
Concern over women’s abilities to access abortions is legitimate; however other 
implications of foetal protection laws have been identified by US scholars.  The 
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implications of foetal protection laws are the focus of this final section of this 
chapter.  Two main arguments have been presented in opposition to foetal 
protection laws, firstly that they fail in their aims to protect foetuses, even if only 
applied to third parties and not pregnant women.  Secondly, that the laws are 
discriminatory against women and interfere with women’s rights to liberty and 
privacy.  
 
Not all scholars who oppose the criminalisation of women due to behaviour while 
pregnant are against the principles of foetal protection laws when applied to third 
parties.  A number of scholars argue that foetal protection laws, including the 
UVVA, aim to protect foetuses from third parties who commit acts of violence 
against pregnant women, rather than to protect the foetus from the pregnant 
woman (Murphy, 2014; Johnson, 1994; Schroedel et al., 2000).  Violence 
against pregnant women is a considerable problem; domestic violence victims 
often describe their history of abuse beginning or escalating during pregnancy 
(Tuerkheimer, 2006).  Ramsey (2006) argues that when a foetus dies as a result 
of an attack on a pregnant woman the laws demonstrate that two victims exist, 
the woman and her foetus; as such, heightening the criminal liability and 
punishment of the attacker.  Furthermore, she argues that the majority of 
American states have approached foetal protection laws in ways that do not 
challenge women’s reproductive rights and the right to terminate a pregnancy.  
Ramsey argues that if the pro-choice camp does not acknowledge the loss of a 
foetus as well as of a pregnant woman when a pregnant woman is attacked, 
then they risk appearing to live up to the image presented by pro-life 
campaigners that those who support abortion are in support of an agenda of 
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death, the culture of life rhetoric (Sanger, 2006).  Ramsey presents evidence 
that the majority of Americans questioned are in support of foetal homicide laws 
that punish third parties, as well as supporting a woman’s right to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy.  She advocates a contextual approach to life-taking, 
recognition that the decision to terminate a pregnancy can only belong to a 
pregnant woman and not to a third-party who attacks her.  If such an attack 
leads to the death or harm to the foetus then a criminal wrong and a death have 
occurred and subsequently punishment should ensue.  
 
However, a number of arguments have been raised against recognising the 
foetus as a victim in such circumstances.  Firstly, feminist scholars and 
domestic-violence policymakers have rejected foetal protection laws as the 
solution to violence against pregnant women.  Flavin (2009) argues much of the 
legislation at both state and Federal level have been enacted in response to 
attacks on a pregnant woman by third parties resulting in the death of the foetus.  
Flavin argues that rhetoric surrounding these laws have often negated the 
existence of women who have been attacked, in favour of advocating on behalf 
of their foetuses.  Flavin cites the rhetoric that was employed by the Kansas 
State Senate judiciary committee when referring to the death of Chelsea Brooks 
who was murdered; at the time of her murder she was nine months pregnant.  
The State Senator commented, ‘Now the bill is dead as is Chelsea’s baby’; 
Flavin comments, ‘One feels the need to remind the Senator that Chelsea is 
dead as well’ (2009: 101).  Similarly, Tuerkheimer (2006) argues that such laws 
have constructed the foetus as a new class of victim to the exclusion of the 
pregnant woman.  The laws obscure injuries that have been inflicted upon that 
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woman and so remove her from consideration altogether, ‘effectively 
preclude[ing] an account of the nature of her suffering, or even recognition of her 
existence as a person who has been harmed’ (2006: 697).  Tuerkheimer argues 
that this renders the woman invisible and leaves the real injuries experienced by 
her unremedied.  Secondly, commenters have argued that if third parties are 
held criminally liable for ending a pregnancy then surely it is discriminatory to not 
also hold pregnant women account for similar actions that harm a foetus 
(Robertson, 1983; Tsao, 1998).  Such an argument would, therefore, open the 
door for foetal protection laws to be applied to pregnant women at a later date.  
Finally, it has been argued that is it not necessary to give a foetus legal 
personality to recognise the loss of that foetus if a pregnant woman is attacked 
by a third party.  For example, in Colorado foetuses are not considered separate 
victims of violent crime from the pregnant woman, instead, the law considers the 
intentional killing of a pregnant woman with knowledge that she was pregnant as 
an aggravated factor.69  Similar increases in sentencing occur in relation to 
assault and other specific offences against the person.70  Such an approach 
unambiguously excludes pregnant women from those potentially subject to 
criminalisation for harm to a foetus, as a woman could not be prosecuted for 
causing injury to herself (Murphy, 2014).  
 
One of the main critiques against foetal protection laws is that they fail to protect 
foetuses, the specific aim of the legislation.  Hospitals have been noted to be the 
initiator of the involvement of the criminal justice system (Paltrow and Flavin, 
2013).  It is feared that such initiating behaviour by medical professionals may 
                                             
69 Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-1.3-1201. 
70 Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-1.3-401 (13); Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-1.3-501 (6). 
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damage the doctor-patient relationship and women may avoid prenatal care 
altogether, rather than dealing with the legal consequences that can result in 
them seeking treatment for their substance abuse (Boudreaux and Thompson, 
2015; Flavin, 2009).  Such concerns have also been mirrored by medical 
associations and groups, such as The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (2014) and American Medical Association and the American 
Public Health Association; similarly groups who are primarily concerned with the 
health and rights of children have also opposed punitive approaches to pregnant 
substance users, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the Center 
for the Future of Children (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2000).  One 
unintended consequence of foetal protection laws is that the threat of 
punishment for drug-use or other conduct perceived to cause harm to a foetus 
may lead a woman to seek a legal abortion in order to avoid being punished 
(Murphy, 2014; Boudreaux and Thompson, 2015).  Such an outcome was 
unlikely to be the aim of legislators hoping to protect foetal health and life.  
Advocates argue that socio-economic context of pregnancy is of great 
importance when considering maternal and foetal health during pregnancy and 
leads women to make decisions about their health and life.  Johnsen (1987) 
identifies lack of money as the single largest constraint on women to facilitate 
the protection of foetuses from preventable harm.  Research has outlined the 
multiple factors lead to poor birth outcomes, including maternal poverty, 
homelessness, history of domestic violence, and lack of prenatal care 
(Ondersma et al., 2000; Frank et al., 2001; Kampschmidt, 2015).  Commentators 
have noted significant cuts to health services for poor women and the impact of 
lack of services on pregnancy outcomes (Faludi, 1992; Rosenbaum and Murphy, 
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2005).  Access to available healthcare and affordability of health insurance have 
been noted to be a significant problem for poor pregnant women, and there are 
racial and ethnic disparities in insurance status (Fentiman, 2006). 
 
The issues of poverty and lack of access to healthcare are reflected in foetal 
mortality rates.  While US foetal mortality rate (defined as death of foetus at 20-
weeks’ gestation or later) has declined from 25.0 per 1,000 live-births in 1942 to 
5.96 in 2013 (MacDorman and Gregory, 2015), 23,595 foetal deaths occurred in 
2013.  In the same year 3,932,181 live-births were recorded (Martin et al., 2014).  
However, this figure needs to be contextualised by ethnicity and race.  In the 
non-Hispanic White community 4.88 out of every 1,000 live-births were stillborn.  
But in the Non-Hispanic Black community the rate was 10.53 for every 1,000 
live-births (MacDorman and Gregory, 2015).  The figures are starker when 
considering the entire perinatal period (from 20 weeks’ gestation to 28 days 
post-birth).  In total, the perinatal mortality rate is 9.98 per 1,000 births.  For the 
non-Hispanic White community it is 8.2 per 1,000 live-births, for the non-
Hispanic Black population it is 17.92 per 1,000 live-birth (MacDorman and 
Gregory, 2015).  The availability of resources to help support women through 
pregnancy and motherhood has been the focus of much feminist work on 
women’s reproductive rights, particularly feminists of colour.  Lack of available 
healthcare has been noted by many as one of the barriers for poor women and 
women of colour to express freedom of choice in relation to reproduction 
(Nelson, 2003; Silliman, 2002; Roberts, 1997; Ehrenreich, 2008; Fried, 1990; 
Davis, 1990; Gurr, 2015; Petchesky and Judd, 1998). 
 
Chapter 7 Pregnancy, politics, rights and law in America 247 
A further critique levied at foetal protection laws that target pregnant women is 
the impact upon women’s rights.  A number of commentators have argued that 
foetal protection laws deprive women of their constitutional rights to liberty and 
privacy.  This deprivation of rights occurs due to requirement that women should 
adapt their behaviour to meet state-sanctioned conduct of pregnancy.  These 
behaviours have been focused upon drug-use and a requirement to follow 
medical advice through court-ordered Caesarean sections; however, as noted 
above, there is concern about the ‘slippery-slope’ of these regulations.  Johnsen 
(1989) argues that this prescription of behaviour deprives women of the right to 
control their lives during pregnancy, which is a fundamental right of liberty and 
privacy.  Similarly, Gallagher (1987) asserts that women have the right to refuse 
medical intervention and to be free from criminal or civil liability for their conduct 
during pregnancy.  This right is not based on Roe’s assessment of the legal 
personhood of the foetus, but upon common-law and constitutional rights of 
bodily integrity and personal decision making, which lay at the core of Roe, 
facilitating a woman’s choice to abort: self-determination; non-subordination, 
freedom from bodily invasion and appropriation for the purpose of another; and 
privacy, freedom from coercion of medical treatment and freedom in choice for a 
family life (see also Bordo, 2003; Flavin, 2009).  And yet, as Halliday (2016) 
argues, many US states have demonstrated that they are prepared to prioritise 
the protection of the foetus over the pregnant woman’s rights to bodily autonomy 
and integrity.  
 
The argument here is not that women should not be prosecuted for any criminal 
offence while pregnant.  Instead, the argument is that criminal law should be 
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applied equally to all people – to pregnant women as it is applied to people who 
are not pregnant.  Therefore, application of the law on the basis of a woman 
being pregnant or because she may become pregnant, such as harsher 
punishments for pregnant women or different limits of law, intrudes on 
fundamental rights of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
liberty, the right to choose to bear children and the right to bodily autonomy.  
Such application of law would force women to live with the fear of being 
pregnant, or even being fertile as the basis under which the government may 
impose extensive burdens on their freedom (Johnsen, 1989).  Consequently, 
Johnsen (1986) argues that the laws reinforce the traditional sex-based 
discrimination, disadvantaging women based on their reproductive capacity, in 
spite of the fact that having a child involves a woman taking on an important 
function necessary for the survival of the human species (Johnsen, 1987).  
Similarly, Oberman (1992) argues that application of the law essentially attempts 
to criminalise sex, conception and gestation, and the only way for a woman to 
avoid state intrusion into her life is to be sterilised.  Her conclusion is based upon 
analysis of a neonaticide case, a case involving a woman mandated by a court 
to use Norplant, a long-term contraception, and criminalisation of pregnant drug 
addicts.  A further example of the gendered and discriminatory nature of state 
intervention is provided by Minkoff and Paltrow (2004).  They consider a 
hypothetical equivalent event – a newborn child, born alive, has a lethal cancer 
which can only be reversed by a bone marrow transplant, the father of the child 
has the only compatible marrow, without which the child will die, with the 
transplant its long-term health is assured.  If the father refuses to donate, he is 
likely to be seen in a negative light, but he is very unlikely to be legally 
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compelled to donate, nor is he likely to be charged with a homicide offence if the 
child dies due to not receiving the marrow.  US law has upheld that to legally 
compel a person to donate would enforce intrusion of the body that would 
fundamentally change principles on which society is founded.  However, Minkoff 
and Paltrow outline cases in which women have been legally compelled to have 
Caesarean sections and others where women have been criminalised after 
refusal to undergo a Caesarean section resulted in the death of the foetus.  
Consequently, they conclude that ‘the State has now endowed the foetus with 
greater rights than its living siblings and, for that matter, any born person of any 
age’ (2004: 1235).  While this example specifically applies to forced Caesarean 
sections, it is also applicable to criminalising women who use illegal substances, 
or recklessly drive cars, as in the cases presented in this chapter.  All these 
cases involve action by the state that either compelled a woman to conform to 
state-sanctioned norms and expected maternal bahviours, or to criminalise 
women post-birth because they did not conform.  A consequence of such 
pressure is, as Brazier (1999) argues, that a woman loses the power and control 
to make ‘mothering’ decisions, as she is no longer choosing her behaviour or 
action, but is legally compelled to follow behaviour or action that the state, with 
support of the medical community has mandated.  As such, a pregnant woman 
ceases to be an independent moral actor. 
Conclusion 
In the previous chapter I argued that if the state wished to punish women for 
ending the life of their foetus then it would be important to reflect such decisions 
within legislation through the enactment of foetal protection laws.  Enactment of 
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such legislation would clearly demonstrate the limits and parameters of the law.  
This demarcation of the law and outlining of intent of the law would be preferable 
to the current situation in England and Wales whereby the CPS are utilising a 
select number of criminal offences in order to punish the actions of women that 
result in the stillbirth or death following live-birth of a foetus/child.  To consider 
some of the possible implications of foetal protection laws in England, I have 
reviewed examples of application of such laws in states across the US.  The 
examples presented here, Purvi Patel, Jennifer Jorgensen, Amanda Kimbrough 
and Hope Ankrom, illustrate a number of the outcomes of foetal protection 
policy.  The behaviour of all four women does appear to have endangered the 
lives of their foetuses, and their actions are very possibly, if not likely, the sole 
cause of the death of these foetuses/children.  As such, it might be perceived 
that all four women deserve to be punished for their actions.  However, when the 
consequences of foetal protection laws are explored, the cost of such laws are 
extreme, and very possibly are not worth the gains that are achieved by 
criminalisation.  The costs of the laws to the rights of women are experienced 
not just by those who are pregnant or plan to become pregnant, but by any 
person who is believed to have the reproductive potential of bearing a child.  The 
laws create a legal presumption that a woman will act in the best interests of her 
foetus.  While this expectation arguably already exists, as outlined in Chapter 3, 
there is currently no legal basis to enforce it in England.  Construction of foetal 
personhood has resulted in this legal basis in some states in the US.  Such a 
legal development challenges women’s rights to control their own bodies, 
fundamental principles granted to citizens under the rights to liberty and privacy.  
Furthermore, the success of foetal protection laws in protecting foetuses is 
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doubtful.  Numerous commenters and medical associations have argued that the 
laws discourage women from engaging with antenatal services; particularly the 
most vulnerable women, such as drug-users, who need specific assistance with 
their pregnancies for their own and their foetuses’ health.  Anecdotal and 
statistical evidence from the US shows us that these laws have the greatest and 
most negative impact on the most vulnerable women in the US (Paltrow and 
Flavin, 2013).  It is not unreasonable to believe that a similar consequence 
would occur in England, as criminal law is currently targeting the vulnerable 
women, those who experience crisis pregnancies.  Considering the examples 
from the US, if the true aim of the state is to protect foetal life, then help and 
support for pregnant women is the most appropriate response.  Engagement of 
criminal law should be the very last resort, if not completely prohibited due to the 
negative consequences it has upon women and their unborn children.  This idea 
will be considered in the final chapter.  
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Chapter 8 Concluding 
discussion 
This thesis has demonstrated the gender biases that are encoded within English 
criminal law relating to cases of suspicious perinatal deaths.  As my analysis has 
illustrated, the law draws upon and utilises perceptions of idealised motherhood 
as the basis of expected behaviour of all pregnant women.  Three key findings 
can be drawn from my analysis.  Firstly, there is little to no understanding or 
consideration of the impact of a crisis pregnancy within criminal court hearing 
relating to suspicious perinatal deaths, and by extension the criminal justice 
system.  As discussed in Chapter 3, a crisis pregnancy that manifests itself as a 
concealed/denied pregnancy has significant implications on women’s reactions 
and behaviour towards their pregnancies throughout the period of gestation, 
labour and delivery, and in the postpartum period.  As analysis of the cases in 
the sample demonstrates, lack of comprehension of the significance of crisis 
pregnancy impacts the perception of a woman’s culpability for the death of her 
foetus/child.  In Chapter 5 I present examples of this, such as Hannah who was 
portrayed as having poor judgement or being callous or selfish, with limited 
exploration and appreciation of the context that surrounded her actions and the 
difficulties the pregnancy caused her life.  The second finding is that the women 
are judged according to idealised images of motherhood, informed by the myths 
of motherhood.  The court draws on the societal expectation that a pregnant 
woman will act like the idealised mother, putting the needs of the foetus first, 
managing the foetus’ risk, and that she will do everything in her power to ensure 
the foetus is born healthy.  None of the women in the sample adhered to this 
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expected behaviour, and their actions were perceived to demonstrate behaviour 
that required criminalisation; different offences were used to criminalise them 
depending upon the context of the cases.  The wrongs perceived in each of the 
cases, summarised in the sentencing hearing, related to the perception of 
motherly behaviour.  However, as I have demonstrated through analysis of 
criminal law, failure to put the foetus first and to protect the foetus from harm or 
risk of harm is not illegal in England and Wales; unless such failures are 
accompanied by intent to end the pregnancy or kill the viable foetus, in which 
case the offences of procuring a miscarriage1 or child destruction2 will have been 
committed.   
 
This leads to the final finding.  In cases of suspicious perinatal deaths analysed 
in this thesis, application of the law reflects neither the principles nor the spirit of 
the law.  Prosecutors drew upon out-dated legislation to criminalise women.  
Consequently, the law is being applied to capture behaviour identified as wrong, 
but which falls beyond that which was intended to be criminalised when these 
offences were enacted.  As argued in Chapter 6, concealment of birth3 appears 
to punish several perceived wrongs, including unproven homicide.  However, as 
I have argued following analysis of the three cases, perverting the course of 
justice or obstructing a coroner would be the most appropriate criminal offences 
to criminalise the identified wrongs and could only be drawn upon if it could be 
proven that the defendant hid the dead body of a baby to prevent her further 
criminal offending from being discovered.  Other behaviour that can be identified 
as morally wrong is either captured by lesser criminal offences, or does not 
                                             
1 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vict. c.100) s58. 
2 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (19 and 20, Geo.5, c.34). 
3 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vict. c.100) s60. 
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warrant criminalisation, as my analysis in Chapter 6 concludes.  Similarly, in 
relation to the offence of procuring a miscarriage, and by extension child 
destruction, in the cases analysed here, the law is being applied to fulfil the 
function of a foetal homicide offence.  As was clearly outlined by the judge in 
Hayley’s case, the wrong identified and deemed to warrant criminalisation was 
ending the life of her foetus.  The offence of procuring a miscarriage does 
capture such behaviour and label it as criminal.  However, my analysis 
concludes that this offence is inappropriate to capture the identified criminal 
wrong in Hayley’s case.  When read in conjunction with the Abortion Act 19674, 
s58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 does not suggest that abortion 
is a moral wrong that should be condemned at all stages of gestation.  Instead, it 
considers abortion a serious wrong when not carried out under medical 
supervision according to the best medical practice of the 1960s.  As Sheldon 
(2016b) concludes, the legislation is out-dated and acts to stigmatise women 
and hinder professionals who conduct the medical procedure.  Consequently, 
there is strong argument to advocate that abortion should be removed from the 
criminal law (We Trust Women, 2016).  Similarly, as the offence of child 
destruction has only ever been used as an extension of abortion legislation 
(Sheldon, 2016b), this offence would seem to be similarly obsolete within 
modern criminal law.   
 
There may be strong public, legal and political support to protect foetal life and to 
criminalise those who threaten it, including pregnant women.  It is not the 
intention of this thesis to suggest otherwise.  However, following analysis of the 
                                             
4 c.87. 
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application of law, I advocate that any intention within law to specifically protect 
foetal life from harm, including unlawful killing, should be clearly outlined by 
legislation enacted by Parliament.  As I have argued throughout the thesis, 
English law has steadfastly maintained the legal principle of the born alive rule.  
On this basis, Hayley’s actions cannot be interpreted as an unlawful killing, as 
there is no evidence of live-birth.  If the protection of foetal life is the aim of the 
law then it would be appropriate for legislators to enact statute to this effect.  
Enactment of such legislation would clearly demonstrate intent to protect the 
foetus, signifying that any person who intentionally attempts to harm a foetus 
has broken the law.  Thus, one contribution of this thesis is to provide evidence 
that advocates the repeal of the criminal offences of concealment of birth, 
procuring a miscarriage, and child destruction.  Foetal homicide laws may offer a 
practical solution to the problem of women causing harm to their foetuses, 
however my analysis in Chapter 7 illustrates some of the difficulties such laws 
have created in the US brings the appropriateness of these laws into question.  
This will be discussed in more detail below.  
Implications of research 
This research has provided a new perspective on the study of maternal newborn 
child killing.  Neonaticide as an area of study has received a large amount of 
attention from scholars, as has maternal obligation to the foetus and criminal 
liability for causing harm.  I am one of the few scholars to bring these two areas 
of study together.  Oberman (1992) and Flavin (2009) have also brought these 
two areas together, but with a specific focus on the violation of women’s 
reproductive rights.  Within this study I have proposed a reconceptualisation of 
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the killing of newborn children; developing the terminology ‘suspicious perinatal 
death’.  My research has implications for child protection services.  While child 
protection services already focus their attention on pregnant women and the risk 
they pose to their unborn child (Cox, 2012), my research suggests a more 
holistic approach is required to ensure safety for unborn children.  As argued in 
this thesis, the women in the cases in the sample were extremely vulnerable.  
Protection of these perinates would have been achieved not through increased 
surveillance of all women of childbearing age to prevent concealed/denied 
pregnancies as some scholars suggest (Jenkins et al., 2011; Kaplan and 
Grotowski, 1996), but through greater concern with the provision of services and 
support for vulnerable women.   
 
While it was not the aim of this research to develop feminist theory of violent and 
offending women, this study does have implications on feminist theory.  The 
findings here support those argued by numerous, eminent feminist scholars – 
female offenders are often vulnerable; their offending is often a response to the 
context of their lives; and their behaviour is judged alongside gendered 
stereotypes (Carlen, 1983, 2002; Worrall, 1990, 2002; Eaton, 1986; Edwards, 
1984; Lloyd, 1995; Hudson, 2002).  The success of feminists’ research to bring 
these issues to the fore and to have impact on the lives of offending women is 
questionable, as female prison rates have increased and women’s victimisation 
continues to be high (Snider, 2003; Annison et al., 2015; Milne et al., 
Forthcoming).  Nevertheless, women’s offending and punishment remains an 
important area of study from criminologists due to the impact it has on women’s 
lives.  This research makes a valuable contribution to this body of work, 
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providing further evidence for a need to contextualise women’s criminality by 
looking more broadly at their life experiences, and to consider responses by 
criminal justice and other regulatory social institutions accordingly.  
 
From a legal standpoint, this thesis offers one of the first critical assessments of 
the application of the law in relation to suspicious perinatal deaths; analysing 
laws surrounding newborn child homicide and abortion.  My findings have 
implications in terms of the suitability of the law, and also how that law is applied.  
As already argued, one of the key implications of this research, that has 
developed directly from my analysis, is evidence to support the repeal of three 
criminal offences from the law – concealment of birth, procuring a miscarriage 
and child destruction.  However, my analysis of these seven English cases of 
suspected perinatal killing, and of the developments of law leads to further 
implications for the role of law and future legal developments.  These will be 
briefly discussed. 
Role of law 
One of the broader implications of my research is the role of law in cases of 
suspicious perinatal death, such as those analysed in this sample.  The decision 
to prosecute a suspect is discretionary in England.  A two-staged test is used to 
determine if prosecution will go ahead – the evidential stage, and the public 
interest stage (Crown Prosecution Service, 2013).  As noted in Chapter 6, a 
number of the cases in the sample appeared to not meet the evidentiary 
requirements, but the Crown was not required to prove their cases due to the 
entrance of guilty pleas.  Furthermore, the use of certain criminal laws appears 
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to go beyond the scope of the intention of legislation, at least in some cases.  
However, the question here lies in the public interest of prosecuting these cases.  
A critical assessment of the Crown Prosecution Service (hereafter ‘CPS’) code is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  Nevertheless, I believe it is reasonable to 
question what merit lies in prosecuting women involved in cases of suspicious 
perinatal death.  As outlined in Chapter 5, all seven women experienced a crisis 
pregnancy, which appears to have affected their behaviour throughout their 
pregnancies and in the post-partum period.  Therefore, culpability for their 
actions is questionable.  The nature of the offences committed can be 
interpreted as ‘serious’, and the victims were aged under 18 at the time, both 
considerations of public interest.  However, prosecutions of these women are 
unlikely to act as a deterrent to others, as the judge suggests in Hayley’s case 
during the sentencing hearing.  Women do not purposefully get pregnant to 
facilitate a concealment/denial allowing them to be in a positon to cause the 
death of the foetus/child.  Such cases occur out of the circumstances of these 
women’s lives.  While other reasons exist to prosecute, notably the public focus 
on child abuse and homicide, I feel the contextual factors of these cases 
warrants scrutiny of the response by the criminal justice system. 
 
One way of conceptualising cases of suspicious perinatal deaths and the role of 
criminal law is to consider a social justice perspective.  Reproductive justice 
developed as a social justice movement that emphasised the intersection of 
social identities with community-developed solutions to structural inequalities 
(Luna and Luker, 2013).  The movement specifically rejects the notion of 
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‘choice’, particularly in relation to abortion and Roe v Wade,5 advocating that the 
concept of choosing to have an abortion privatises that decision and, by 
extension, the decision to parent, thereby legitimising a minimal state response 
to the problems faced by pregnant women and the social support provided for 
poor parents (West, 2009).  The movement was developed by feminists in the 
US, particularly feminists of colour, who argued that their personal 
circumstances – poverty and racial discrimination, meant that for them the legal 
choice to have an abortion would not mean they had reproductive rights.  
Instead they argued that the state has a responsibility to facilitate women to 
make choices about their reproductive functions, this includes addressing the 
structural factors that challenge the decision to keep a pregnancy – access to 
healthcare, childcare, housing, jobs that pay a living wage (Nelson, 2003; 
Roberts, 1997; Ehrenreich, 2008; Fried, 1990; Davis, 1990; Gurr, 2015; 
Petchesky and Judd, 1998).  As Flavin (2009) argues, 
Reproductive rights encompass the right to mother and the right to provide 
for healthy children by meeting not only their physical needs but also their 
educational, emotional, and social needs (2009: 2-3).  
 
Women involved in cases of suspicious perinatal death do not act, or fail to act, 
in a vacuum.  As Oberman (2003b) argues, maternal filicide is deeply embedded 
in and responsive to the society in which it occurs (Vellut et al., 2012; Ayres, 
2007; Flavin, 2009).  These scholars argue that there is a collective 
responsibility held by society for the actions of these women and the 
consequential deaths of their foetuses/children.  None of the women in the 
sample can be said to have full reproductive rights as outlined by reproductive 
                                             
5 410 US 113 – Supreme Court 1973. 
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justice advocates.  If they did, then a crisis pregnancy may not have occurred as 
social support would have redressed the difficulties that resulted in the 
pregnancy being perceived as a crisis.  Within this context, it is important to ask 
what function criminal prosecution and conviction serves.  There is insufficient 
space to consider this question in any depth here; however, the findings from 
this thesis highlight the need for an analysis of prosecutors’ decisions.  As stated 
in Chapter 1 – methodology, the CPS were unprepared to engage with this 
research.  The findings from this study support a review of prosecutorial 
decisions in cases of suspected perinatal killing to assess the appropriateness of 
the decision to prosecute, the consistency in response to such cases, and how 
the woman’s crisis pregnancy is understood and used as evidence in her cases.  
 
A consideration of the offence of infanticide is useful here.  The 1922 Infanticide 
Act6 could be interpreted as an unofficial compensatory measure to counteract 
one aspect of women’s lack of reproductive justice.  As discussed in Chapter 4, 
juries during the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries were reluctant to 
convict unmarried women suspected of killing newborn children, as they were 
perceived to be acting out of desperation due to the social prohibition of bearing 
a child outside marriage.  The 1922 Infanticide Act formalised lenient treatment, 
and the 1938 Act7 extended it to women who killed their infants up to the age of 
one year – recognising other socio-economic causes of maternal infant filicide 
(O'Donovan, 1984; Brennan, 2013a; Ward, 1999).  While neither Infanticide Act 
aimed to address the inequalities faced by women in relation to pregnancy and 
childrearing, they acknowledged those difficulties and provided official means to 
                                             
6 12 and 13 Geo 5 c.18. 
7 1 and 2 Geo.6, c.36. 
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curb punishment for the negative consequences of this lack of rights, albeit using 
medicalisation as its formal justification for leniency.  Feminist critiques of the 
offence of infanticide demonstrate that the leniency of infanticide is not available 
equally to all women, but is reserved to those whose behaviour and persona fall 
within the confines of the ideologies of the myths of motherhood (Morris and 
Wilczynski, 1993b).  And as the analysis I have presented in this thesis shows, 
the principles of the born alive rule prevent women from availing themselves of 
the leniency in instances where no evidence exists that their child was not born 
alive, such as Hayley’s case in this sample.  Therefore, while the offence of 
infanticide is not a substitution for reproductive justice for all women, it does 
have its function in providing leniency for some women and so confer a minimal 
form of compensation for those who can benefit from its protection.  In an ideal 
world, the infanticide offence would be scrapped and all women would 
experience reproductive justice, potentially reducing the number of crisis 
pregnancies and therefore the number of suspected perinatal killings.  In the 
meantime, the Infanticide Act 1938 appears to offer a compensatory measure to 
those women who can avail themselves of its leniency, and it therefore remains 
an important measure in criminal law.  One only needs to look to the US and the 
harsh punishments experienced by some women due to the lack of an 
equivalent offence to appreciate the benefit of the Infanticide Act 1938 (Ayres, 
2007; Barton, 1998; Fazio and Comito, 1999; Maier-Katkin and Ogle, 1997; 
Oberman, 1996).   
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Future direction of the law 
My analysis raises significant questions as to the protection that should be 
offered to the foetus and subsequently the future direction of criminal law to 
regulate women’s behaviour in the perinatal period.  As described in Chapter 7, 
many American pro-choice feminists have been vocal in their opposition to foetal 
protection laws, advocating that these laws serve to undermine a woman’s right 
to choose.  While public support for the prosecution of women who cause harm 
to their foetuses is uncertain (Murphy, 2014), there is large support amongst the 
US public for foetal homicide laws that criminalise third parties who attack 
pregnant women (Ramsey, 2006: 729-30).  Ramsey (2006) is one feminist 
scholar who advocates for foetal protection laws.  She argues that, whether we 
like it or not or believe it is good, the foetus is seen as a baby that has not yet 
been born and as a consequence, some women (and other people she knows) 
will mourn the loss of that foetus if it dies.  As such, Ramsey argues that harm 
that comes to a foetus as a result of a third party attack should be punished.  
However, she maintains foetal protection laws should be amended to ensure 
that women cannot be criminalised for their actions while pregnant, nor should 
they interfere with the right to end a pregnancy.  I reached the same conclusion 
following my analysis of foetal protection laws in Chapter 7.  
 
While it is unclear how widespread support for foetal homicide laws would be in 
the UK, as I am unaware of any poll asking such questions, cases before the 
courts would indicate that support does exists, such as the decision in the 
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Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994)8 (hereafter ‘A-G Ref’) and in cases 
such as Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v First-tier Tribunal,9 analysed 
in Chapter 4.  Public health messages also support foetal health, such as the 
message about the Zika virus (Public Health England, 2016), and a report into 
preconception health, commissioned by NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde (Sher, 
2016).  The report advocated that all women of childbearing age should be 
asked whether there is a reasonable chance they will start a pregnancy this 
year.  The suggested advice to be given to women who answer ‘yes’ is that they 
should give up harmful substances – drinking alcohol, smoking, taking drugs; 
should lose weight; leave violent and abusive partners; and avoid exposure to 
radiation and illnesses such as HIV, diabetes, rubella and the Zika virus.  
However, the report also acknowledged that approximately 50% of pregnancies 
are unplanned (Sher, 2016: 12), and so the advice provided by Dr Sher would 
need to be heeded by all women of childbearing age, as if she engaging in 
sexual activity, then there is a reasonable chance she will start a pregnancy.  As 
argued in Chapter 7, general support for the principle that women should put 
their unborn child before their own health and needs must have general support, 
as institutions would be unprepared to advocate such a position if they did not 
believe it would be positively received by wider society.  However, it should be 
noted that Dr Sher’s report was not received without criticism (Yorke, 2016).  
 
The ruling in A-G Ref has left pregnant women open to the possibility of 
prosecution for harm caused to a foetus if born alive, as discussed in Chapter 4 
(Cave, 2004).  Furthermore, as my analysis shows, use of the offences of 
                                             
8 [1998] AC 245; [1997] 3 WLR. 421. 
9 (Social Entitlement Chamber) (British Pregnancy Advisory Service and others intervening) 
[2014] EWCA Civ 1554; [2015] QB 459. 
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concealment of birth, procuring a miscarriage, and child destruction appear to 
operate as unofficial foetal homicide laws, criminalising women who fail to act in 
the foetuses’ best interests, or who act with intent to harm foetuses.  As in the 
US, the burden of public policy relating to foetal health and the weight of criminal 
law is experienced by the most vulnerable.  Considering the direction of public 
policy and criminal law, it may be time to consider changing the law to include 
the foetus as a legal subject.  Certainly, the current principles of the born alive 
rule appears to do little to protect vulnerable women from prosecution, as a 
selection of criminal offences have been used to criminalise women.   
 
If the foetus were to be given a legal personality then it would be essential to 
maintain two important principles, firstly, that a woman has the right to end a 
pregnancy.  Debate still rages as to the moral status of the foetus.  Some 
philosophers argue that foetuses should be protected from conception, 
conservatives argue life begins at conception (Noonan, 1970; Joyce, 1978), and 
potentialists see foetuses as potential human life (Finnis, 1973).  Others argue 
that foetal rights grow with gestational development – gradualists (Feinberg, 
1992; Scott, 2007), and Steinbock (1996), who argues that foetuses are sentient 
in the latter stages of pregnancy so have a right to life form this point.  Finally, 
other scholars argue that foetuses are not equivalent to humans who have been 
born; scholars advocating for personhood argue human beings are those who 
possess consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, the capacity to 
communicate, presence of self-concept, hence excluding a foetus from the 
definition (Warren, 1973; Tooley, 1972; Engelhardt, 1974). Similarly, Dworkin 
(1993) advocates that human life is sacred due to the ‘biographical’ picture 
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captured in the human effort and influence that shapes out lives, a foetus has a 
physical life, but not the personal life-course of an individual.  Nevertheless, as 
Furedi (2016) argues, there is no question over the moral status of a pregnant 
woman – she is a moral person who is conscious and self-aware.  As such a 
woman has priority rights over the foetus, and so she, and she alone, should 
decide whether or not to abort a foetus, due to her rights to bodily integrity and 
autonomy.  As such, access to abortion should be ‘as early as possible and as 
late as necessary’ (Furedi, 2016: 80).  Secondly, foetal protection laws should 
not apply to women, this point is explored below.  By writing into law that a 
woman cannot be prosecuted for harm against her own foetus, the law would 
unequivocally state that women cannot be held criminally liable.  Such a legal 
pronouncement would offer a recognition of the unique situation of a pregnant 
woman, and would recognised the vulnerabilities faced by women due to their 
lack of reproductive justice.  Such a change in law should be accompanied by 
repeal of the statute relating to concealment of birth, procuring a miscarriage and 
child destruction, as argued above.  
 
Removing the born alive rule, a fundamental principle of law, would have 
dramatic consequences on the operation of criminal and civil law, which cannot 
be explored here.  There are potential concerns of the impact of foetal protection 
laws, even if they only target third parties, notably that such laws would identify 
the foetus as a victim of the violent assault, potentially negating the pregnant 
woman who has also been attacked (Tuerkheimer, 2006; Flavin, 2009).  
Therefore, foetal protection laws may not be a perfect solution to the difficulties 
created by the current law.  Nevertheless, the analysis I have provided in this 
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thesis supports a change in law to protect vulnerable women from potentially 
unfair, unjust, and stringent punishments for harm caused to a foetus.  
 
In conjunction with the concept of foetal rights lies the debate as to maternal 
legal obligation and liability for harm.  From my analysis I have concluded that 
there appears to be a strong desire to criminalise women who are perceived to 
fail to put the foetus first and manage the foetus’ health.  However, there is a 
wider debate here as to the level of liability all pregnant women should face if 
they cause harm (not necessarily death) to the foetus due to behaviour and 
actions while pregnant.  Scholars have argued that as women have chosen to 
continue a pregnancy then they have a duty and responsibility to the foetus and 
they should be compelled to act accordingly (Eekelaar, 1988; Dougherty, 1985; 
Greenwood, 1994; Cook, 2002; Robertson, 1996, 1983).  However, for many 
feminists, a woman’s right to bodily integrity and autonomy remains the basis 
under which women should not be held criminally liable for harm against a foetus 
due to actions while pregnant.  Jackson (2001) argues that women have the 
right to make decisions about their lifestyles and medical treatment and this 
should not be impeded by the existence of a pregnancy (Nelson, 2013; Bordo, 
2003; Flavin, 2009; Purdy, 1990; Solinger, 2005; Thomson, 1994).   
 
Feminists have argued that women have a moral duty to protect the foetus 
(Scott, 2002).  However, strong argument is made as to why moral duty should 
not translate into the legal obligation.  Brazier (1999), one of the foremost 
authorities on the bioethics of maternal duty to the foetus, advocates that legal 
requirements for pregnant women to act in the best interests of their foetuses 
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would remove choice and prioritise the needs of the foetus.  Introducing law to 
protect the interests of the foetus would result in undue restrictions on women’s 
liberty, autonomy and privacy over and above restrictions that exist within 
English tort law.  Every choice in a pregnant woman’s life would be subject to 
scrutiny, render her vulnerable to coercion by others.  Consequently, a pregnant 
woman would lose the power to make ‘mothering’ decisions.  Brazier provided 
the example of a woman who is advised by a doctor that a medical procedure is 
required, if legal sanctions were a potential consequence of a woman deciding to 
not follow medical advice then her ability to ‘choose’ to have the procedure are 
removed.  The consequence would be that a pregnant woman would cease to 
be an independent moral actor.  Furthermore, legal sanctions for action that 
causes foetal harm could not be constrained by time (9 months gestation) as a 
woman may not know she is pregnant at the time she conducts the harmful act.  
Therefore any woman of childbearing age would potentially be required to 
monitor her behaviour for the benefit of a foetus, just in case she is pregnant.  
Legal sanctions may also be required when account is taken of the risk of pre-
conception harm, such as men smoking while teenagers, as it reduces the 
strength of sperm (Brazier, 1999).  As such, legal sanctions surrounding moral 
obligation to the foetus would potentially restrict the general liberties of both men 
and women, from childhood through to menopause for women, and for the 
remainder of their lives for men.  Such restrictions cannot, Brazier argues, be 
justified.  While criminal sanctions may only be limited to ‘egregious cases’, if the 
possibility of criminal sanctions existed then it would hang over every woman 
confronted with a difficult choice in pregnancy and at odds with her partner or 
her doctor.  The consequence would be to give the control of pregnancy to 
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others, primarily medical professionals.  Vulnerable women would bear the brunt 
of such measures, as is witnessed in the US.  As Johnsen (1989) argues, legal 
mandate to act in the best interests of a foetus would oblige a woman to make 
herself an incubator throughout pregnancy, sacrificing her obligations to her 
children, husband10 and herself.  Women would be at risk of being legally liable 
for any illness or perceived imperfection in their child.  As the literature explored 
in Chapter 3 outlined, it is often unknown what causes a pregnancy to end with a 
negative outcome.  Similarly, as I argued in Chapter 7, there is little evidence to 
suggest that legal regulation of pregnant women’s behaviour actually works to 
increase the health outcomes of foetuses, with many scholars and medical 
professionals arguing foetal protection laws that target pregnant women lead to 
poorer foetal health, or to the death of the foetus as women seek terminations in 
order to escape prosecution (The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 2014; Center for Reproductive Rights, 2000; Boudreaux and 
Thompson, 2015).   
 
Considering these arguments, it would appear that the best result for women, 
foetuses and society would be to not hold women to account for harm they 
commit towards their foetuses.  Removal of the offences of concealment of birth, 
procuring a miscarriage, and child destruction, and enactment of foetal 
protection laws with clear exceptions for maternal liability, would mean that a 
woman could not be held criminally liable for harming her foetus, even if she 
acted with intent to kill the foetus in the very late stages of pregnancy, as it is 
believed Hayley did.  Under such changes in law, neither Hayley nor Sally would 
                                             
10 Johnsen’s specific reference to ‘husband’ should be understood more broadly to include any 
partner, regardless of marital status or sex/gender.  
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not have committed a criminal offence.  Such a conclusion will be considered 
unthinkable to many, as Ramsey (2006) states, the foetus is considered a child 
in wider society.  It does, on the face of it, seem perverse to punish a woman for 
killing a child that has been born, but not a child that is unborn.  Nevertheless, it 
is important to consider the consequences of holding women to account – as 
outlined above.  One potential solution would be to only hold women criminally 
liable if they demonstrate intent to kill the foetus; but it seems unlikely that such 
a provision would be able to operate without infringing upon a woman’s right to 
have an abortion.  The cases analysed in this study can be understood as 
‘typical’ cases of suspect perinatal killing.  Women involved in these cases are 
vulnerable and appear to be acting out of desperation.  As already noted, the 
purpose of prosecution is questionable on a basis of public interest, particularly 
when considering the cases in light of the theory of reproductive justice.  
Changing the law to specifically exclude women from criminal liability for harm to 
a foetus would formalise an acknowledgement that women do not have 
reproductive justice, making them vulnerable and therefore leniency could be 
shown.  As argued in this thesis, decisions as to whether women should be held 
liable for harm towards a foetus must only be made by elected officials and 
mandated in statute.  Nevertheless, analysis provided here offers a strong case 
to promote immunity.  
Revisiting perceptions of motherhood 
The final implication of this thesis, lies in the relationship between the myths of 
motherhood and cases of suspicious perinatal death.  As argued in Chapter 5, 
the seven women are judged according to images of the ideal mother, which are 
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informed by the myths of motherhood.  They have all failed to be the ‘good’ 
mother.  As many feminists have argued, the myths of motherhood maintain that 
women should put their children first, this expectation seeps into the perceived 
behavioural requirements of pregnant women (Glenn, 1994; Hays, 1996; 
Douglas and Michaels, 2005; Lupton, 2011; Gregg, 1995; Harper and Rail, 
2012).  As I illustrated in Chapter 6, it was subtly suggested in the court hearings 
of a number of the women, that if they were unprepared to be mothers then they 
should not have engaged in sexual activity and so not have risked becoming 
pregnant.  Public health messages, such as those produced by the US Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (2016) and Sher (2016), also appear to 
suggest that women’s behaviour should be moderated in favour of a good 
outcome for the foetus, if this is unachievable then women should refrain from 
becoming pregnant – presumably by taking long-term contraception which has 
lower failure rates, or by not engaging in sexual activity.  The role of 
contraception in this debate cannot be explored here.  However, it is important to 
note that the negative impacts of many contraceptive methods on women’s 
physical, mental, and emotional health is rarely considered in public health 
messages such as those provided by the CDC and Sher (Petchesky, 1990; 
Albury, 1999; Hardon, 1994; Hoggart and Newton, 2013; Kimport, 2017; 
Littlejohn, 2013; Mills and Barclay, 2006).  Following publication of Sher’s (2016) 
report, one commentator noted ‘So now pregnancy is a prize for women who 
lead a “good life”’ (Williams, 2016).  As I concluded from the review of literature 
examined in Chapter 3, the burden of pregnancy on women is onerous.  This 
thesis illustrates that failure to conform to the expectations purported by the 
myths of motherhood and becoming pregnant while failing to lead a ‘good life’, 
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can and does result in criminalisation for vulnerable women.  The role of the 
criminal justice system in these cases works to strengthen and perpetuate the 
myths of motherhood and expectations of all pregnant women, with the most 
vulnerable being subjected to punishment for their failures.  
Implications for future research 
This research has opened up the field of analysis in this area of criminal law and 
in the field of social regulation of pregnancy and motherhood.  There is more 
work to be done to further explore the points raised above.  Research needs to 
be undertaken to consider the role of criminal law in cases of suspicious 
perinatal death, preferably in conjunction with the CPS.  This is the direction that 
I intend to take my research, drawing on previously unused data, the Homicide 
Index, interviews with police forces, barristers and solicitors and judges, and 
ideally with the CPS.  Therefore, involvement of the Government, notably the 
Ministry of Justice, would be crucial for this research to proceed. 
 
Further work in the areas of bioethics and legal philosophy is needed to consider 
the implications of removing the born alive principle and creating foetal homicide 
legislation.  As my analysis in Chapter 7 outlines, such changes in law could 
have dramatic consequences on the rights of women to access abortion and to 
control and regulate their bodies.  However, as my analysis in Chapter 6 and in 
this chapter concludes, the current situation for women is ambiguous.  As is 
evident from this research, the law as it stands can result in vulnerable women 
being criminalised for failure to put the foetus first, if the foetus/baby dies.  
Women may also face prosecution if the foetus is born alive and dies.  Unless 
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the born alive principle is swept away, or legislation clearly outlines that women 
cannot be held liable for harm caused to the foetus, women’s autonomy remains 
at risk.  Following domestic UK political developments in 2017, it seems unlikely 
that women’s reproductive rights will feature on the political agenda in the 
foreseeable future.  The increased influence of the Democratic Unionist Party in 
British politics following the election on June 8th, 2017, has the potential to limit 
any positive developments in women’s reproductive rights, as they have clearly 
demonstrated opposition to a woman’s right to choose (O’Brien, 2017; Saul, 
2017).  In the US, the Trump administration, given its conservative support base, 
may also mean that the best we can hope for is that we do not lose any ground 
over the next decade (Kristof, 2017). 
 
This research has added to the significant body of feminist literature relating to 
the perceptions of motherhood and pregnancy.  It demonstrates how such 
expectations permeate the law and its application, even if the legal principle of 
the born alive rule should technically prevent such use of criminal sanctions.  
Despite substantial social change, the role of modern women continues to centre 
around their reproductive function.  Failure to conform to the expected norms of 
idealised motherhood has gruelling consequences for all women; for the most 
vulnerable, these consequences are punitive in nature.  From the cases 
analysed in this thesis, it seems we care more for the myths of motherhood than 
we do for the wellbeing of women.  
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during first stage of data collection 
Table 7 List of cases identified during first stage of data collection. 
Case 
No. 
PhD 
Case 
Study 
How 
identified 
as 
potential 
case 
Age of 
child 
Offence 
(conviction 
secured 
unless 
stated 
otherwise) 
SCR 
Document(s) 
Request 
court 
transcript 
1 Yes Google 
search 
while 
looking for 
a different 
case 
Neonate/ 
perinate 
– unclear 
if born 
alive 
Concealment Unable to 
locate SCR 
Only given 
permission 
to view 
sentencing 
remarks 
2 No SCR Neonate/ 
perinate 
– unclear 
if born 
alive 
Concealment Executive 
summary 
Unavailable 
as tapes 
destroyed 
3 No SCR Neonate 
– born 
alive 
Murder - not 
guilty 
Executive 
summary 
(overview 
report could 
be viewed in 
the office of 
the LSCB) 
Unavailable 
as tapes 
destroyed 
4 No SCR Neonate 
– born 
alive 
Concealment Executive 
summary 
Unavailable 
as tapes 
destroyed 
5 No SCR Neonate 
– born 
alive 
Infanticide - 
not guilty 
Executive 
summary 
Did not 
apply as 
case 
occurred 
outside of 
England 
and Wales 
legal 
jurisdiction 
6 No SCR Neonate 
– born 
alive 
Infanticide Executive 
summary 
Unavailable 
as tapes 
destroyed 
7 Yes SCR Neonate 
– born 
alive 
Cruelty to a 
person under 
16 and 
Executive 
Summary and 
Overview 
Prosecution 
opening of 
facts, 
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Case 
No. 
PhD 
Case 
Study 
How 
identified 
as 
potential 
case 
Age of 
child 
Offence 
(conviction 
secured 
unless 
stated 
otherwise) 
SCR 
Document(s) 
Request 
court 
transcript 
endeavoring 
to conceal the 
birth of a child 
Report mitigation 
and 
sentencing 
remarks 
8 Yes Google 
news alert 
for 
infanticide 
Neonate 
– born 
alive 
Infanticide Executive 
Summary and 
Overview 
Report 
Sentencing 
remarks 
9 No SCR Neonate 
– 
possibly 
born 
alive, but 
limited 
detail in 
the SCR 
does not 
make 
this 
clear. 
Unknown – 
excluded as 
unable to 
determine if 
criminal 
investigation 
occurred 
Executive 
summary 
Not enough 
information 
about the 
case to 
identify a 
court 
hearing 
10 No SCR 4.5 
months 
Infanticide Executive 
summary 
Permission 
granted 
11 No SCR 10 days Infanticide Executive 
Summary and 
Overview 
Report 
Sentencing 
remarks 
12 No SCR 7 months Infanticide Executive 
Summary and 
Overview 
Report 
Permission 
granted 
13 No News 
reports 
6 weeks Infanticide Overview 
Report 
Prosecution 
opening of 
facts, 
mitigation 
and 
sentencing 
remarks 
14 No News 
reports 
7 months Infanticide No SCR 
published at 
time of data 
collection 
Prosecution 
opening of 
facts, 
mitigation 
and 
sentencing 
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Case 
No. 
PhD 
Case 
Study 
How 
identified 
as 
potential 
case 
Age of 
child 
Offence 
(conviction 
secured 
unless 
stated 
otherwise) 
SCR 
Document(s) 
Request 
court 
transcript 
remarks 
15 No Google 
search 
while 
looking for 
a different 
case 
‘A few 
weeks 
old’ 
Infanticide 
and ‘serious 
assault’ on a 
second baby 
Unable to 
locate SCR 
Permission 
granted 
16 No SCR 1 month Attempted 
infanticide 
Executive 
summary 
Transcript 
unavailable, 
tapes 
destroyed. 
17 No SCR 4 months Murder - 
found not 
guilty 
Executive 
summary 
No 
sentencing 
remarks 
available 
18 No News 
reports 
11 
months 
Murder Executive 
Summary and 
Overview 
Report 
Sentencing 
remarks and 
sentencing 
appeal 
19 No Google 
search 
while 
looking for 
a different 
case 
10 
months 
Murder - 
judge 
acquitted 
Unable to 
locate SCR 
No 
sentencing 
remarks 
available 
20 No SCR 20 days 
(approx.) 
Attempted 
murder 
Overview 
Report 
Unable to 
locate 
details of 
case via 
Google 
search 
21 No SCR 8 months Attempted 
murder 
Executive 
summary 
Unable to 
locate 
details of 
case via 
Google 
search 
22 No Google 
search 
while 
looking for 
a different 
case 
6 months Manslaughter Unable to 
locate SCR 
Permission 
granted 
23 No SCR 3 months Manslaughter Executive Permission 
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Case 
No. 
PhD 
Case 
Study 
How 
identified 
as 
potential 
case 
Age of 
child 
Offence 
(conviction 
secured 
unless 
stated 
otherwise) 
SCR 
Document(s) 
Request 
court 
transcript 
summary granted 
24 No SCR 4 months 
& toddler 
Manslaughter Executive 
summary 
Prosecution 
opening of 
facts, 
mitigation 
and 
sentencing 
remarks 
25 No SCR 11 
months 
Manslaughter Executive 
summary 
Permission 
granted 
26 No SCR 6 weeks Child Cruelty Executive 
summary 
Did not 
apply 
27 No SCR 10 
months 
Causing or 
allowing the 
death of a 
child 
Executive 
summary 
Did not 
apply 
28 No SCR 6 months Neglect Executive 
Summary and 
Overview 
Report 
Unable to 
locate 
details of 
case via 
Google 
search 
29 No SCR 5 months No criminal 
case 
Executive 
summary 
Did not 
apply 
30 No SCR 7 weeks No criminal 
case 
Executive 
summary 
Unable to 
locate 
details of 
case via 
Google 
search 
31 No SCR 8 months administering 
a noxious 
substance 
with intent to 
endanger life 
Executive 
summary 
Did not 
apply 
32 No News 
reports 
Neonate 
– born 
alive 
Infanticide No SCR 
published at 
time of data 
collection 
Did not 
apply – 
case not 
heard until 
after data 
collection 
stage 
33 No News 
reports 
Neonate/ 
perinate 
Initially 
arrested for 
No SCR 
published at 
No 
prosecution 
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Case 
No. 
PhD 
Case 
Study 
How 
identified 
as 
potential 
case 
Age of 
child 
Offence 
(conviction 
secured 
unless 
stated 
otherwise) 
SCR 
Document(s) 
Request 
court 
transcript 
– unclear 
if born 
alive 
murder, 
concealment 
and sexual 
offences, 
later for child 
neglect 
time of data 
collection 
at time of 
data 
collection 
35 No News 
reports 
Neonate 
– born 
alive 
Manslaughter No SCR 
published at 
time of data 
collection 
Did not 
apply– case 
not heard 
until after 
data 
collection 
stage 
36 Yes Google 
search 
while 
looking for 
a different 
case 
Neonate/ 
perinate 
– unclear 
if born 
alive 
Concealment Unable to 
locate SCR 
Prosecution 
opening of 
facts, 
mitigation 
and 
sentencing 
remarks 
37 Yes Google 
search 
while 
looking for 
a different 
case 
Neonate 
– born 
alive 
Child cruelty - 
wilful neglect 
Unable to 
locate SCR 
Sentencing 
remarks 
38 No Google 
search 
while 
looking for 
a different 
case 
11 
months 
manslaughter 
on the 
grounds of 
diminished 
responsibility 
Overview 
report 
Unable to 
access due 
to not being 
able to 
determine in 
which court 
the case 
was heard. 
39 No SCR Neonate Concealment Executive 
summary 
Unable to 
locate 
details of 
case via 
Google 
search 
40 No SCR 6 weeks Allowing the 
death of a 
child 
Executive 
summary 
Permission 
granted 
41 Yes Identified Neonate Infanticide Unable to Prosecution 
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Case 
No. 
PhD 
Case 
Study 
How 
identified 
as 
potential 
case 
Age of 
child 
Offence 
(conviction 
secured 
unless 
stated 
otherwise) 
SCR 
Document(s) 
Request 
court 
transcript 
from 
secondary 
literature 
locate SCR opening of 
facts, 
mitigation 
and 
sentencing 
remarks 
42 No Google 
search 
while 
looking for 
a different 
case 
42-day-
old baby 
Murder Unable to 
locate SCR 
Permission 
granted 
43 No SCR 6 weeks Manslaughter Executive 
summary 
Permission 
granted 
44 No Google 
search 
Neonate Concealment Unable to 
locate SCR 
Unavailable 
no tapes – 
magistrates’ 
court 
45 Yes Google 
search 
Unborn/ 
perinatal 
Procuring a 
miscarriage 
Unable to 
locate SCR 
Prosecution 
opening of 
facts, 
mitigation 
and 
sentencing 
remarks 
46 No News 
reports 
Neonate Charged with 
infanticide, 
manslaughter 
and 
concealment 
No SCR 
published at 
time of data 
collection 
Case not 
heard at 
time of data 
collection 
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Appendix 2 Access to court transcripts 
email 1 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
  
I am writing to request permission to gain access to the transcript of a court 
case.  I would like access to the judge’s sentencing judgement of the below 
case. 
  
Name, aged, Address of defendant. 
Name of Crown Court. 
Date of hearing. 
Conviction. 
Sentence. 
  
If you are happy to provide access to this case could you please provide me with 
the details of the company from which to order the transcript (including contact 
details) and the full reference code which they would need to process the order. 
  
Many thanks for your assistance in advance. 
  
Best wishes, 
  
Emma 
  
Emma Milne 
PhD Student 
Department of Sociology 
University of Essex 
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Appendix 3 Access to court transcripts 
email 2 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
I am writing to request permission to gain access to the transcript of a court 
case.  I would like access to the judge’s sentencing judgement of the below 
case. 
 
Case 
Name, aged, Address of defendant. 
Name of Crown Court. 
Date of hearing. 
Conviction. 
Sentence. 
  
Applicant 
Emma Milne 
emilne@essex.ac.uk 
Department of Sociology 
University of Essex 
Wivenhoe Park 
Colchester CO4 3SQ 
01279870769 
  
Represents a media organisation 
No 
  
Reason for the application 
I am a PhD student studying at the University of Essex.  My supervisors are 
Professor Pete Fussey and Dr Jackie Turton.   One aspect of my PhD is focused 
on women who have been convicted of the charge of [concealment of birth/ 
infanticide/ procuring a miscarriage/ child cruelty].  I wish to view the transcript of 
the judge’s sentencing judgement in order to understand the view of the courts in 
regards to women such as the one involved in this case.  Full information about 
my research can be found on my home page 
(http://www.essex.ac.uk/sociology/staff/profile.aspx?ID=3464).  
  
I have full ethical approval from the University and am fully supported by the 
Department of Sociology, evident in the fact that I have coped in my supervisors 
– they will provide a reference if you wish.  I am following the ethical guidelines 
of the University of Essex and the British Association of Sociology.  
  
My interest in this case is in regards to the events surrounding the offence the 
individual has committed and the response by the criminal justice system.  If this 
case is used in any academic publication, including my PhD, then all names and 
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places will be changed to ensure anonymity of the subject of the case, their 
family, family of the victim and all professionals involved. 
  
Purpose the information is required 
Academic research only. 
  
What use the information will be put 
Academic research and potential academic publication.   All identities and 
locations will be changed to ensure anonymity. 
  
Information under a protocol 
No 
  
Who will pay for the production of any transcript 
My funding body – Consortium of the Humanities and the Arts South-East 
England (CHASE), who are funded by the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC). 
  
Agreement to abide by any restrictions on publication which may apply to 
the case 
Yes 
  
If you require any further information then please contact me. 
  
Best wishes, 
  
Emma 
  
Emma Milne 
PhD Student 
Department of Sociology 
University of Essex 
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Appendix 4 Summary of cases 
Alice 
After feeding and clothing her newborn infant, Alice left her in a carrier bag in a 
park, where she was later found by a member of the public.  Although it was 
initially believed the baby would die of hypothermia, she recovered and was 
released into foster care.  In her mid-twenties at the time, Alice had three other 
children fathered a man with whom she had been in a long-term relationship.  
Following the break-up of that relationship and believing she could not cope with 
a fourth child, Alice concealed her pregnancy and gave birth alone.  She left the 
child in the park, hoping she would be found quickly.  After pleading guilty to 
child cruelty by wilfully abandoning or exposing a child in a manner likely to 
cause the child unnecessary suffering or injury to health, the judge accepted 
evidence from the psychiatrists that Alice was suffering a severe depressive 
episode and from a major depressive disorder.  She was sentenced to 6-months’ 
imprisonment, suspended for two years with supervision.  Although her three 
older children were removed from her care, at the time of sentencing social 
services were working with her to implement a long-term plan to return all four 
children to her care. 
• Sentencing remarks. 
Fiona 
At the age of 16, Fiona gave birth alone, in a public place.  The baby was full-
term and born alive.  She stated that she had no knowledge of her pregnancy 
prior to giving birth.  Following the birth, Fiona stabbed the baby 27 times with a 
penknife.  Media publication of the details of the birth and death were broadcast 
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in the local area.  Fiona’s parents saw the reports and spoke with Fiona who 
acknowledged the baby was hers and she was responsible for the death.  They 
informed the police and sought medical attention for Fiona.  The conclusion of a 
psychiatric assessment that Fiona’s actions were driven by panic and the effects 
of mental and physical shock.  Fiona was indicted with infanticide, she pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to a youth rehabilitation order for 12-months.  
• Full transcript. 
Hannah 
Hannah concealed her pregnancy from her family and gave birth alone in her 
home.  Following her arrest and subsequent medical examination, she told a 
nurse that she passed out following the labour.  The child was born alive and 
died within two hours of birth.  There were no signs of injury to the child and no 
cause of death could be ascertained.  In her mid-twenties, Hannah’s family 
disapproved of her relationship with her boyfriend.  Despite scheduling two 
appointments to terminate the pregnancy, Hannah carried the child to full term.  
The morning after giving birth to the child Hannah left the body in the front 
garden of a friend’s house, who later discovered it.  The police traced Hannah 
through her boyfriend’s DNA.  During her sentencing hearing, her defence 
barrister outlined the cultural pressures faced by Hannah, namely that being 
pregnant out of marriage was unacceptable and so she felt she had no option 
but to keep her pregnancy secret.  Hannah pleaded guilty to concealment and 
child cruelty due to not seeking medical assistance for the child.  She was 
sentenced to 6-months imprisonment, suspended for 2-years. 
• Full transcript. 
• SCR Executive Summary and Overview Report. 
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Hayley 
Hayley first presented at an abortion clinic when she was approximately 30-
weeks pregnant, she was in her early 30s at the time.  Following the discovery 
that she could not access a legal termination of the pregnancy she sought 
means to end the pregnancy.  Hayley’s internet browsing history reveals that she 
purchased misoprostol, a drug used to start labour or cause an abortion, over 
the internet; at the time she was close to, or at, full-term.  Hayley claimed that 
the child was stillborn, the body was never found.  At her trial evidence was 
presented of Hayley’s experience of four previous crisis pregnancies.  She 
pleaded guilty to administering poison with intent to procure a miscarriage.  The 
judge sentenced her to 12- years’ imprisonment with a third off for an early guilty 
plea.  The sentence was appealed and the Court of Appeal ruled the sentence 
was excessive, and that the starting point should be five years.  Honouring the 
sentence reduction for the plea, Hayley was imprisoned for 3½-years. 
• Full transcript. 
• Court of Appeal sentencing hearing transcript. 
Lily 
Lily was in her mid-thirties when she discovered she was pregnant.  Although a 
termination of the pregnancy was scheduled, she did not attend the 
appointment.  Four years later the body of a full-term baby was discovered in the 
grounds a house in which Lily had previously resided.  Identification of Lily’s 
former partner, [Alan], through DNA, followed by a media campaign on the 
BBC’s programme Crime Watch, resulted in Lily being arrested, ten years after 
giving birth to the child.  Lily advised the police that Alan had been abusive and 
controlling and she failed to an abortion for that reason.  Police records and 
hospital admissions demonstrate that their relationship was abusive and violent.  
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Lily stated she gave birth to the baby following an assault by Alan, which 
resulted in stomach pains, bleeding and the baby ‘falling out’.  She told the 
police that she did not bury the body to conceal wrong-doing.  Lily pleaded guilty 
to concealment and preventing the lawful burial of the corpse.  At the same 
hearing, Lily was also indicted for fraudulent offences which involved her 
assuming different identities to gain bank services, property, documents and a 
liquor licence, as well as other crimes of dishonesty.  Lily’s defence barrister 
maintained that all offences committed were done so in the context of domestic 
abuse, and that Lily was acting under the influence of Alan and in fear of him 
and what he may do to her and her young daughter who resided with her.  For 
all indictments, Lily was sentenced to 1- year’s community sentence with 
supervision, she was also required to pay £400 towards the cost of the 
prosecution. 
• Full transcript. 
Sally 
Sally was convicted of four counts of concealing the birth of a child.  While in her 
thirties, Sally gave birth to four babies, all of whom, she claimed, were stillborn.  
Sally hid the bodies in her bedroom.  The pregnancies and births occurred within 
a ten-year period following Sally’s divorce from her second husband, who was 
reportedly violent towards her.  Sally reportedly abused alcohol and marijuana 
during this period, and neglected her three living children from her previous two 
marriages.  The bodies of the dead infants were discovered over ten years after 
the births, and Sally was arrested and charged with four counts of concealment.  
She pleaded guilty and received a community sentence with supervision for a 
period of 2-years. 
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• Sentencing remarks. 
• Court file. 
Tanya 
Tanya gave birth to her child at the age of 16.  Immediately following the birth 
she pushed a tissue into the baby’s airway, suffocating him.  The post-mortem 
concluded that the baby had drawn a breath prior to the tissue being inserted.  
Although Tanya initially informed the police that the child was conceived through 
consensual sexual relations, she later reported to a psychiatrist that she believed 
she had been raped.  The court did not share this opinion.  Tanya’s defence 
barrister advised the court that Tanya’s belief that she had been raped was ‘in 
the context of how it felt in her own mind, rather than in any way seeking to 
suggest now that it was in fact a criminally properly indictable rape’.  At the same 
hearing, Tanya was also charged on a second indictment with perverting the 
course of justice, as she falsely claimed to have been raped.  Tanya pleaded not 
guilty and the matter remains on file not to be proceeded with.  While I cannot 
say for certain that this matter relates to Tanya’s sexual encounter with the man 
who fathered her son, it appears likely.  Regardless of the legal nature of the 
sexual encounter, Tanya experienced flashbacks to the attack and was treated 
for depression (although her GP was unaware of the attack or that she was 
pregnant).  Tanya also experienced flashbacks of the rape during childbirth and 
reported feeling dazed and confused.  She told the psychiatrist that her actions 
in placing the tissue in the baby’s mouth were out of a desire to stop the gurgling 
noise the baby was making following the birth.  Tanya was charged with murder 
and pleaded guilty to infanticide.  The court determined that the balance of 
Tanya’s mind was disturbed at the time she killed the child.  Tanya was 
sentenced to a 24-months’ youth rehabilitation order with supervision. 
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• Full transcript. 
• SCR Executive Summary and Overview Report. 
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Appendix 5 CDC guidelines on alcohol-
expose during pregnancy 
 
Figure 2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance on alcohol-expose during pregnancy, as first 
published.1 
 
 
                                             
1 Accessed from Petri (2016). 
